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1. Introduction 
}َﺎﻧِﺪ'ْ(  َ"#َﺮ ﱢﺼﻟ# ﻢ"َِﻘﺘْﺴُﻤْﻟ,{  
{Guide us in the straight path} 
AL-FĀTIḤA, Q 1: 6 
It is Sunday evening, 5 November 2006, 10.15 p.m. local time in Mecca. A camera captures the 
panorama of a city from the edge of a bridge under which a broad river flows. The silhouettes of red 
house roofs and a pointed church tower stand out on the horizon of the opposite bank. Then the 
images depicts a long drawn arch, until the church tower finally moves into focus. A male voice starts 
off-screen. 
 ﻲﻓ ﺔﻨ#ﺪﻣ !ﺮ#ﺑ ﺔ"ﺪﻨﻠﺘﻜﺳﻻ* !ﺬ# !"# ﺮ"ﺎﻨﻤﻟ' !ﺮﺣﺎﺴﻟ' ﻂﺣ !ﺎﺣﺮﻟ& !ﻮﺘﻛﺪﻟﺎﺑ !ﺎﻤﻋ !"#ﺪﻌﺴﻟ# !ﺗﺮﺳ%& 
ﻞﺒﻗ ﺮﺜﻛ$ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺸﻋ !"ﻮﻨﺳ !ﻮﺸ$ﻌ$ﻟ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺌ#ﺑ ﺖﺴ#ﻟ ﻢ"ﺘﺌ%ﺒﺑ ﺔ"ﻣﻼﺳﻹ'  
In this Scottish town, Perth, endowed with enchanting views, Dr ʿImād al-Saʿdāwī 
and his family settled down more than ten years ago to live in an environment 
that is not their Islamic environment. 
For a moment, the church gable appears in the image close-up. This is followed by a jump cut to the 
profile of a man sitting at the wheel of a car. Whitewashed facades of houses pass behind green 
bushes along the edge of the road. The next shot is the river again, this time in close-up. Waves and 
whirlpools curl its surface. 
ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﺔ"#ﺪﺒﻟ# ﺔﺒﻌﺻ !"ﺎﺨﻤﻟﺎﻓ ﻢ"ﺘﺑﺎﺘﻧ' ﻦﻣ ﻞﻛ ﺔ"ﺟ ﻖﻠﻘﻟ%& ﻢ"#$ﺎﺳ !ﺄﺸﺑ ﺔﺌﺸﻨﺗ ﻢ"ﺋﺎﻨﺑ' ﻖ"ﻓﻮﺘﻟ'( ﻦ"ﺑ 
ﻚﺴﻤﺘﻟ& ﻢ"ﺘﻓﺎﻘﺜﺑ ﺶ"ﺎﻌﺘﻟ'( ﻊﻣ ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ& ﻲﺑﺮﻐﻟ&  
The beginning was hard. Fears afflicted them from every side, and concerns 
assaulted them about the education of their children and the compromise between 
adherence to their culture and coexistence with Western society. 
Dr al-Saʿdāwī gets out of his car. A boy hurries towards him and stretches out his hand. The doctor 
gently pulls him to him, bends down and kisses him on the cheek: a picture of family intimacy. 
[R.و ?9 Y\X. نأ ت#cو ة0>أ رF*G#.ا د?-D ?V*.?m :; n9?!05 6B80Z.ا ة?(o.او يP.ا ر?!أ _80p.ا ?V9?9أ.  
However, it was not long before the family of Dr ʿImād al-Saʿdāwī found the object 
of their long-cherished desire (ḍālla) in the programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt, 
which illuminated the way (ṭarīq) before them. 
Global flows of persons, objects, images and ideas have unsettled and reconfigured many of 
the intimate ties that bound society to territory, culture to place and religion to region in a 
now distant – and presumedly more sedentary – past.1 At the same time, new scapes of 
ideology, technology, finance and media have emerged, and have established novel 
territories, collective identities and individual desires that cut across the imaginary 
boundaries of postcolonial nation–states.2 The visible appearance of Muslim actors in these 
transnational territories has not only disturbed prior sensibilities and understandings of 
Islam and Muslim identity, as some scholars have pointedly remarked.3 It has also brought 
into question many supposedly unquestionable ideas, profound convictions and 
teleological narratives of secularism, modernity and the liberal public in so-called 
“Western” societies.4 The female body, gendered identities, sexuality, marriage and the 
1 Academic research on the different dimensions of globalization has multiplied since the 1990s (Steger et al. 
2014). A central analytical contribution, on which my introductory statement draws, has been made by Arjun 
Appadurai (1996) and his notion of scapes as cultural and deterritorialized spaces that enable the global 
exchange of persons, objects and ideas. For a lucid overview on the genealogy of globalization and the career 
of the concept, see the essay by James and Steger (2014) published in the journal Globalizations, as well as their 
subsequent interviews with some major contributors to the debate, including Appadurai (2014), Roland 
Robertson (2014), David Held (2014), Saskia Sassen (2014), Joseph E. Stiglitz (2014) and Jonathan Friedman 
(2014). For an early and much referenced study on the effects of globalization on Islam, see Roy 2002. 
2 Appadurai 1996. 
3 See e.g. Göle 2002; Roy 2002. 
4 The inverted commas indicate the problematization of the “West” as an ontological category that is 
naturally set apart from its Other, the “Orient” (Said 1978). For two analytical approaches that seek to de-
essentialize and overcome these categories, see Shalini Randeria’s notion of “entangled history” (1999; 
Conrad/Randeria 2002) and Werner and Zimmermann’s reflections on histoire croisée (2002; 2004; 2006). 
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family have evolved in this process into major sites at which different projects for claiming 
and inhabiting these unsettled territories meet.5 
The Islamic scholar and activist Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) has become one of the 
most visible religious authorities in this transnational public during the past two decades.6 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s visibility is closely related to his long-term affiliation to numerous 
influential institutions like the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwān al-muslimūn), the 
International Union of Muslim Scholars (al-ittiḥād al-ʿālamī li-ʿulamāʾ al-muslimīn) and the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research (al-majlis al-ūrūbī li-l-iftāʾ wa-l-buḥūth).7 But it is 
above all his numerous books translated into various languages, his early embracing of the 
Internet and not least his regular appearances on the transnational satellite television 
channel Al Jazeera Arabic that have established him as a global authority whose teachings 
and legal opinions (fatāwā, sg. fatwā) among millions of viewers and readers worldwide.8 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s ongoing visibility in this transnational public sphere contradicts 
many predictions about the emergence of new media technologies and the fate of Muslim 
authority that Western academic scholarship has proposed over the past two decades. This 
scholarship has assumed two opposite and indeed, as the anthropologist Charles 
Hirschkind has pointedly remarked, contradictory beliefs in regard to the question of the 
impact of new media technologies on religious authority: one deliberative and one 
disciplinary.9 The first assumption is associated with the work of anthropologists such as 
                                                        
5 Seminal studies of colonial, (secular) nationalist or religious fundamentalist engagements with gender 
include Sangari et al. 1989; Kandiyoti 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997; Göle 1997; Abu-Lughod 1998. 
6 For an overview of al-Qaraḍāwī’s biography, see chapter 3 of this prologue, as well as Kursawe 2003; Wenzel-
Teuber 2005: 35–47; Krämer 2006; Soage 2008; Gräf/Skovgaard-Petersen 2009; Gräf 2010: 102–122; 2013b. 
7 For an overview of these institutions and al-Qaraḍāwī’s affiliation to them, see Tammam 2009: 67-68. 
8 The central role of the media in al-Qaraḍāwī’s popularity was highlighted to me by several interlocutors 
during my field research in Egypt and in Qatar between September 2010 and February 2014. A comprehensive 
list (qāʾima shāmila) of al-Qaraḍāwī’s book publications in Arabic is maintained on his personal website (al-
Qaraḍāwī 2014f). For a historical contextualization of his writings, see Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 39–47; 
Gräf/Skovgaard-Petersen 2009: 4–6; Tammam 2009: 65–67; Gräf 2010: 123–134. For al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement 
with the media, see Skovgaard-Petersen 2004; Gräf 2007; 2008; 2010; Galal 2009. On al-Qaraḍāwī’s minority fiqh 
(fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) and his importance to Muslims in Europe see e.g. Caeiro 2004; Caeiro/al-Saify 2009; Albrecht 
2010; Shavit 2012; Hassan 2013. 
9 Hirschkind 2001: 3. For a fundamental problematization of the (Protestant) conception of a primordial 
immediacy of religion that enables us to measure and evaluate the impact of (new) media on the phenomenon 
in one or the other way, see Meyer 2011. 
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Walter Ong (1982) and Jack Goody (1987), the modernization theorist Daniel Lerner (1958) 
or the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989).10 Drawing on “the conventional histories of the 
Protestant revolution”, this scholarship emphasizes new prospects of contestation, 
argument and dialogue that have been provided by the arrival of modern literacy, print 
and mass media.11 The new “object-like quality” of religious knowledge is presumed to 
propel a “fragmentation”12 and “democratization”13 of religious authority in an emerging 
Muslim public, in which an increasing number of individuals engage with and revise their 
religious traditions.14 
The second assumption, as Hirschkind argues, is to be found in the works of Aziz Al 
Azmeh (1993), Bruno Etienne (1983), Gilles Kepel (1986), Annabelle Sreberny and Ali 
Mohammadi (1994), Olivier Roy (1992) and Emmanuel Sivan (1990).15 These scholars stress 
the ideological or disciplinary aspects of Islamic media, enabling “an extension of 
authoritative religious discourse”.16 Media change thus results less in a public sphere of 
discussion and debate than in one of “subjection to authority as part of a project aimed at 
promoting and securing a uniform model of moral behaviour”.17 
What both perspectives have in common, Hirschkind concludes in his observations, 
is that they identify the public arena constituted by media practices of religious actors 
“either as a deliberative space of argument and contestation between individuals or as a 
normative space for education in community-oriented virtue. The assumption is that the 
more truly deliberate the public is, the weaker its disciplinary function, and vice versa.”18 
Hirschkind subsequently adds a third perspective that dialectically transcends the 
former two assumptions.19 Based on his field research in Cairo, he highlights the pivotal 
role of cassette sermons in an expanding arena of Islamic argumentation and debate – or 
                                                        
10 Lerner 1958; Ong 1982; Goody 1986; Habermas 1989; Hirschkind 2001: 3. 
11 Hirschkind 2001: 3. 
12 Eickelman/Anderson 2003. 
13 Eickelman 2000. 
14 Hirschkind 2001: 3. 
15 Azmeh 1993; Etienne 1983; Hirschkind 2001: 3, 28, n. 2; Kepel 1985; Roy 1992; Sivan 1990; 
Sreberny/Mohammadi 1994. 
16 Hirschkind 2001: 3, 28, n. 2. 
17 Hirschkind 2001: 3. 
18 Hirschkind 2001: 3. 
19 Hirschkind 2001: 4–6. 
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what he calls, taking up a notion by Michael Warner, an “Islamic counterpublic”.20 
Although this counterpublic clearly rests on some of the fundamental assumptions of 
modern publicity, its “conceptual architecture” cuts across liberal distinctions between 
state and society, public and private, authoritative discipline and rational deliberation.21 
Sermon tapes provide the material bedrock of this counterpublic that “has been mapped on 
the national civic arena by Muslim reformists over the course of the last century”.22 Their 
circulation and consumption as “a form of pious entertainment” discipline and hone the 
bodily sensibilities, moral virtues and rational arguments on which this arena crucially 
depends.23 
My research represents at the same time an extension of and a restriction of 
Hirschkind’s argument. Following the suggestion by Alexandre Caeiro to draw “a denser 
landscape of contemporary forms of Islamic piety”, my study focuses on an arena that 
overlaps and transcends the ethical soundscape of Cairo’s “popular neighbourhoods”.24 At 
its centre we find the normative reflections on gender and sexuality in the writings and 
media appearances of al-Qaraḍāwī. 
This topical focus is not incidental. Rather, it reflects the highly prominent place 
that contestations over the nature of gendered relations, sexuality and the family have 
taken in negotiating the place of Islam in recent times.25 As Judith Tucker has shown in her 
seminal work on Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, gender relations have held a 
prominent position in Muslim normative thought for a long time now.26 As Talal Asad has 
pointed out, however, the colonial reconfiguration of the shariʿa has rendered gender 
relations a central site both for the physical and moral (re)production of religion and for 
the religious subject.27 Since the 1970s, in the context of the crisis of the postcolonial 
nation–state and of Third World socialism, and as a result of the politics of (partial) 
                                                        
20 Hirschkind 2001: 4; Warner 2002. 
21 Hirschkind 2001: 4. This argument has been adopted and further developed by Saba Mahmood (2011) in her 
work on the women’s mosque movement in Cairo. I will comment on Mahmood’s contribution, particularly in 
regard to the notion of the subject, below on pp. 15–17. 
22 Hirschkind 2006: 107. 
23 Hirschkind 2006: 121. 
24 Caeiro 2010: 447, n. 26; Hirschkind 2006: 8. 
25 McLarney 2015: 23. 
26 Tucker 1998. 
27 Asad 2003; McLarney 2015: 17. 
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liberalization, gender has been strategically reinvested by a transnational movement in 
which al-Qaraḍāwī has assumed the role of a leading thinker and theorist: the Islamic 
revival.28 
Ellen McLarney has convincingly argued that intellectuals and activists of the 
Islamic revival such as Muḥammad Jalāl al-Kishk (d. 1993), Bint al-Shāṭīʾ (d. 1998), Niʿmat 
Siḍqī, Īmān Muḥammad Muṣtafā and Hiba Raʾūf ʿIzzat have defined gender relations as 
“Islamic territory” by playing on and subverting the secularist state’s “core assumption 
about the separation of church and state and of the private and public”.29 Although these 
thinkers contest the secular divide between “private and public, personal faith and 
politics”, it is ironically the private realm within the logic of secularism that provides them 
a shelter from the encroachments of the secular authoritarian state and “a safe haven for 
opposition discourse”.30 The private sphere of family and gender relations, of female bodies 
and the sexual division of labour, as McLarney concludes in her insightful remarks, turns 
into a sacrosanct and “extrapolitical” space in which religion and Islamic politics have 
become “inordinately invested.” 31 
Al-Qaraḍāwī, as I will argue, provides us with a particular insight into the remaking 
of sexuality and gender relations in the revivalist movement. His contributions to the 
                                                        
28 McLarney 2010; McLarney 2015. The Islamic revival, as Mahmood puts it, refers to a religious ethos and 
sensibility that has a palpable presence in the public sphere. This presence “manifest[s] in the vast 
proliferation of neighbourhood mosques and other institutions of Islamic learning and social welfare […,] a 
brisk consumption and production of religious media and literature, and a growing circle of intellectuals who 
write and comment upon contemporary affairs in the popular press from a self-described Islamic point of 
view” (Mahmood 2011: 3). Al-Qaraḍāwī has published eighteen titles on the Islamic revival or – in a rendering 
closer to the Arabic term – the Islamic awakening (al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyya). On al-Qaraḍāwī’s role as an 
intellectual in the Islamic revival, see Salvatore 1997; Baker 2003; Polka 2003. 
29 McLarney 2015: 18. 
30 McLarney 2015: 19–20. 
31 McLarney 2015: 19–20. Moderate Islamists’ politicization of this extrapolitical space, as I hope to outline, is 
highly contested. On the one hand, they have to develop and defend this space against other Islamist projects, 
that either seek to (re)shift the focus to the arena of politics proper (e.g. Sayyid Quṭb and jihadi Salafism), or 
to enforce their own normative claim on gender relations in a highly competitive public sphere and market of 
ideas that has emerged with Sadat’s policy of economic liberalization since the 1970s (Rock-Singer 2016b). 
This confrontational context is crucial to situate and understand al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement both with gender 
and with the traditional disciplines of Muslim normative thinking at large (see part III). 
  
 
 
12 
revival’s biopolitical project32 are located at a particular juncture at which Islamic 
knowledge (ʿilm), activism and modern media meet. The topic of gender has a long 
genealogy in his writings. In his earliest text in the 1960s, al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām, he 
had already developed some fundamental elements of his thought, which he subsequently 
revisited and refined in his later publications.33 In the late 1970s, he published Nisāʾ 
muʾmināt on the exemplary life of Muslim women in early Islamic history.34 In 1988, he 
released a fatwa collection on or for the Muslim woman.35 
The 1990s witnessed a significant increase in the number of publications dedicated 
to gender-related issues. Many of these publications were explicitly framed as a response to 
the perceived challenges posed by transnational feminism and global gender 
mainstreaming. In 1996, al-Qaraḍāwī published a booklet about the debate on the Islamic 
veil.36 In the same year, he released a short publication on the status of women in Islamic 
life.37 In 1999, he published Zawāj al-misyār.38 In 2004 Muslimat al-ghad appeared,39 followed 
in 2007 by Diyat al-marʾa fī al-sharīʿa al-islāmiyya and al-Ḥukm al-sharʿī fī khitān al-ināth.40 In 
2008, he published al-Usra kamā yurīduhā al-islām.41 And in 2011 his latest publication on the 
                                                        
32 The notion of “biopolitics” (or “bio-politics”) was introduced by Michel Foucault in his lectures at the 
Collège de France (published in 1996) and in La volonté de savoir (1976) in the mid-1970s. According to Foucault, 
it designates a specific form of power that emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century whose strategic 
target and starting point is sexuality. On the one hand, sexuality opens access for this power to the individual 
body, providing it a key to analyse “the smallest details of individual existences”, and bearing in the process 
the very “stamp of individuality” (Foucault 1978: 146). On the other hand, biopolitics renders sexuality a 
central site of population policy, making it “the theme of political operations, economic interventions 
(through incitements to or curbs on procreation), and ideological campaigns for raising standards of morality 
and responsibility” (Foucault 1978: 146). Drawing on Foucault, Ellen McLarney provides an intriguing 
definition of “Islamic biopolitics” as a “ ‘set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of a political strategy, a general strategy of power,’ one that contested the 
biopolitics of the secular state” (McLarney 2015: 5; Foucault 1978: 140). 
33 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 139–216. 
34 al-Qaraḍāwī 1979. 
35 al-Qaraḍāwī 1988a. 
36 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996a. 
37 al-Qaraḍāwī: 1996b. 
38 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999a. 
39 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004a. 
40 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007d; 2007a. 
41 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008a. 
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topic appeared, Ḥayāt al-marʾa al-muslima fī iṭār al-ḥudūd al-sharʿiyya.42 Since the mid-1990s, 
al-Qaraḍāwī has disseminated his normative views on Islamic gender relations in numerous 
public appearances on satellite television and the Internet, in parallel with his publications. 
In al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt, his weekly talk show on Al Jazeera, he has addressed issues relating 
to love, marriage, divorce and family life, child care, women’s liberation, and the equality 
and status of women in Islam, veiling, the visibility of women in private and public, their 
political rights, Islamic feminism, and Islamic gender relations among Muslim minorities in 
the West.43 
The present study investigates al-Qaraḍāwī’s public engagement with Islamic norms 
on gender and sexuality and his contribution to the Islamic revival’s biopolitical project 
from four analytical perspectives. The first perspective inquires into the particular place 
from which al-Qaraḍāwī speaks. Drawing on al-Qaraḍāwī’s extensive memoirs and 
secondary literature, it tries to carve out the extent to which the key events and different 
stages of his life help us to situate and comprehend the lines and ruptures in his normative 
thinking since the 1960s.44 
The second perspective inspects the specific traditions of knowledge (ʿilm) on which 
al-Qaraḍāwī draws in his normative reflections, in which fiqh plays a highly prominent part. 
That is, how are the respective norms established? How are they justified? On which 
textual foundations do they rest? And through which hermeneutical rules and practices are 
they deduced from the authoritative texts? 
The third perspective inquires into the particular materialities45 and media related 
practices through which these norms circulate: the writing and reading of books, the 
asking of and replying to morally and epistemically sound questions and the production 
                                                        
42 al-Qaraḍāwī 2011a. In addition to the publications explicitly listed here, we find numerous references to 
gender-related issues in his publications on other topics; see, for example, al-Qaraḍāwī 1991a; 1993a; 1993b; 
1997a; 2003a; 2009a; 2012a. 
43 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996e; 1997c; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998d; 1998e; 1999f; 1999h; 2000a; 2003b; 2004e; 2004f; 2005a; 
2005b; 2005c; 2006c; 2007a; 2007c; 2007d; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008e; 2008f; 2008h; al-Qaraḍāwī/al-Qarā 
Dāghī 1998. 
44 al-Qaraḍāwī 2002a; 2004b; 2006a; 2011b. 
45 The notion of materiality that I draw on is shaped by a larger discussion that has taken place in the past 
three decades in and across various disciplines, including anthropology, art history, philosophy, literature, 
gender and media studies and, more recently, Islamic studies. For further remarks and references, see the 
discussion below. 
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and consumption of classical and modern media (iʿlām): the Islamic book, terrestrial and 
satellite TV and, more recently, the internet. My focus in this last case is both on al-
Qaraḍāwī’s specific adoption of these media, as well as the repercussions of the inherent 
logic (Eigenlogik) of these media on al-Qaraḍāwī’s discourse on Islamic gender relations. 
The fourth perspective is transversal to the previous two. It inquires into the 
specific subjectivities that this normative discourse seeks to engender, and the particular 
ways these subjectivities are positioned and inscribed into the material bodies of the text – 
that is, the pious reader of the Islamic book, the devout enquirer of the scholarly opinion 
(fatwā) and modern media’s virtuous consumer. 
At this point, a brief theoretical excursus is necessary. Analytical inquiries into 
gender, knowledge and the cultivation of pious subjects in the Islamic revival are not new, 
but have a prominent genealogy in Western academic thought. A central plank has been set 
by Saba Mahmood in her seminal study on the women’s mosque movement in Cairo, for 
whose protagonists al-Qaraḍāwī is an important intellectual reference.46 In her analysis, 
Mahmood critically adopts post-structuralism’s challenge to Enlightenment thought and its 
liberalistic “illusion” of a “rationalist, self-authorizing, transcendental subject” that 
necessarily excludes all that is bodily, feminine, emotional and nonrational.47 At the same 
time, however, she questions post-structuralist feminist notions of subjectivity and their 
underlying analytical framework of power, agency and resistance.48 Her critical point of 
reference is the work of Judith Butler. 
In her seminal study Gender Trouble, Butler deconstructs gender and sexuality as 
presumed natural and prediscursive categories of human male or female identity.49 
According to Butler, neither gender nor the sexed body represent a natural given. Rather, 
they are social and historical products of a binary gender matrix that continuously 
(re)inscribes and (re)maps its normative order onto the male and female body. “Sexed 
nature” and “natural sex”, as she succinctly puts it, are not prediscursively fact, but rather 
the sedimentative effects of “the apparatus of cultural construction”.50 
                                                        
46 Mahmood 2011: 66, 83. 
47 Mahmood 2011: 13. 
48 Mahmood 2011: 14. 
49 Butler 1999. 
50 Butler 1999: 10. 
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This heteronormative order, as Butler maintains, enfolds its power through its 
repetitive enactment.51 Since these repetitions never take place in exactly the same 
context, however, gender’s primary mode of power – its iterative performance – 
simultaneously bears the possibility of resisting and subverting its norms of 
heterosexuality. It is here that Butler locates the possibilities of insubordination, autonomy 
and agency.52 
Mahmood finds fault with Butler’s position of identifying resistance to norms as the 
primary site for the formation of agency and subjectivity.53 Post-structuralist feminism, she 
admonishes, remains trapped inside liberalism’s “binary model of subordination and 
subversion”.54 Drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of power as “a strategic relation of 
force”, she highlights that power is not merely repressive, but also productive of new forms 
of desires, objects and subjectivities.55 Subjects and their agency are not only formed 
through liberatory practices of subverting or resisting social norms, but in the variety of 
ways in which these norms are embodied, lived and inhabited.56 It pertains to the paradox 
of individuals’ subjectivation (assujettissement), she sums up this perspective, that “the 
conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a 
self-conscious identity and agent”.57 
Mahmood’s thoughts on the subjects of norms and her critical indication of non-
liberatory forms of power that engender different kinds of bodies, knowledge and desires 
are inspiring for my own analysis of the Islamic revival’s subjects. Nevertheless, my 
approach departs from her analytical perspective in several regards. This departure 
concerns first – and most obviously – the object of study. Although al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings 
constitute a major point of intellectual reference for the pedagogical circles of Cairo’s pious 
                                                        
51 Butler 1997b. 
52 Butler 2004. 
53 Mahmood 2011: 17–22; Butler 1993; 1997a; 1997b; 1999. 
54 Mahmood 2011: 14. 
55 Mahmood 2011: 17; Foucault 1978; 1980. 
56 Mahmood 2011: 23. 
57 Mahmood 2011: 17; Foucault 1980. 
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mosque movement,58 his writings and public appearances address a transnational audience 
that includes yet clearly transcends the movement’s pedagogical circles. 
Besides this most obvious deviation, my second point of difference concerns 
Mahmood’s notion of the subject and its agency. While I continue to think of the subject as 
a double effect of a power that is simultaneously subordinating and productive, I seek to 
“read” this effect not immediately in the female body – an examination that Mahmood has 
brilliantly carried out – but rather in the media and in the material body of texts. 
Admittedly, it might appear odd to think of the subject not from the angle of the body as 
the major site for its intellectual and moral formation, but from material objects and the 
media themselves. In the past few years, however, several authors in and across various 
disciplines including anthropology, art history, philosophy, literature, gender, media and – 
most recently – Islamic studies have questioned the anthropocentric bias of the humanities 
and social sciences and have sought to overcome the ontological rupture between subject 
and object by highlighting their mutual constitution and the agency of objects in the 
formation of the self.59 
This “material turn” has left an imprint of its own in Islamic studies. Drawing on the 
discipline’s philological tradition and taking inspiration from works on the sociology and 
history of books that have been conducted in other literary and philological disciplines,60 
scholars on the Near and Middle East have recently taken an increased interest in the 
material and social life of texts.61 This re-excavated – or “future”62 – philology transcends 
the analytical framework of pure semiotics and hermeneutical analysis. It draws on the 
                                                        
58 Mahmood 2011: 66, 83. A similar observation has been made by Barbara Stowasser, who is surprised by the 
“old shaykh’s” popularity among the younger generation of Islamic feminists such as the prominent Egyptian 
activist and political scientist Hiba Raʾūf ʿIzzat (Stowasser 2001: 99). 
59 Prominent interlocutors in this “material turn” (that builds on the preceding “linguistic turn”) are, among 
others, Daniel Miller (1987), Arjun Appadurai (1988) and Bruno Latour (1999). For an excellent overview on 
these recent turns in the humanities and social sciences, see Bachmann-Medick 2014. For an earlier discussion 
of the materiality of discourse in Foucault’s work, see Sarasin 2003: 37–46. 
60 A lucid and comprehensive overview on this field has been submitted by Finkelstein and McCleery (2012). 
61 Early contributions that pursue this analytical perspective have been made by Brinkley Messick (1986; 1989; 
1993; 1997). Further studies that cover various aspects of book culture in different regions and historical 
epochs of the Islamicate world have been presented by Heinzelmann and Sievert (2010), Hirschler (2012; 
2016), Klemm et al. (2013), Heinzelmann (2015) and Liebrenz (2016). 
62 Pollock 2009. 
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idea that the physical materiality of texts and their paratextual architecture not only 
constitute the meaning of the texts themselves, but embody particular norms and 
protocols on how to read and how to consume them.63 The text’s material body and its 
liminal devices thus provide us with specific historical insights into social conventions and 
practices of reading, and into the social life of readers whom these texts address or, to use 
Althusser’s term, “interpellate”.64 
My third departure from Mahmood less informs my approach than it represents a 
consequence of my analysis that, I hope, emerges over the course of my argument.65 
Nevertheless, I would like to anticipate it here. By highlighting the difference between the 
Enlightenment notions of a disembodied rationality and the centrality of the body as a site 
of the formation and cultivation of a virtuous self, I think Mahmood partly misses the 
ironic dialectics and paradoxical conjunctures between the moral epistemology of the 
Islamic revival and the secular order it seeks to resist.66 To put it in a nutshell: knowledge 
(ʿilm), rationality (ʿaqliyya) and understanding (fahm) are crucial in al-Qaraḍāwī’s normative 
thoughts on the formation and cultivation of a pious Muslim self. The revival’s subject is 
not only a subject of embodied norms – it is also a subject of knowledge (ʿilm). 
Returning to the analytical perspectives of the present study, the fourfold focus – (a) 
the social and biographical conditions that shape al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings and media 
appearances on Islamic norms on gender and sexuality, (b) the hermeneutic rules and 
epistemic procedures of their production, (c) the specific materiality of their circulation, 
                                                        
63 The classical references here are the works by Roger Chartier (1971; 1985; 1987; 1992) and Gérard Genette 
(1987; 1992). 
64 Althusser 1968. In this perspective, the reader (or listener) represents – to use Foucault’s provocative 
formulation – a function of the text that is inscribed into its liminal devices and its material body. As Roger 
Chartier and Eric D. Friedman have aptly put it, a reader “is always socially defined by the competency, 
conventions, expectations and practices of reading that he shares with others” (Chartier/Friedman 1997: 10). 
These normative conventions are inscribed and reproduced in the physical form of the text. Although the 
history of reading is equiprimordial with the history of writing, the reader still represents the “ ‘missing link’ 
of book history” (Finkelstein/McCleery 2012: 100, 102). Seminal studies in the field that build on, but depart 
from, post-structuralism’s proclaimed “birth of the reader” after the “death of the author” (Barthes 1967) 
include works by Altick (1957), Ginzburg and Aymard (1980), Chartier (1971; 1985; 1987), Genette (1992), Rose 
(1992) and Darnton (1994). For an intriguing analysis on how public texts discursively create their audience, 
see Warner 2002. 
65 See particularly part I, chapter 2, “The Subject of Knowledge”. 
66 This dialectic conjuncture has been presented by McLarney (2015), among others. 
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and (d) particular subjectivities they seek to construct – is pursued across the four parts of 
the dissertation. 
Following this introduction, the second chapter of the prologue seeks to locate my 
own work in the (admittedly extensive) research-scape on al-Qaraḍāwī. This represents an 
obligatory tribute to the rites and conventions of my discipline, and to the important 
accomplishments of other researchers.67 Surprisingly, no English-language monograph on 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s life or work has appeared thus far.68 However many articles have appeared 
which look at particular aspects of his life and his publications. While many of these studies 
provide crucial contributions to our understanding of al-Qaraḍāwī, his thought and his 
involvement with media, none has highlighted his particular adoption of media, and the 
strategic significance of this in a biopolitical project with transnational dimensions.69 Here, 
I hope to draw on notions of power, subjectivity and gender developed by Foucault, Butler 
and Mahmood to provide a new analytical focus on already-researched material, as well as 
to cover more recently published sources.70 
The third chapter of the prologue investigates the specific location that al-Qaraḍāwī 
speaks from, which appears – to a certain degree – representative of the broader condition 
                                                        
67 Unfortunately, critical self-reflections on these rites and conventions that aspirants and candidates in the 
German tradition of Oriental studies are confronted with have thus far taken place only in a scattered 
manner. Tellingly, the major impulses in this direction have come not from within the discipline, but from 
other fields. Among these conventions there is the focus on the single author “as the unifying principle in a 
particular group of writings or statements, lying at the origins of their significance, as the seat of their 
coherence” (Foucault 1972: 221). While I have only little firsthand experience in doing research on discourses 
of the premodern period – a focus that has dominated German Oriental studies until recently – I deem it 
highly problematic to transfer the analytical instruments and perspectives of that field unreflectingly to the 
study of (post)modernity, as tempting as this transfer might appear. My critique does not intend to dismiss 
the monographic form, philology or other tried and tested instruments of the discipline as such, but to tune 
them to the rhythms and forms of other traditions and disciplines that claim to produce knowledge on the 
modern Middle East, and to enrich them with the insights provided by the linguistic and other turns that 
have taken place over the last four decades or more, thereby bringing philology – from the opposite 
perspective – “back in”. 
68 In the 2000s, however, two monographs were released in German: Wenzel-Teuber 2005 and Gräf 2010. 
69 Only a few authors have examined al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with gender relations thus far: Roald 2001a; 
2001b; Stowasser 2001; 2008; Kugle/Hunt 2012. 
70 Bettina Dennerlein informed me a few weeks before I submitted this thesis that she plans to publish two 
articles and a book chapter on al-Qaraḍāwī’s gender-related publications. 
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of many proponents and activists of the Islamic revival during the last five decades.71 I 
describe this condition as a condition of exile, that is, the biographical experience of 
political persecution, physical expulsion and ongoing trial (miḥna) by the secular 
authoritarian nation–state.72 This condition, I argue, shapes al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with 
Islamic gender norms in a particular and specific manner that manifests on three 
interrelated levels: first, in his identification of gender as a strategic site for the moral and 
biological (re)production of Islam, the Muslim subject and – through marriage and the 
family – of an Islamic society at large; second, in his deliberate adoption of the media as the 
primary means and technology to circulate these norms as part of a biopolitical project 
that seeks to subvert and transcend the secular order of the authoritarian nation–state; and 
third, in the particular way he engages with and reconfigures the tradition of Muslim 
normative thought (fiqh). This reconfiguration, which includes both the theory (al-uṣūl) and 
the practice (al-furūʿ) of fiqh, is deeply rooted in the specific political setting of “post-
Islamism”,73 and its accompanying strategy of – to use Asef Bayat’s provocative term – a 
“cheap Islamization”.74 
                                                        
71 In that third chapter, I draw on al-Qaraḍāwī’s four-volume autobiography Ibn al-qarya wa-l-kuttāb (2002a; 
2004b; 2006a; 2011b), which will be critically discussed there, as well as on the relevant secondary literature. 
72 In his frequently referenced study Democracy without Democrats?, Ghassan Salame reminds us of the 
systematic place of exclusion in the nation-building of postcolonial states in the Middle East (1994: 14). On the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s experience of persecution and exile, see e.g. Zollner 2009: 36–63; Wickham 2015: 20–45. 
As David Warren prudently reminds us, however, we should not reduce the framework of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
thought and works to the Egyptian context (Warren 2014). I hope to tackle the Qatari–Saudi context, al-
Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with Wahhabism, and its particular effect on his engagement with and 
reconfiguration of fiqh in a future paper. 
73 Although it might be justifiably to doubt the global validity of the concept of post-Islamism and its accuracy 
for describing the various trajectories in the region, I share Göle’s more nuanced observation that since the 
1980s a process of “normalization” has taken place: “In the ‘second wave’ of Islamism, actors of Islam blend 
into modern urban spaces, use global communication networks, engage in public debates, follow 
consumption patterns, learn market rules, enter into secular time, get acquainted with values of 
individuation, professionalism, and consumerism, and reflect upon their new practices. Hence we observe a 
transformation of these movements from a radical political stance to a more social and cultural orientation, 
accompanied by a loss of mass mobilization capacity” (Göle 2002: 174). This observation is particularly apt in 
regard to al-Qaraḍāwī and other proponents of centrism (wasaṭiyya) among the Muslim Brotherhood, like 
Muḥammad ʿImāra (b. 1931), Fahmī Huwaydī (b. 1936), Muḥammad Salīm al-ʿAwwā (b. 1942) and Muḥammad 
al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), who have overtly denounced political violence as a legitimate means for pursuing their 
objectives. See al-Qaraḍāwī 1970a; 1982; 1990a; 1991a; 1999a; 2002a, among other works. 
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Turning to part I, chapter I.1 provides an outline of al-Qaraḍāwī’s reflections on 
gender on ontological and theological grounds. Drawing on al-Ḥalāl – al-Qaraḍāwī’s first and 
arguably most prominent publication – I argue that he formulates a distinct notion of the 
human subject (insān) on whom he inscribes a natural and profound inner truth (ḥaqīqa): its 
consuming desire for the other sex.75 The individual’s sexual desire is represented as an 
prominent component of the revival’s biopolitical project that strives to engender – 
through the proper use of one’s sexual desire – a particular kind of pious subjectivity and to 
create, through marriage and the family (usra), an Islamic society at large. 
Chapter I.2 locates this biopolitical project in the disciplinary traditions of Muslim 
scholarship, most notably fiqh. In his programmatic text Taysīr al-fiqh li-l-muslim al-muʿāṣir, 
which marks the beginning of al-Qaraḍāwī’s more extensive engagement with the 
principles of Islamic normativity (uṣūl al-fiqh), he reveals a rather conventional 
understanding of the discipline, its epistemic boundaries and its relation to other traditions 
of Muslim scholarly thought, notably theology (ʿilm al-kalām), ethics (ʿilm al-sulūk) and 
mysticism (ʿilm al-taṣawwuf).76 This conventional understanding, however, is overlaid by a 
profound engagement with the ideas of modern Islamism as formulated by Ḥasan al-Bannā 
(d. 1949) and Sayyid Sābiq (d. 2000), two figures who have had a major influence on al-
Qaraḍāwī’s intellectual and political formation. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s notion of fiqh thus lies at the 
intersection of Muslim scholarly tradition and political activism.77 His specific 
reconfiguration and engagement of these two discourses, I argue, subject the human being 
(insān) in a particular manner to Islam’s normative rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm) by putting it into 
                                                                                                                                                                            
74 Bayat contrasts this “cheap” Islamization, which became the dominant strategy in the mid-1990s and which 
resorts “to the language of moral and cultural purity”, with a more “costly” version that seeks to establish “an 
Islamic polity and economy” and to conduct “international relations compatible with the modern national 
and global citizenry” (2007: 9). 
75 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a. Although his later writings on sexuality and gender-related issues are marked by certain 
shifts, which have been discussed by Stowasser (2001) and which will be the subject of chapter 5 in part III, I 
maintain that his heteronormative assumptions on gender and sexuality on ontological and theological 
grounds remain unchanged. The modern genealogy of these heteronormative assumptions which are 
articulated at the intersection of science, fiqh and theology still needs to be written for the Islamicate world. A 
first contribution in this direction has recently been made by Gadelrab (2016). 
76 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c. 
77 On al-Qaraḍāwī’s notion of fiqh, see also Salvatore 1997; Baker 2003; Polka 2003; Krämer 2006; Warren 2014. 
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a distinct relationship with its interior (bāṭin) and its exterior forum (ẓāhir), and to the 
realms of private (al-ḥayāt al-shakhsiyya) and public life (al-ḥayāt al-ʿāmma). 78 
Part II of my study rests on the argument that al-Qaraḍāwī’s normative discourse 
and its underlying epistemology are ineluctably material in character.79 Its chapters draw 
on al-Qaraḍāwī’s media theory in nuce, highlighting his distinct appropriation of the media 
as well as the particular positions and imaginations of the pious subject that are inscribed 
in it, namely the pious reader of the Islamic book, the devout enquirer (mustaftī) of 
scholarly opinion (fatwā) and modern media’s virtuous consumer.80 Media, as I will point 
out, are represented in al-Qaraḍāwī’s discourse primarily as powerful and effectual (taʾthīrī) 
tool (wasīla) for seeking knowledge (ṭalab al-ʿilm) and the cultivation of a virtuous self. Their 
proper engagement effects in their consumer an understanding (fahm) of his or her 
outward actions (afʿāl ẓāhira) in the light of Islam and its normative rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm). 
The success of this transformation, however, crucially depends on the disciplinary 
regulation of the production and consumption of media that simultaneously restricts and 
enables the subject’s epistemological and moral transformation through them. These 
regulations, as I will show, are on the one hand grounded in more traditional concerns on 
the proper ways of reading and writing (chapter II.1) and of asking (istiftā) and providing 
(iftā) formal legal opinions (chapter II.3), which al-Qaraḍāwī partially extends to the 
                                                        
78 The debate on the role of the interior and the exterior forum in Islamic normativity has a long genealogy in 
Western academic scholarship. Samira Haj has argued that early Orientalist scholars represented Islam as a 
rigidly legalistic tradition which ignores the believer’s inner state, and that subjective interiority has often 
been considered to have be introduced into Islam in modern times (Haj 2011: 237–238). However this belief 
about traditional religious legalism was contested as early as 1925 by Goldziher (1925: 88), and later by Barber 
Johansen (1999), Brinkley Messick (2001) and Talal Asad (2003: 225), among others. 
79 My analysis rests on interviews with Sultan Wahba, al-Qaraḍāwī’s primary publisher, conducted in Cairo in 
December 2012, on al-Qaraḍāwī’s biography and on his two texts Fī ṭarīq ilā Allāh: al-ḥayāt al-rabbāniyya wa-l-
ʿilm (2007) and al-Fatwā bayna al-inḍibāt wa-l-tasayyub (2008). While I discuss his particular engagement with 
the adab al-fatwā genre in Fatwā (2008), the sole study of al-Qaraḍāwī’s involvement with neo-Sufism and its 
imprint on his biography and thought has been provided by al-Khateeb (2009). It definitely deserves further 
study. 
80 My use of the concepts of “subjectivation” and “subject” draw on Foucault’s late work on governmentality 
and technologies of the self, and Butler’s critical rereading of Althusser (Foucault 1988; 1991; 1992; Butler 
1997b). For a lucid introduction to Foucault discovery of the subject in the context of the Iranian revolution, 
see Sarasin 2010: 172–190. Recently, two cogent introductions to Butler’s thoughts on the subject have been 
provided by Bublitz (2013: 79–97) and Villa (2012: 35–58). 
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production and consumption of new media (iʿlām) (chapter II.4). On the other hand, 
however, his concerns reflect at the same time a distinctly modern critique of the liberal 
media market and its modern consumers’ sensibilities. Chapter II.2 tries to link the 
arguments of the preceding three chapters by providing a close reading of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
first and most important publication, al-Ḥalāl.81 Here, I seek to illustrate how his theoretical 
reflections on gender (chapter I.1), fiqh (chapter I.2), and the book (chapter II.1) translate 
into practice, and how this translation reconfigures the characteristic structure and 
conventional architecture of Muslim normative writing. 
Part III marks a change in perspective. Whereas the previous parts inquire into the 
production (part I) and circulation (part II) of Islamic norms on gender and sexuality in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s publications and media appearances, the subsequent chapters scrutinize the 
adaption of these norms to the reality (al-wāqiʿ) and daily life (ḥayāt) of his imagined 
audience.82 Al-Qaraḍāwī represents the media as a privileged and indeed indispensable 
means for providing the Muslim scholar and activist with access to people’s lived realities. 
By claiming a perfect harmony between divine revelation and mediated reality – or 
between shariʿa and human nature (fiṭra) – this mediated reality, I argue, acquires for itself 
a powerful normative force. This force finds its most paradigmatic expression in the notion 
of the fiqh of reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ). This fiqh of reality encompasses on the one hand a 
particular capacity and innate flexibility (saʿa wa-murūna) to adapt to reality. In this 
perspective, reality is ascribed a specific temporal structure that stretches between the 
poles of continuity (thābit) and change (mutaghayyir). On the other hand, this fiqh seeks to 
regulate reality as a site of constant violation, transgression and an antagonistic encounter 
with a non-Islamic other. Both the discourse on temporality and on identity and alterity 
are profoundly gendered. 
The fiqh of reality, I further argue, comprises a particular rereading and re-
engagement with the discursive traditions of Islamic normativity that accentuates shariʿa’s 
                                                        
81 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960. While all my subsequent page references refer to the edition of 1994, I will – for the sake 
of chronological clarity – stick to referring to it as al-Qaraḍāwī 1960. 
82 My notion of an imagined audience obviously draws on Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) 
and his insights on the crucial role of print capitalism for the creation of national consciousness. Michael 
Warner, on whom Charles Hirschkind (2009) builds in his analysis of the Islamic revival’s counterpublic, has 
provided inspiring reflections on the discursive mechanics of addressing and constructing an imagined public 
(Warner 2002). 
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aims (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) and its moral dimensions (chapter III.4). In this re-engagement, I 
suggest in my final chapter, on the issue of “females’ circumcision” (khitān al-ināth), the 
boundaries of Islamic normativity are deliberately shifted and redrawn so to open up new 
dialogical pathways to other epistemic fields in which different – but not less normative – 
representations of reality and human nature are produced: namely, medicine and modern 
science. This shift moves the boundaries of Islamic normativity towards a discipline that is 
– at least in al-Qaraḍāwī’s perspective – intimately tied to the subject’s inner dimensions 
rather than its outward actions, and which ironically largely resonates with a secularist 
notion of religion as a spiritual and inner experience: mysticism and ethics (ʿilm al-taṣawwuf 
wa-l-sulūk). 
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2. Al-Qaraḍāwī and Academic Scholarship Revisited83 
Doha, 25 December 2012. I’m sitting with Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh, my “local informant”, in al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
office. Since my arrival, I have been anxious about whether I would be able to gain access to the field: 
a crucial and (at times) critical step in anthropological fieldwork. Now I’m “in”, resting in a 
comfortable armchair, sipping a glass of tea and exchanging a number of witty remarks with al-
Qaraḍāwī’s office staff. My field has embraced me. 
ʿAbd Allāh’s announcement that the shaykh is ready for an interview takes me by surprise. I 
wasn’t prepared for this. Combing through the shaykh’s voluminous oeuvre back in my office at the 
Institute for Oriental Studies at the University of Zurich during the past year and a half, I was 
primarily interested in learning more about the specific conditions and the people who are involved 
“behind the scenes”, so to speak, in the production of this global authority. My host, however, 
cordially insists. I’m torn between sentiments of pride and pure embarrassment. 
Two days later, my interview with al-Qaraḍāwī is published on his personal website.84 I’m 
represented as a Swedish researcher who interviewed al-Qaraḍāwī on the comprehensiveness of Islam 
and on his latest edition of al-Ḥalāl. It strikes me that I might have recklessly squandered 
Orientalism’s privileged comfort zone of an interested – but safely distanced – observer. My field has 
consumed and disgorged me. I’m half Sudanese, half Swiss. 
In his seminal study Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, Armando Salvatore 
maintains that modern Islamist discourse is inescapably caught in a “transcultural ‘short-
circuit’ ”, in which the perspectives of the supposedly external etic observer and of the 
internal emic actor are inextricably entwined.85 Contemporary Islamist discourse on Islam 
                                                        
83 The most extensive overview over the state of research on al-Qaraḍāwī has been provided by Gräf (2009b; 
2010: 84–101). While revisiting Gräf’s summaries, I will also include later studies that have been published on 
al-Qaraḍāwī and his works since 2010. 
84 al-Qaraḍāwī 2012b. 
85 Salvatore 1997: 198–199. 
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and Muslim identity, put differently, is intimately tied to Western discourse on its Other, 
and – as some academics claim pace Said86 – vice versa. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī has been subject to academic scrutiny for the past two decades.87 
Surprisingly, no English-language monograph on his life or his work has been published 
thus far.88 This monographic silence, however, contrasts with the plethora of articles in 
English that have engaged with various aspects of al-Qaraḍāwī’s life and oeuvre. 
Among the earliest research contributions from a political science perspective 
stands Armando Salvatore’s aforementioned title.89 In its eleventh chapter, Salvatore 
depicts al-Qaraḍāwī as among the most prominent intellectual proponents of the Islamic 
awakening (al-ṣahwa al-islāmiyya) since the 1970s.90 As such, Salvatore argues, al-Qaraḍāwī is 
firmly rooted in the Islamic movement, while simultaneously seeking to preserve in this 
movement the privileged position of the traditional body of Muslim scholarship (ʿulamāʾ).91 
This preservation of the ʿulamā’s privilege to guide and interpret the Islamic awakening, 
however, requires a redefinition of their role and of the Islamic knowledge (ʿilm) that 
emphasizes their function in the public sphere.92 
Salvatore’s study in many regards set the tone for later academic research on al-
Qaraḍāwī. Three overlapping analytical perspectives have dominated this academic 
engagement: politics, fiqh and new media.93 
                                                        
86 Said 1978. Incidentally, I had a translation of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) in my bag when I met al-
Qaraḍāwī in his office in Doha, which I gave him as a gift. His reaction was mixed. First, he rhetorically asked 
if Edward Said was not a Christian; a point that had slipped my mind. But then he conceded that as a 
postcolonial thinker he had done much for Muslims and Islam. 
87 According to Gräf (2009b: 25, n. 3), the first academic reference to al-Qaraḍāwī in a European language was 
made by Gudrun Krämer (1994). Given this long scrutiny, it is thus “in the nature of things” that this review of 
the state of research is partial. 
88 Two monographs were released in German in the 2000s. Wenzel-Teuber’s Islamische Ethik and Bettina Gräf’s 
Medien-Fatwas@Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Both contributions will be discussed below. 
89 Salvatore 1997. 
90 Salvatore 1997: 201. 
91 Salvatore 1997: 201. In describing this specific position, Gudrun Krämer would later coin the notion of the 
“scholar-cum-activist” (2006: 198, n. 34). 
92 Salvatore 1997: 204. 
93 Gräf 2010: 94. As well as this, a number of studies have presented a more general portrait of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
life and thought. See e.g. Kursawe 2003; Soage 2008; 2010; Gräf 2013b. 
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In Islam without Fear, William Baker identifies al-Qaraḍāwī as among the major 
proponents of an intellectual circle within Islamism’s Centrist trend or “middle way” 
(wasaṭiyya).94 The members of this circle, which besides al-Qaraḍāwī includes scholars and 
activists such as Muḥammad ʿImāra (b. 1931), Fahmī Huwaydī (b. 1936), Muḥammad Salīm 
al-ʿAwwā (b. 1942) and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), “pragmatically choose to utilize 
professional organizations and other civil society institutions in order to realize their 
dream of a more righteous Islamic society”.95 Sagi Polka highlights a number of 
characteristic traits that mark the ideological position of these Centrists: their claim of 
Islam’s comprehensiveness (shumūl al-islām); a particular conception of Islamic temporality 
that stretches along the bipolar axis of continuity (thābit, lit. “lasting”) and change 
(mutaghayyir); dialogue; the aim of striking a harmonious balance between reason and 
tradition (al-ʿaql wa-l-naql); a gradualist approach (tadarruj) in applying Muslim law to state 
and society; and the fusion of tradition (aṣāla) and modernity (muʿāṣira).96 
This last point has been subject to further scrutiny in the first monograph that 
appeared (in German) on al-Qaraḍāwī.97 In his highly erudite study that is based on almost 
all of al-Qaraḍāwī’s book publications up to the mid-1990s, Wenzel-Teuber seeks to situate 
the scholar’s thinking along the analytical categories of tradition and modernity.98 
Identifying al-Qaraḍāwī as a major ideologist of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and of 
mainstream Islamism,99 he examines al-Qaraḍāwī’s quest for an Islamic solution (al-ḥall al-
islāmī) in various fields such as fiqh, economy, culture and politics.100 Highlighting the 
eclecticism that marks al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with tradition and modernity, he 
concludes that the two categories are inextricably entwined.101 
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Other scholars have engaged with political categories and have sought to position 
al-Qaraḍāwī along the ideological spectrum of liberalism and extremism. In his anthology 
Liberal Islam, Charles Kurzman characterizes al-Qaraḍāwī with other intellectuals and 
activists such as ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (d. 1977), Mohamed Arkoun (d. 2010), ʿAbd Allāh al-Naʿīm and 
ʿAbd al-Karīm Surūsh as a liberal thinker, due to his rejection of Islamic extremism and 
violence.102 Gudrun Krämer, in her analysis of al-Qaraḍāwī’s position on apostasy (ridda), 
arrives at a somewhat contrary conclusion.103 Drawing on a close reading of the booklet 
Jarīmat al-ridda wa-ʿuqūbāt al-murtadd fī ḍawʾ al-qurʾān wa-l-sunna – literally, “The Crime of 
Apostasy and the Apostate’s Punishment in the Light of the Qurʾan and the Sunna” – which 
al-Qaraḍāwī published shortly after the assassination of Egyptian secularist thinker Faraj 
Fūda (d. 1992),104 she highlights al-Qaraḍāwī’s indirect endorsement of the court’s 
exculpation of Fūda’s killers. “Moderation”, she pins down her thoughts, “does not equal 
liberalism.”105 
At around the same time, a number of academics have examined al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
engagement with secularism.106 In his essay “The Construction and Deconstruction of 
Secularism”, Masud highlights the different experiences of secularism in the Islamic 
world.107 Comparing al-Qaraḍāwī’s thoughts108 to those of Abū al-ʿAlā Mawdūdī (d. 1979), 
Muḥammad Naqīb al-ʿAṭṭās (b. 1931), Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938) and Fazlur Rahman (Faḍl 
al-Raḥmān, d. 1988), he underlines the former’s particular conception of and strict 
opposition to secularism’s presumed separation of the world and the religious.109 Unlike 
Mawdūdī, Masud observes, al-Qaraḍāwī draws a distinction between secularism and 
atheism (ilhād).110 This distinction allows him to mark and marginalize secularism as a 
particularly Western and Christian experience. Christianity has no concept of shariʿa, and 
in the West secularism fills this gap. But secularism thus has no place in Islam, since Islam 
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is “a comprehensive system of laws that govern every sphere of life”.111 Secularism in 
Islamic societies, by implication, equals blasphemy (kufr) and the penal act of apostasy 
(ridda).112 
Andrew March examines al-Qaraḍāwī’s thoughts on Western secularism within the 
framework of what has been called the “Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities” (fiqh al-
aqalliyyāt) discourse.113 In his article, March draws on the example of an online fatwa, in 
which al-Qaraḍāwī claims that it is “permissible for Muslims to align themselves with other 
faith groups to fight against the homosexual movements”.114 This allows March to 
scrutinize and depart from political liberalism’s “simple assumption” that religious 
minorities prefer to endorse public reason if their own exclusive and potentially 
threatening reason cannot prevail.115 
Husam Tammam and Aaron Rock-Singer have studied al-Qaraḍāwī’s relation to the 
Muslim Brotherhood.116 While Tammam outlines the parallels between the political 
trajectory of the Brotherhood and al-Qaraḍāwī’s intellectual development, Rock-Singer 
analyses the latter’s contribution in redefining the movement’s call (daʿwa) and his vision of 
an institution-based preacher education. This vision, Rock-Singer argues, not only deploys 
Muslim scholarly traditions to new circumstances but also engages with categories 
transmitted by the civil education system and others that are alien to this tradition.117 
Since the mid-2000s, a number of articles have dealt more narrowly with al-
Qaraḍāwī’s “politicization of fiqh”.118 Several academics have considered al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
contribution to the aforementioned “Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities” (fiqh al-
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aqalliyyāt).119 While Alexandre Caeiro takes up a fatwa by the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research (ECFR) on the purchase of houses through an interest-bearing mortgage, 
Sarah Albrecht presents a summary of al-Qaraḍāwī’s major publication on the topic.120 Uri 
Shavit draws a comparison between wasaṭī and salafī approaches to fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, 
underlining the centrality of the ethico-legal concept of maṣlaḥa to the former.121 Said Fares 
Hassan provides the most comprehensive study of al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution to the 
topic.122 According to Hassan, this contribution marks a major “paradigm shift”.123 Deviating 
from the classical debate on the legality of staying in non-Muslim territory, al-Qaraḍāwī 
urges Muslims to do so in order to spread the universal message of Islam to the world.124 His 
reconceived notion of minority fiqh, Hassan concludes, is marked by an unwillingness to 
reproduce older controversies “in an era that has different rules, that is, constitution, civil 
society, human rights, minority rights, etc.”.125 
Providing a somewhat complementary perspective, Alexandre Caeiro and Mahmoud 
al-Saify have looked at the presence of al-Qaraḍāwī in Europe.126 His prominence in the 
European public sphere “through personal visits, translation of books, production of fatwas 
and airing of television satellite programs”, they argue, defies the assumption of an 
ongoing fragmentation of religious authority in the West.127 Rather, he represents “the 
classic example of the transnational religious leader”.128 While the first part of their study 
inquires into the genealogy and significance of al-Qaraḍāwī’s intellectual and institutional 
engagement with Muslim minorities living in the West,129 its second part analyses the 
circulation and appropriation of al-Qaraḍāwī’s discourse by different actors in Europe, 
                                                        
119 Here, the major reference is al-Qaraḍāwī’s book Fī fiqh al-aqalliyyāt al-muslima (2001a). 
120 Caeiro 2004; Albrecht 2010; al-Qaraḍāwī 2001a. Among the first scholars to have highlighted the 
significance of al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution in this field is Mathias Rohe (2003; 2007). 
121 Shavit 2013. The term maṣlaḥa is often translated as “the common good” or “the public good”. Following 
Felicitas Opwis’s critical remarks on the problematic of translating maṣlaḥa, I will stick in the following to the 
Arabic term. Opwis 2007: 204. 
122 Hassan 2013. 
123 Hassan 2013: 75. 
124 Hassan 2013: 76. 
125 Hassan 2013: 75. 
126 Caeiro/al-Saify 2009. 
127 Caeiro/al-Saify 2009: 109. 
128 Caeiro/al-Saify 2009: 135. 
129 Caeiro/al-Saify 2009: 111–118. 
  
 
 
30 
including Muslim communities, mainstream media and the state.130 While to some Muslim 
communities he has come to stand as a symbol and a test of Muslim authenticity, he 
represents to mainstream media “the epitome of the Islamic fundamentalist threat”, 
particularly since 9/11.131 
In a parallel line of analysis, Motaz al-Khateeb has considered al-Qaraḍāwī and the 
shifting notion of authority in Sunni Islam.132 He describes the latter as an embodiment of 
marjiʿiyya, a central authoritative reference.133 Al-Khateeb contrasts the personalized 
concept of marjiʿiyya in the Shiʿi context with the Sunni context, where the notion 
represents rather the authoritative reference of a system of thought.134 He argues that al-
Qaraḍāwī appears to blur the boundaries between these two conceptions.135 Different from 
the Shiʿi marjiʿiyya, however, al-Qaraḍāwī’s position is not imposed by clerical structure but 
“by virtue of several factors on the personal, scholarly, political, and media level”.136 Al-
Khateeb identifies three formative elements of al-Qaraḍāwī’s singular authority, 
comprising his contributions to fiqh, the specific historical context in which he operates 
and a number of personal factors.137 Finally, al-Khateeb raises the question of the future of 
this personalized authority after al-Qaraḍāwī (baʿd al-Qaraḍāwī), conceding the possibility of 
a return of marjiʿiyya as a system of thought.138 
More recently, two contributions have engaged with al-Qaraḍāwī in the context of 
the Arab Uprising and its aftermath. David Warren and Christine Gilmore have studied al-
Qaraḍāwī’s new fiqh of citizenship (fiqh al-muwāṭana) for non-Muslims against the backdrop 
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s election victory in Egypt, and the looming prospect of the 
emergence of an Islamic state.139 While acknowledging the potential of de-centring “the 
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dominant Western model of common citizenship”, they also stress the inherent tensions of 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s endeavour to integrate modern concepts into legal tradition.140 In a second 
article published in the same year, David Warren criticizes the all-too-narrow scope of 
those political studies that situate al-Qaraḍāwī’s work solely in the Egyptian context.141 
Consequently, he extends the scope of his analysis to the international level. Exploring al-
Qaraḍāwī’s “highly publicized interventions in relation to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria”, 
he underlines al-Qaraḍāwī’s attempt to maintain a precarious balance. On the one hand, al-
Qaraḍāwī seeks to preserve his virtual self-stylization as an independent scholar according 
to the authoritative discourse of Muslim scholarly tradition. On the other hand, he is 
committed to “a diverse base of supporters”, including the Muslim Brotherhood, his public 
audience and the Qatari royal family.142 Al-Qaraḍāwī thus faces a conundrum, Warren 
concludes, and his attempts to resolve it are ultimately doomed to fail.143 
Following the overthrow of Muḥammad Mursī on 3 July 2013, Uriya Shavit discusses 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s view on the legitimate use of violence against an unjust Muslim regime 
(aḥkām al-bughāh, lit. “the rulings on rebellions”).144 Consonant with his self-
characterization as a moderate (wasaṭī), Shavit argues, al-Qaraḍāwī seeks to claim a middle 
ground between what he perceives as “enthusiast extremist and literalist youth” and the 
“religious scholars of the regime and the agents of the police (ʿulamāʾ al-ṣulṭa wa-ʿumalāʾ al-
shurṭa) who argue, fearing anarchy, that only walī al-amr [(the ruler)] can enforce 
change”.145 al-Qaraḍāwī, Shavit continues, defines three criteria for the legitimate 
application of physical violence to correct a wrong. First, the wrong must constitute a 
ḥarām on which there is a juristic consensus. Second, it must be one that is witnessed 
publicly. And third – and this point is crucial – the individual or group must be certain to 
succeed.146 This certainty, Shavit continues in outlining al-Qaraḍāwī’s view, rests on having 
control over three powers: the military, the parliamentary majority and the power of the 
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masses.147 If one of these three powers is beyond control, then the rebels “must wait with 
patience and perseverance” until they have control of it, trying in the meantime “to bring 
about change by preaching and writing”.148 Just like al-Bannā and other mainstream 
Islamists, Shavit concludes, al-Qaraḍāwī encourages “political passivity”, since “applying 
violence in order to topple an unjust ruler is legitimate only as a last resort”.149 As Shavit 
concedes with regard to al-Qaraḍāwī’s retroactive support of the violent rebellions against 
the Syrian and Libyan regimes between 2011 and 2013, however, the “legitimacy of taking 
sides in an already existing fitna is a different issue”.150 
The second analytical perspective that dominates the academic engagement with al-
Qaraḍāwī focuses primarily on fiqh.151 Building on Salvatore’s earlier insights on the 
redefinition and politicization of fiqh in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings, Muhammad Qasim Zaman 
has published two studies on al-Qaraḍāwī’s ethico-legal thought.152 In the earlier of his two 
essays, he tackles al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution to contemporary Muslim discussions of 
maṣlaḥa, or the “common good”.153 While highlighting al-Qaraḍāwī’s selective recourse to 
older discussions of maṣlaḥa by al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), the Hanbali jurist Najm al-Dīn al-
Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) and al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388), Zaman carves out al-Qaraḍāwī’s expansive 
reinterpretation of the concept.154 This reinterpretation, Zaman concludes, is crucial to 
constitute and sustain the public role of fiqh.155 Zaman’s second essay investigates al-
Qaraḍāwī’s response to the modern challenges to the doctrine of consensus (ijmāʿ).156 Again, 
Zaman highlights the tension between al-Qaraḍāwī’s endeavour to enlarge the sphere of 
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this consensus while preserving the prerogatives of the ʿulamāʾ to (re)draw and guard its 
boundaries.157 
Building on Zaman’s insights, Armando Salvatore takes the argument a step further 
by re-situating al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with maṣlaḥa in its political context.158 Salvatore 
argues that this context is marked by the “enduring authoritarianism”159 and “the demise 
of the legitimacy of the postcolonial state”160 which operate under the neo-liberal aegis of 
international agencies.161 Drawing on Gudrun Krämer,162 he points out that maṣlaḥa 
provided “the most obvious anchorage of modern Islamic republican thinking facing the 
resistant authoritarianism of contemporary regimes”.163 Although Islamic activism seeks to 
capture “the fiscal sources of command over welfare, i.e. state power”164 in the long run, al-
Qaraḍāwī’s path of a middle way (wasaṭiyya) and gradualism (tadarruj) has proved to be 
crucial for Islamic social activism. Exiting from “the exclusivity of the nation–state frame”, 
its emphasis has shifted from “political Islam” to the “public Islam” of a transnational 
public sphere.165 
David Johnston has provided two studies on al-Qaraḍāwī’s adoption of the legal 
methodology of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa.166 Whereas his first article characterizes al-Qaraḍāwī 
as a textualist,167 he argues in his second publication that al-Qaraḍāwī’s growing intellectual 
attraction to this “purposive methodology” in the 1990s and 2000s dovetails neatly with his 
self-positioning as a scholar of international standing.168 Eventually, Johnston raises the 
question of whether the focus on the maqāṣid is likely to undermine the authority of 
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traditional Muslim scholarship (ʿulamāʾ) in a century “marked by a radically democratized 
public sphere”.169 He answers in the affirmative.170 
Focusing on a particular genre of fiqh, a number of scholars have investigated al-
Qaraḍāwī’s theoretical and practical engagement with the fatwa.171 Alexandre Caeiro places 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution to the genre of the etiquette of the fatwa (adab al-fatwā) into a 
historical–comparative perspective.172 Based on his analysis, he highlights two major 
transformations in the fatwa’s authoritative arrangement in the twentieth century. The 
first transformation marks a shift from “straight-to-the-point fatwas to the mustaftī, who 
was an uneducated individual”, to “a wider public, which is then free to adopt or reject the 
advice”.173 The second change marks a shift from the institutional authority of the mufti 
affiliated to his madhhab to “the textual authority of the independent scholar’s 
argument”.174 
The third major analytical focus in the academic study of al-Qaraḍāwī has been on 
new media.175 While some research contributions in this field have engaged with a 
particular thematic aspect based on a limited selection of al-Qaraḍāwī’s media appearances, 
others have sought to interrogate the role of new media in the production and 
transformation of religious authority more fundamentally. In the early 2000s, Anne Sofie 
Roald analysed al-Qaraḍāwī’s appearances on the programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt on Al 
Jazeera, as part of a global theological scape in which “theologies of liberation, feminism, 
ecology, and human rights” merge.176 Highlighting the popularity of his programme among 
immigrant Muslims in Scandinavia, she suggests that his pragmatic and moderate approach 
responds “to a particular need for immigrant Muslims in Europe” 177 and “opens up the way 
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for reconciliation between living ‘Islam’ and doing civil duties”.178 Ermete Mariani has 
published an article in which he discusses – in addition to al-Qaraḍāwī’s political and 
economic activities – the crucial role of new media in establishing al-Qaraḍāwī as a 
transnational authority.179 Peter Mandeville describes al-Qaraḍāwī as a “superstar” 
religious scholar and a central figure of a “virtual caliphate”.180 This caliphate, Mandeville 
argues, represents not so much a political institution attached to territory but rather “an 
ideal of pan-Islamic ecumenism”. It is sustained by an emerging infrastructure of websites 
such as Islam Online, satellite television, widely-circulated books and major international 
conferences and research centres that seek to challenge extremism and to provide an 
antidote to radical jihadism.181 In his article “The Global Mufti”, Skovgaard-Petersen 
investigates “the impact of the al-Jazeera phenomenon on contemporary Arab 
understandings of Islam”.182 Drawing a comparison between al-Qaraḍāwī’s regular 
appearance on Al Jazeera’s al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt and Shaykh al-Shaʿrawī’s (d. 1998) 
programme on Egyptian national television, he maintains that the former’s insistence “on 
dialogue and argument, on educating and edifying the public and imbuing it with a 
rational, universal, and democratic Islam” very much resembles the “icon of European 
modernism”.183 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s “universalist pan-Islamism”, he concludes, is “reminiscent of 
a modernist globalism that came to the fore in the Arab world a hundred years ago, but 
ever since has had to fight to establish a platform free of political control”.184 Ehab Galal 
investigates the communicative methods and strategies of al-Qaraḍāwī with the use of new 
Islamic television.185 Providing a genealogy of al-Qaraḍāwī’s appearances on television since 
the 1970s,186 he highlights al-Qaraḍāwī’s and Al Jazeera’s successes “in combining new 
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transnational media with Islamic thinking in a modern framework”.187 While Al Jazeera’s al-
Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt has become a model that has been copied by other Arab satellite channels, 
al-Qaraḍāwī has emerged as a powerful constituent of the Islamic dimension in this 
transnational public sphere.188 Drawing a comparison between al-Qaraḍāwī’s regular 
appearance on Al Jazeera’s al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt and his weekly fatwa programme Hady al-
islām (Guidance of Islam) on Qatari national television, Galal highlights the shift in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s role from “an educator and informer” to “an agenda setter”.189 Unlike Salafis 
and new Muslim missionaries (duʿāh, sg. dāʿiya) whose experience-based discourse 
addresses the individual believer, however, al-Qaraḍāwī’s primary attention is directed to 
the community, the group and the family. This absence of the powerful “discourse of 
individualization”, Galal concludes, might eventually expose his “weak spot”.190 
Bettina Gräf arrives at a similar conclusion in her earlier investigation of al-
Qaraḍāwī’s virtual presence in cyberspace.191 She underlines al-Qaraḍāwī’s pioneering role 
in cooperating with journalists and media producers in order “to restore the influence of 
Muslim scholars in Muslim societies and worldwide”.192 Her analysis focuses on his website 
qaradawi.net, “the first personal website of an ʿālim in Arabic”.193 Following Mariani’s 
earlier insight, Gräf maintains that al-Qaraḍāwī’s virtual presence can be assessed only in 
its technical and organizational context.194 Consequently, she concludes that al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
translocal authority remains inextricably tied to “special sets of actions outside 
cyberspace”.195 His claim to global authority, however, appears spurious, since he faces 
numerous competitors like the Egyptian lay preacher ʿAmr Khālid, whose virtual presence 
attracts significantly more visitors.196 
In her PhD thesis – one of the two monographs published on al-Qaraḍāwī in German 
– Bettina Gräf expands her analytical focus by drawing a comparison between media forms 
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with different regional ranges.197 Situating the production and circulation of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
media fatwas in their particular context, she highlights the involvement of various actors 
in the production of these fatwas. In her conclusion, she argues that al-Qaraḍāwī’s fatwas 
are subject to a process of “popularization” which affects their content and the nature of 
their authority alike.198 
Before situating my own study within this admittedly vast field of research, I would 
like to confront an issue that has all too often been neglected in Western academic 
research: the reception of al-Qaraḍāwī in Arabic. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s reception by Arabic scholars and thinkers is marked by a distinct 
tension.199 While some publications bear an almost hagiographic imprint, others in contrast 
are bluntly antagonistic. The former category includes, for example, an edited collection of 
essays by more than sixty scholars and activists on the occasion of al-Qaraḍāwī’s seventieth 
birthday, which reads, as Bettina Gräf puts it, like a contemporary Who’s Who of the Islamic 
discourse community.200 It assembles contributions by Salīm al-ʿAwwā, Ṭarīq al-Bishrī, Hiba 
Raʾūf ʿIzzat, Rashīd al-Ghannūshī, Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), Abū 
al-Ḥasan al-Nadwī (d. 1999) and Ḥasan al-Turābī (d. 2016). The majority of these scholars 
and activists are affiliated to the Islamist middle way (wasaṭiyya).201 
Public opposition to al-Qaraḍāwī arose as early as the mid-1970s, in particular in the 
works and pamphlets of Salafi and Shiʿi scholars.202 In 1976, the renowned Wahhabi scholar 
Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān published a critique of al-Qaraḍāwī’s first book, generally considered to be 
his most important, al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām.203 Al-Fawzān targets al-Qaraḍāwī’s legal 
philosophy, his views on friendship with non-Muslims (mawaddat ghayr al-muslimīn), 
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smoking, the prohibition of wearing silk for men, his rule on the decency of the beard, 
photography, the disclosure of women’s face and hands to male strangers, chess, cinema 
and – at length – singing.204 
In the past few decades, Salafi polemics against al-Qaraḍāwī have proliferated, 
spreading across several monographs, numerous websites and YouTube clips.205 As Shaham 
highlights, many of al-Qaraḍāwī’s Salafi critics are students of the traditionalist 
Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999).206 Some of them formulate their critique within 
the traditional boundaries of ikhtilāf, that is, the legitimate “disagreement”, such as the 
former grand mufti Ibn Bāz (d. 1999) or al-Albānī himself.207 This group rejects many of al-
Qaraḍāwī’s positions on scholarly grounds, including his views on women, singing, dancing 
and the cinema, on the zakāt, on the use of revenues from interest-bearing investments, 
and on what they see as his all too permissive legal philosophy in principle.208 The majority, 
however, accuse him on personal grounds for forgery, heresy, outright corruption and 
personal immorality.209 They brand his desire for publicity as inappropriate, deny his 
scholarly credentials, blame him for factionalism and his deviation from the consensus of 
the community, or reproach him for his outright foolishness (hawas).210 
Paradoxically, however, al-Qaraḍāwī is one of the few scholars affiliated to the 
Muslim Brotherhood who has been able to forge more consensual ties with Salafi 
scholars.211 He has even become, as Tammam observes, an authority to the younger 
reformist Salafi current in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt that includes prominent figures like 
Salmān b. Fahd, Sāfir al-Ḥawālī and ʿĀʾiḍ al-Qarnī.212 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s initiative to seek 
reconciliation with Salafism dates back several years.213 He sent “copies of his writings as 
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gifts to Salafi shaykhs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia” and paid several visits to them in an 
attempt to open paths for dialogue and exchange.214 His initiative might be seen, Tammam 
suggests, as a corrective to the fierce polemics that arose between Salafi scholars and his 
mentor and later colleague Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996) after the latter’s publication of 
al-Sunna al-nabawiyya bayna ahl al-fiqh wa-ahl al-ḥadīth (literally, “The Prophetic Sunna 
between the Specialists of Jurisprudence and the Specialists of Tradition”).215 Some Salafis 
have attempted for their part to present al-Qaraḍāwī to Saudi society “in an acceptable 
way” in order “to reconcile the Salafis with Shaykh Qaraḍāwī”.216 
Less known is al-Qaraḍāwī’s reception by Shiʿi scholars.217 Bettina Gräf mentions one 
monograph by Aḥmad Rasīm al-Nafīs published in 2006. In that work, al-Nafīs attacks al-
Qaraḍāwī as an enemy of the Shiʿa.218 As several researchers have pointed out, al-Qaraḍāwī 
for his part has long advocated a rapprochement (taqrīb) and an “ecumenical attitude” 
towards the Shiʿa.219 This endeavour included his participation in a number of highly 
publicized conferences and media appearances, including a debate with the former 
president of Iran and chairman of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, Akbar Hāshimī Rafsanjānī, 
hosted on Al Jazeera in February 2007.220 Whereas al-Qaraḍāwī’s commitment to this 
rapprochement has been interpreted as a historical continuation of the classical idea of 
pan-Islamism as advocated by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) and Ḥasan al-Bannā 
(d. 1946), the more immediate significance of the Sunni–Shiʿi strife in Iraq has also been 
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indicated as relevant.221 The year 2006, however, marked a change in his course.222 As Elad-
Altman has highlighted, this change took place against the backdrop of the so-called “Shiʿi 
surge” (al-madd al-shīʿī), which has as its key elements Iran’s hegemonic ambitions to 
establish itself as a regional power, Iraq’s Shiʿi government, Hizbullah’s rise in Lebanon and 
an allegedly growing trend of Sunnis converting to Shiʿism (tashayyuʿ) in Sunni-majority 
countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Sudan and Morocco.223 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s earlier 
ecumenical advocacy for a rapprochement of the legal schools (taqrīb al-madhāhib) had left 
him open to fierce attacks, with accusations that his programmatic emphasis on the 
proximity and similarity between basic Shiʿi and Sunni principles “has been used by former 
Sunnis to justify their conversion to Shiism” and to have opened “the door to 
Shiitization”.224 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s work and biography have become a kind of prism for Western 
academic scholarship, through which it studies the major transformations and trajectories 
of Islamism, public religious authority and Muslim normative thinking (fiqh) during the 
past five decades. However, despite the prolific scholarly output on al-Qaraḍāwī, vast 
segments of his voluminous oeuvre – which includes over 170 written publications and 
countless media appearances – remain unanalysed in academic research. As well as other 
areas, this includes the majority of his publications on gender. So far only four authors 
have engaged in depth with al-Qaraḍāwī’s thoughts on women and homosexuality. 
In her essay “Old Shaykhs, Young Women and the Internet”, published in 2001, 
Barbara Stowasser analyses the first volume of al-Qaraḍāwī’s fatwa collection, registering 
an important shift in his position on women’s rights.225 This shift signals, she argues, the 
emergence of “a new gender paradigm” in Islamist discourse.226 Whereas earlier discussions 
raised questions about the equality of the sexes in terms of their humanity and their 
personhood, and women’s rights to education and work, the new focus is now on women’s 
rights to political participation.227 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s contributions to this issue have been, as 
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Stowasser puts it, “truly momentous” and represent “a re-tapping into the dynamic 
capabilities of Islamic jurisprudence”.228 According to Stowasser, his “liberal publications” 
have a wide resonance among traditionalist scholars, modernist intellectuals and Islamic 
feminists such as the prominent Egyptian activist and political scientist Hiba Raʾūf ʿIzzat.229 
In Women in Islam, Anne Sofie Roald examines the function of al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings 
and media appearances in the reconstruction of gender attitudes among Muslims living in 
the West.230 Putting al-Qaraḍāwī’s positions on divorce 231 and the veil 232 into a comparative 
perspective with those of a number of other Islamist thinkers and activists – most of them 
belonging to “the ikhwān stream of thought” 233 – she highlights the centrality of the notion 
of the shariʿa’s innate flexibility (murūna) that emerged in the late 1980s.234 She concludes 
that this notion enabled al-Qaraḍāwī and other thinkers to adapt their normative 
reflections according to circumstances and “to pave the way for alternative 
interpretations” of Islam’s perspective on gender.235 
Scott Kugle and Stephen Hunt present a case study of a media fatwa against 
homosexuality issued by al-Qaraḍāwī in his programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt.236 Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s reprobation of homosexuality represents, they argue, a neo-traditionalist and 
                                                        
228 Stowasser 2001: 102. 
229 Stowasser 2001: 99. This finding resonates with Saba Mahmood’s insights in her study of the women’s 
mosque movement in Cairo (2011b). Mahmood highlights these women’s use of and reference to books by 
Sayyid Ṣābiq (d. 2000) and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (2011b: 83, n. 10). 
230 Roald 2001a: ix. In her monograph, she consults four books by al-Qaraḍāwī: al-Tarbiya al-islamiyya wa-
madrasat Ḥasan al-Bannā (1980), Kayfa nataʿāmal maʿ al-sunna al-nabawiyya (1990), an English translation of his 
Madkhal li-maʿrifat al-islām (1996), and the first volume of his fatwa collection (al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a). In her 
article The Wise Men (2001b), she draws on an English translation of al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām (1960), al-
Qaraḍāwī’s first and most renowned publication, and al-Saḥwa al-islamiyya bayna al-juhūd wa-l-taṭarruf (1988), 
two broadcasts of the programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt: Ḥijāb (1998) and Fiqh al-usra al-muslima fī al-gharb 
(1999), and her personal communications with al-Qaraḍāwī in 1998. 
231 Roald 2001a: 213.  
232 Roald 2001a: 279–280. 
233 This includes, among others, Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966), Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Abū 
Shuqqa (d. 1996), Sayyid Sābiq (d. 2000) and Zaynab al-Ghazālī (d. 2005). 
234 Roald 2001a: 98–100. 
235 Roald 2001a: 297. 
236 Kugle/Hunt 2012. 
  
 
 
42 
“distorted view of religious texts and cultural conventions”.237 Arguing from a self-
proclaimed “progressive Islamic” point of view,238 they deconstruct the homophobia of 
neo-traditionalists as a defence strategy of a fragile Muslim masculinity.239 
While Stowasser’s, Roald’s and Kugle and Hunt’s studies are crucial contributions to 
our understanding of an (admittedly limited) number of al-Qaraḍāwī’s gender-related 
publications, none of them has explored their strategic significance in the Islamic revival’s 
biopolitical project. Al-Qaraḍāwī, as I will argue, provides us with a particular insight into 
the revival’s remaking of gender relations. His contributions to its biopolitical project are 
located at a particular juncture at which Islamic knowledge (ʿilm), activism and modern 
media meet. In this regard, I hope to not only cover new sources but also – by drawing on 
Foucault’s, Butler’s and Mahmood’s notions of power, subjectivity and gender – to provide 
a new analytical perspective on material that has been previously studied. 
Before closing this chapter, let me pay my obligatory tribute to the postmodern 
vogue for academic self-positioning. As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter – 
alluding to Salvatore’s notion of a transcultural “short-circuit” – al-Qaraḍāwī blurs the 
boundaries between observers and observed. Evidence that Western scholars play a part in 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s (self-)presentation comes not only from my own personal experience or that 
of other academics who have been co-opted by al-Qaraḍāwī.240 The recent emergence of 
academic establishments and scholarly biographies that lie at the intersection of academic 
scholarship and Muslim activism point in a similar direction.241 The implications of these 
shifting boundaries are a largely pending subject for academic self-reflection. 
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3. The Condition of Exile 
ﺮﻔﻐﺘﺳ& ﷲ !ﻧﺎﺤﺒﺳ ﻦﻣ ﻞﻛ ﺈﻄﺧ !" !"ﺎﺠﺗ !" 
!ﺎﺠﻋ% ﺲﻔﻨﻟﺎﺑ...  
I ask God’s forgiveness - may He be exalted – 
for all offence, exceeding or self-
complacency …242 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
Delineating the biographical place from which al-Qaraḍāwī speaks and writes requires 
several disclaimers. Despite al-Qaraḍāwī’s high visibility, we have very few independent 
sources on his life. His portrayal by academic scholarship largely rests on his public self-
presentation sketched in his autobiographical recollections (mudhakkirāt, sg. mudhakkira) 
that have been published in four weighty volumes between 2002 and 2011.243 These latter 
provide us, as Krämer pointedly remarks, “an idealized image” of al-Qaraḍāwī as a 
preacher, teacher and activist faithfully committed to the Islamic cause.244 
On the one hand, in their tonality and their topographical arrangement, al-
Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs draw on traditional elements of Muslim autobiographical writing, 
notably on the genre known as ṭabaqāt.245 Thus, we find his memoirs replete with portraits 
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of other activists and scholars, expressing a constant “awareness of the collective body of 
Muslim scholarship”.246 At the same time, however, he transcends the genre and its 
conventions, carefully testing its boundaries and trying to strike a balance between his 
biographical inscription into the traditional body of Muslim scholarship and more modern 
sensibilities of autobiographical self-stylization. Both his autobiographical inscription into 
the tradition and his expansion of it manifest in a number of topoi. 
The first topos that he draws on, humility and modesty, forms a central virtue of 
Islamic scholarship and is a prominent theme in the autobiographical writings of Muslim 
scholars.247 The theme provides a foil that underscores al-Qaraḍāwī’s outstanding 
accomplishments as an activist and a scholar, accentuating his self-presentation as, to use 
Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen’s expression, “a modest and authentic Muslim who has 
nevertheless had remarkable success”.248 Al-Qaraḍāwī was born in the humble village of 
Ṣaft al-Turāb in the Egyptian province of Gharbiyya in 1926, “far from all means of modern 
civilization”.249 Being orphaned at the age of two, he grew up with his mother’s family and 
his paternal uncle, “an illiterate (ummī) farmer”.250 By the age of ten, he knew the Qurʾan by 
heart, which earned him in his village the title of “shaykh”.251 His humble origins – as well 
as his early intellectual achievements – are prominently foregrounded in the title of his 
memoirs: Ibn al-qarya wa-l-kuttāb, “Son of the Village and the Koran School”. This first 
topos, which portrays al-Qaraḍāwī as a man of the people, apart from the political centres 
of power, neatly dovetails with the following themes.252 
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The second topos evokes al-Qaraḍāwī’s profound entrenchment in the scholarly 
traditions of Muslim learning, whose state-affiliated establishments, however, he sharply 
criticizes. From 1940 onwards, al-Qaraḍāwī visited the Azhar – first its school in Tanta and 
later, from 1949, the Faculty of Theology (kulliyyat uṣūl al-dīn) at its university in Cairo – 
where he shined as a brilliant student.253 Although he had admired the Azhar since early 
childhood, his memoirs are filled with staunch criticism of its shaykhs’ disdainful 
materialism. His vocal demands for reform included, among others, the introduction of 
English, the modernization of its instruction in Arabic, jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology, 
and the admission of female students to its faculties.254 In later years, his criticism 
increasingly has targeted the Azhar’s subservience and lack of critical independence from 
the Egyptian state, a position that al-Qaraḍāwī claims for himself.255 
The third topos: the decisive encounter with a spiritual guide and his political 
awakening. In 1940, when al-Qaraḍāwī arrived at the Azhar school in Tanta, he listened to a 
speech by Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood – an encounter that he 
describes as “love at first word” (al-ḥubb min awwal kalima).256 Three years later (1942–1943), 
he joined the Brotherhood, to which he held a life-long allegiance. Eventually, he advanced 
to become one of the movement’s central intellectual authorities.257 In 1976, he was offered 
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256 al-Qaraḍāwī 2002a: 242. Al-Qaraḍāwī describes this first auditive encounter with al-Bannā further in al-
Qaraḍāwī 2002a: 159-161, 242-246. 
257 Skovgaard-Petersen 2009: 31-32; Tammam 2009. As Motaz al-Khateeb suggests, al-Qaraḍāwī filled an 
intellectual vacuum in the Islamic movement that came into existence because of the gap between Sayyid 
Quṭb’s (d. 1966) beliefs and the previous ideas of the movement (al-Khateeb 2009: 94). “Briefly”, as al-Khateeb 
puts it, “Qaraḍāwī’s project counters Quṭb’s project” (2009: 94). He argues that al-Qaraḍāwī filled this vacuum 
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the position of the General Guide (al-murshid al-ʿāmm) in the organization; an offer which he 
– repeatedly – declined with the arguments that “God had given him a talent for 
scholarship, not for politics” and that he wanted to be the general guide of all Muslims, not 
only of the Muslim Brothers.258 
The fourth topos: persecution and imprisonment. In 1948, then after the 
assassination of Ḥasan al-Bannā in February 1949, and then – following the failed 
assassination attempt on President Nasser – twice again in 1954, al-Qaraḍāwī was arrested 
and imprisoned like many other members of the Muslim Brotherhood.259 Although he 
worked as a teacher and a preacher after his release in June 1956, his efforts to work were 
seriously hampered by the Egyptian security service.260 Yet he obtained employment in the 
administration of the Azhar, where he came under the tutelage of the renowned Islamic 
thinker Muḥammad al-Bahī.261 It is from this particular position, located within yet on the 
margin of the authoritarian secular state, that he engaged in his first activities of editing 
and writing, including the publication of his earliest – and most influential – book, al-Ḥalāl 
wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām.262 Applying for a position in one of the Azhar’s institutes abroad, he 
evaded the surveillance of the Egyptian security service, arriving in Qatar in 1961.263 
The fifth topos: al-Qaraḍāwī’s exile in Qatar and his establishment as a transnational 
public authority. Like many members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Brotherhood-
associated scholars arriving in Qatar during that period, al-Qaraḍāwī became a teacher and 
public servant in one of Qatar’s religious institutes.264 In a country with no indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“by his abundant production in the fields of Islamic knowledge, Islamic thinking and Islamic movement and 
secondly by realising the main weak point in Quṭb’s work” (al-Khateeb 2009: 95). Academic studies on Quṭb 
are abundant. For an analysis of Quṭb’s reception by al-Qaraḍāwī – and a reference to some central studies on 
the former’s life and work – see Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 324–333, as well as my remarks below (pp. 118–122). 
258 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 381; Skovgaard-Petersen 2009: 37; al-Khateeb 2009: 92. 
259 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004a: 109–110. 
260 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004a: 229–230. 
261 For a study of al-Bahī’s biography, see Badry 2009: 11–13. On al-Bahī’s relation to the Azhar, see Brunner 
1996. Al-Bahī’s name has alternatively been transliterated as “al-Bahayy” (Brunner 1996) and “al-Bahai” 
(Lemke 1980). 
262 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004a: 280–308. 
263 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004b: 321. 
264 al-Qaraḍāwī 2004b: 333. In Doha, al-Qaraḍāwī directed the newly founded College of Higher Religious 
Studies (al-maʿhad al-dīnī al-thanawī). His arrival in Qatar has only more recently been put into context – see 
e.g. Dorsey 2013; Roberts 2014. 
  
 
 
47 
clergy of its own, these Brotherhood-associated scholars proved to be instrumental not 
only to bolster the regime’s domestic legitimacy, but also to fend off the hegemonic 
tendencies of Qatar’s Wahhabi neighbour state, Saudi Arabia, on political and religious 
grounds.265 In the following decades, Qatar’s strategic alliance with the Brotherhood 
became crucial in promoting its foreign policy abroad.266 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s prolific 
publications, which profited from Sadat’s infitāḥ policy and the concomitant liberalization 
of Egypt’s cultural production in the 1970s, made him one of the most audible voices of this 
strategic alliance, both in Egypt and beyond.267 In the mid-1990s, al-Qaraḍāwī took decisive 
advantage of Qatar’s policy of media liberalization and its development into the major hub 
of media-produced reality in the Arabic-speaking world.268 Maintaining the weekly 
programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt on the transnational Arabic satellite television channel Al 
Jazeera, and being one of the first Muslim scholars to embrace the Internet, he has become 
one of the most visible scholars and activists of a (counter)public whose transnational 
discourse not only targets the extremist tendencies of Saudi Salafism, but also Western 
imperialism and the illiberal authoritarianism of the region’s secular regimes.269 It is from 
this particular strategic juncture that al-Qaraḍāwī – like many other writers and activists of 
the Islamic revival – seeks to call and “awaken” his audience at the very spot to which the 
secular state has turned a half-blind eye: the private, the domain of religion and gender.270 
                                                        
265 Dorsey 2013; Haykel 2013; Roberts 2014. 
266 On Qatar’s foreign policy and its strategic alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, see Haykel 2013; Kamrava 
2013; Khatib 2013: 422–425; Roberts 2014; Ulrichsen 2014. 
267 Gräf 2010: 123. The most detailed analysis of Sadat’s infitāḥ policy and its effects on Egypt’s print market is 
still Gonzalez-Quijano’s Les gens du livre (1998). For more recent studies that tackle the repercussions of Sadat’s 
“open-door” policy on cultural production and the emergence of a parallel Islamic sector, see Wickham 2002: 
95–97; Bayat 2007: 136–137; McLarney 2015: 238–243. 
268 Gräf 2010: 119–122; Kamrava 2009; 2011. 
269 For studies of al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with the new media, see Skovgaard-Petersen 2004; Gräf 2007; 
2008; 2010; Galal 2009. 
270 On Islamists’ declaration of the private as “sacred territory” in the context of the Egyptian secular state, 
see McLarney 2015. To put Saudi Arabia on a par with these secular regimes might seem surprising. As 
Stephane Lacroix has forcefully argued, however, “[s]ecularism – in its different social and political senses – 
has [...] been a reality in Saudi Arabia” since the 1950s (Lacroix 2013). Beyond that, the strategic alliance 
between the Saudi royal family and a quietist brand of Salafi scholars has created two interdependent but 
clearly delineated spheres of power “with different (and complementary) prerogatives” (Lacroix 2013). 
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I. The Production of Norms 
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1. The Subject of Desire 
ﺐّﻛ$% ﷲ ﻲﻓ ﻞﻛ ﻦﻣ ﻞﺟﺮﻟ% !"ﺮﻤﻟ&' !ﻮ#ﺷ 
ﺔ"ﺰ"ﺮﻏ ﺔ"ﺮﻄﻓ ﺔ"ﻮﻗ ﺎﻤ#ﻗﻮﺴﺗ ﻰﻟ# !"ﺎﺠﺘﻟ' 
!ءﺎﻘﻠﻟ'( ﻰﺘﺣ ﺮﻤﺘﺴﺗ !ﺎ#ﺤﻟ& ﻰﻘﺒ$% !ﻮﻨﻟ%.  
God mounted in both man and woman a 
strong, natural and instinctive desire that 
drives the two of them to mutual attraction 
and reunion, so that life continues and the 
species remains.271 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
La vie au monde est une vie à l’éros.272 
BOUHDIBA 
The topic of gender has a long genealogy in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings.273 In his earliest text, al-
Ḥalāl, there is already an extensive chapter on the lawful and the prohibited in marriage 
and family life (al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-zawāj wa-ḥayāt al-usra), in which he expounds his 
normative thoughts on sexuality, gendered identities and human nature (fiṭra) on 
ontological and theological grounds.274 
The chapter opens with a reference to an inner complex of impulses and instincts 
(majmūʿa min al-gharāʾiz wa-l-dawāfiʿ) among which the sexual instinct (al-gharīza al-jinsiyya) 
takes a prominent place.275 These instincts have been mounted (rukkiba) or planted (ghurisa) 
inside the human being by its creator as part of a larger scheme of divine wisdom (ḥikma), 
                                                        
271 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996a: 35. 
272 Bouhdiba 2003: 11. 
273 While there have been some brief references in a number of articles, few works have studied the topic of 
gender in al-Qaraḍāwī’s media appearances and writings specifically. For an analysis of his stance on 
homosexuality based on a close analysis of a broadcast of his weekly programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt on Al 
Jazeera, see March 2008; Kugle/Hunt 2012. For studies of his stance on women-related issues, see Roald 2001a; 
2001b; Stowasser 2001; 2008. All these texts are discussed above (pp. 40–42). 
274 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 141–215. 
275 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 141–162. The fundamental significance of gharīza in al-Qaraḍāwī’s reflections on gender 
is structurally highlighted by the place that it takes in this text: the discussion of the sphere of instinct (majāl 
al-gharīza) proceeds and opens his ethico-legal reflections on marriage and family life in its different 
dimensions. 
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stipulating humankind’s succession to God on earth (istikhlāf) and humanity’s biological 
reproduction: 
 !ﺎﺴﻧﻹ& ﷲ ﻖﻠﺧ !ﻔﻠﺨﺘﺴ'ﻟﻓﻲ  ﻰﻠﻋ $ﺗﺎ'ﺣ )ﺮﻤﺘﺳ./ 01ﻮﻨﻟ. .ﺬ6 ﻲﻘﺑ .:; ﻻ; .ﺬ6 ﻢﺘ> ﻦﻟ/ .ﺎ@'ﻓ Bﺮﻤﻌﺘﺴ>/ EFﻷ.
 ﻦﻣ ﺔﻋﻮﻤﺠﻣ (ﺎﺴﻧﻹ- ﻲﻓ ﷲ ﺐﻛ3 ﻚﻟ6 ﻢﺘ9 ﻲﻜﻟ; <=>ﻠﻋ ﷲ ﻖﺣ BCﺆ9; <ﺮﻤﻌ9; ﻲﻨﺒ9; ﻊﻨﺼ9; K3ﺰ9 M3ﻷ-
ﻮﻧ #ءﺎﻘﺑ( )*+ﺮﻓ #ءﺎﻘﺑ ﻦﻤﻀ1 ﺎﻣ ﻰﻟ5 ﺎ6ﻧﺎﻄﻠﺴﺑ ):ﻗﻮﺴﺗ )ﺔ>ﺴﻔﻨﻟ* ﻊﻓ*(ﺪﻟ*( ﺰﺋ*ﺮﻐﻟ*.ﺎﻋ  
God created the human being to make it a successor on earth (istakhlafa) and to settle it on 
her. And this will not be accomplished unless this species (nawʿ) and its life on earth 
continue, cultivating, manufacturing, building and accomplishing God’s right over it. To 
effect this, God mounted inside the human being a complex of instincts (gharāʾiz, sg. gharīza) 
and psychological impulses (dawāfiʿ nafsiyya) that drive [the human being] through their 
power towards that which guarantees its continuity as an individual and its continuity as a 
kind.276 
Al-Qaraḍāwī has continually revisited and expanded this anthropology and its underlying 
heteronormative assumptions about human nature in a number of later writings in which 
theological and biological arguments are neatly entwined.277 In Fatāwā al-marʾa al-muslima, a 
text published almost half a century later, he expresses his thoughts on the gendered 
nature of humans as follows: 
ﺮﻛﺬﺗ %& ﺐﺠ) *ﺮﺧ& ﺔﻘ.ﻘﺣ ﺎﻨ2 -   ﺮﺧﻵ$ ﻰﻟ' ()ﺮﻤﻟ$+ ﻞﺟﺮﻟ$ ﻦﻣ ﻞﻛ ﺔﺟﺎﺣ 4$ﻮﺟ ﻰﻟ'-  ﷲ "# ﻲ%& !ﺮﻏ $ﻧﺎﺤﺒﺳ 
 ﺮﺧﻵ$ ﺲﻨﺠﻟ$ ﻰﻟ* +$ﺬﺠﻧﻻ$ ﺔ0ﻠﺑﺎﻗ ﻦ0ﺴﻨﺠﻟ$ ﻦﻣ ﺪﺣ$: ﻞﻛ =ﺮﻄﻓ ﻲﻓ !!ﻟ" ﻞ"ﻤ ًﻼ#ﻣ %#ﻟ'  !ﺪﺤ$ %ﺒﺒﺴﺑ )ًﺎ$ﺰ$ﺮﻏ ًﺎ$ﻮ0ﺷ
ﻻ"# ءﺎﻘﻠﻟ".!"ﻷ$ %$ﺮﻤﻋ) *+ﻮﻨﻟ$ ءﺎﻘﺑ) 3ﺎﺠﻧ  
[T]here is another truth (ḥaqīqa) that has to be remembered – in the vicinity of both man’s 
and woman’s natural need (ḥāja) for the other – and [this truth] is that God – may He be 
praised – planted (gharasa) in the nature (fiṭra) of each of the two sexes the tendency of 
attraction (qābiliyya al-injidhāb) to the other sex, and the lustful and instinctive desire (mayl 
shahwī gharīzī) for it. Because of [this desire], reunion and natural reproduction, the 
                                                        
276 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a:141. 
277 These naturalizing constructions of gender and sexuality at the intersection of science and politics have 
been deconstructed by Judith Butler (1999) with respect to Western discourses. Butler, however, fails to 
provide a historical account of the emergence of this heteronormative gender binarism (Bublitz 2013: 159, n. 
42). This account has been partially provided for Europe by Schäffner (1995), among others. However it is still 
lacking for the Islamicate world, although an early contribution has recently been made by Gadelrab (2016). 
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continuation of the species (baqāʾ al-nawʿ) and the thriving and prosperity of earth (ʿumrān 
al-arḍ) take place. 278 
Al-Qaraḍāwī considers this natural, inner truth (ḥaqīqa) – the consuming desire of humans 
for the other sex – to be a strong and urging force that subjects the individual being to its 
consuming power, “demanding relief” and the satisfaction of its “ravenous appetite”.279 
Invoking scientific insights from physics, biology and other natural sciences, in a later text 
he draws ironically on the psychoanalyst and critic of religion, Sigmund Freud: 
 ﺲﻔﻨﻟ% ﻢﻠﻋ )*%ﺪﻣ ﺾﻌﺑ 01 ﻰﺘﺣ ,ﺔ6ﺮﺸﺒﻟ% ﺲﻔﻨﻟ% ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮ:ﺛﺄﺘﻟ% =ﻮﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺔ:ﺴﻨﺠﻟ% =ﺰ6ﺮﻐﻠﻟ ﺎﻤﻟ ﻚﻟHI (ﺪ"#ﺮﻓ)ﻟ!ﻔ ﺮﺴ
.!ﻠﻛ $ﺮﺸﺒﻟ) *ﻮﻠﺴﻟ) ﺎ.ﺑ  
The sexual instinct (al-gharīza al-jinsiyya) has such a force and an influence on the human 
psyche (nafsiyya bashariyya) that some schools of psychology (Freud) interpret human 
behaviour in its entirety through it.280 
And, as he adds in a still later text: 
 ﻦﻣ ﻞﺒُﻘ' ﻻ) ,ﻞﺟﺮﻟﺎﺑ /0ﺮﻤﻟ2) /0ﺮﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻞﺟﺮﻟ2 ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﻦﻋ 7ﺪﺤﺘﻧ ﻦ<ﺣ ,ﺔﻘ<ﻘﺤﻟ2 >ﺬ@ ﻰﺴﻨﻧ D0 Eﻮﺠ' ﻼﻓﺾﻌﺑ  !ﺎﻨﻟ%
!ﻓ #ﺎﺜﺘﺴﺗ )* +,ﻮ.ﺸﻟ, ﻢ.!ﻓ ﺮﺛﺆﺗ 5* ﻦﻣ ﺮﺒﻛ* ﻢ.ﻧ* ﻢ.ﺴﻔﻧﻷ ,ﻮﻋﱠﺪ@ 5*!.!ﺎﻄ$ﺸﻟ' ﻢ)$ﻠﻋ ﻚﺤﻀ/ 01 ,ﺰﺋ'ﺮﻐﻟ' ﻢ  
We must not forget this truth (al-ḥaqīqa) when we talk about the relation of man to woman 
and of woman to man. And it is not permissible that some people unduly claim for 
themselves that they are too great for the desires (shahawāt, sg. shahwa) to affect them or for 
the instincts (gharāʾiz, sg. gharīza) to possess (istaʾthara) them, or the devil laughs at them. 281 
The human being as the subject of its desire can neither deny nor resist its inner truth 
(ḥaqīqa). Rather, this inner force subjects the human being to its voracious power and 
demands a constant awareness and watchfulness on the part of its subject. 
                                                        
278 al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 23. 
279 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 141. 
280 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008a: 43. Freud mentions his drive theory (Triebtheorie) first in Drei Abhandlungen zur 
Sexualtheorie. In later phases of his work, he revises the theory significantly (Freud 1999; Nagera/Freud 1998: 
26–41). For a study of Freud’s reception in Arabic, see El Shakry 2014. For a comparison between Freud’s and 
al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) sexual theories, see Mernissi 2011: 44–56. 
281 al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 24. 
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In al-Ḥalāl, al-Qaraḍāwī discerns three different positions (mawāqif, sg. mawqif) on 
how this natural sexual instinct has been used and cultivated: total libertinism (ibāḥiyya), 
repressive asceticism (taqashshuf) and its cultivation within certain boundaries.282 The third 
position, which is identified with the heavenly religions (adyān samāwiyya), sets the sexual 
impulses free within a particular frame, containing and regulating them “without vile 
repression nor lunatic liberty”.283 It is particularly the case that Islam, which al-Qaraḍāwī 
describes as having a position of justice (ʿadl) and a middle way (wasaṭ) – two notions that 
later evolve to become programmatic key terms in his writings284 – acknowledges and 
cultivates human nature (fiṭra) according to a set of normative rules and regulations.285 By 
admitting and even “facilitating the way” to human instinct (gharīza) within its lawful 
frame (iṭār mashrūʿ), Islam strives to engender a particular kind of subjectivity and conduct 
of life that leads to progress and the perfection (kamāl) of society at large: 
ﻂﺳﻮﻟ%& 'ﺪﻌﻟ% ﻮ* ﻒﻗﻮﻤﻟ% %ﺬ*& .. !ﺎﺴﻧﻹ& ءﺎﻘﺑ *&ﺮﻤﺘﺳ& ﻲﻓ ﺎ1*23 4ﺰ6ﺮﻐﻟ& 93: ﺎﻣ <&2ﺰﻟ& =ﺮﺷ ﻻﻮﻠﻓ ..  ﻻﻮﻟ$
ﺟﺮـﻟ% &ﺎﺼﺘﺧ% +ﺎﺠ-./ 0ﺎﻔﺴﻟ% ﻢ-ﺮﺤﺗ ﺔ"ﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻ) ﻒ+)ﻮﻌﻟ) ﺎ/ﻟﻼ1 ﻲﻓ 4ﻮﻜﺘﺗ ﻲﺘﻟ) 7ﺮﺳﻷ) ;ﺄﺸﻧ ﺎﻣ 7@ﺮﻣﺎﺑ ﻞـ
!ﺎﻤﻜﻟ&' ﻲﻗﺮﻟ& ﻰﻟ, -ﻘ/ﺮ0 ﺬﺧ3 ﻻ' ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ& ﺄﺸﻧ ﺎﻣ <ﺮﺳﻷ& ﻻﻮﻟ' @Aﺎﺜ/,' ﺐﺣ' Eﺎﻨﺣ' ﺔﻤﺣA' <Hﻮﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺔJﻗ&ﺮﻟ&.  
This position is justice (al-ʿadl) and the middle way (al-wasaṭ) … if marriage had not been 
enacted (shuriʿa), instinct (gharīza) would not fulfil its role in the continuity of existence of 
the human being … and if fornication (sifāḥ) had not been prohibited and jurisdiction did not 
bind the man to the woman, the family (usra) would not have come into existence, in whose 
shadow the refined social sentiments (al-ʿawāṭif al-ijtimāʿiyya al-rāqiya) of love, mercy and 
compassion (mawadda wa-raḥma wa-ḥanān), of affection (ḥubb) and altruism (īthār), and if the 
family was not there, society would not have come into existence and would not have taken 
its path to progress and perfection.286 
                                                        
282 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 141. 
283 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 142. 
284 For the most comprehensive discussion of wasaṭiyya by al-Qaraḍāwī, see al-Qaraḍāwī 2010b. Gräf (2009a) 
provides an analysis of the concept’s development in al-Qaraḍāwī’s earlier writings. On the relevance of 
wasaṭiyya and the related mīzān in the thinking of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and its later reception by 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1322/1905), see Haj 2011: 87, 239. 
285 In a broadcast on fiṭra that has been aired on his talk show al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt on Al Jazeera, he uses the 
terms mirāʿāh and hadhdhaba to describe Islam’s engagement with the God-created nature (fiṭra) of humans 
(al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b). 
286 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 132. He expresses the same idea a few pages later: “Islam […] has acknowledged the 
instinct (gharīza). Hence, it has facilitated its way in what pertains to the legal. And it has interdicted women’s 
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In al-Ḥalāl, al-Qaraḍāwī outlines the proper use of innate human sexuality within the 
framework of the Islamic revival’s biopolitical project287 in a most extensive chapter that is 
deliberately situated between the sections on Muslims’ private life (ḥayāt shakhsiyya) and 
their public life (ḥayāt ʿāmma).288 The chapter contains regulations in the field of instinct (fī 
majāl al-gharīza), like the prohibition of fornication (zinā), the lustful gaze at the opposite 
sex and the definition of the intimate parts of the male and the female body (ʿawra). They 
touch upon homosexuality (liwāṭ) and masturbation (istimnāʾ bi-l-yad).289 They extend to the 
rules on marriage, including the legitimate boundaries of seeing the engaged woman 
(makhṭūba), a virgin’s (bikr) necessary consent to marriage, temporary marriage (zawāj al-
mutʿa) and the marriage of prostitutes.290 They fix the relations between husband and wife, 
their sexual relationship, contraception, abortion and divorce. And finally, they pick up on 
the relationship between parents and children: for example, does a child need its parents’ 
consent when it goes to holy war (jihād)?291 
                                                                                                                                                                            
chastity and self-denial and their segregation, just like it prohibited adultery and its pursuits and vanguards 
severely. This is the posture of justice (ʿadl) and the middle way (wasaṭ)” (al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 142). In another 
text, he provides a very similar account: “It pertains to the realism of the Islamic shariʿa that it takes the 
power of the sexual impulses in the human being into account. Hence, it has not acted deaf towards them, nor 
has it regarded them with contempt and disgust, as some creeds and faiths have done. Nor is the human being 
satisfied by being guided by its [sexual] impulses alone, as some philosophies would have it […]. [The Islamic 
shariʿa] unites and makes laws for (sharaʿa) the satiation of the sexual instincts in a well-tended way, ensuring 
the survival of the human being, the dignity of the human being and the rise of the human being above the 
beast” (1977b: 158). Later, he expresses the same idea within the framework of the Islamic revival (al-ṣaḥwa al-
islāmiyya) (al-Qaraḍāwī 1988b: 89–91). 
287 For a clarification of the notion of “biopolitics”, see footnote 32 on p. 12. 
288 As Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen have remarked, the book revises the organization of fiqh material 
thoroughly (2009: 5). The text is divided into four chapters. The first chapter discusses the principles (mabādīʾ, 
sg. mabdaʾ) of the legal (ḥalāl) and the prohibited (ḥarām) in Islam. Then, it moves on to reflect these principles 
in the personal or private life of the individual Muslim (al-ḥayāt al-shaḥsiyya li-l-muslim), next in marriage and 
family life, and finally in his public life (al-ḥayāt al-ʿāmma li-l-muslim). In the 2013 edition of the book, al-
Qaraḍāwī has added a further chapter: “The Legal and the Prohibited in the Actions of the Hearts” (al-ḥalāl wa-
l-ḥarām fī aʿmāl al-qulūb). For al-Qaraḍāwī’s retrospective reflections on the formation, publication and 
reception of the text, see al-Qaraḍāwī 2004b: 291–305. These shifts in al-Ḥalāl are discussed further below. 
289 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 141–161. 
290 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 163–180. 
291 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 214–215. 
  
 
 
54 
In his later publications and media appearances, al-Qaraḍāwī has continually revisited 
and gradually expanded these normative reflections and their anthropological underpinnings.292 
While some of these publications show an unbroken continuity, others apparently reflect the 
scientific, technological and political changes of his times.293 What these written texts and media 
appearances have in common, however, is that they address an imagined Muslim reader or 
viewer to whom they ascribe a distinct preoccupation (shughl) and a genuine desire (ḥirṣ) to 
understand (fahima) and use (ṭabbaqa) his or her sexual instinct (gharīza jinsiyya) in the light of 
Islam and its normative rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm). In other words, they render human sexual desire 
into the object of an epistemic desire – for the understanding (fahm) and practice (taṭbīq) of sexual 
desire according to normative knowledge (ʿilm). This epistemic desire is shaped – just like 
sexuality – by a set of disciplinary traditions that simultaneously order and regulate, restrict and 
enable the acquisition of this normative knowledge, putting the individual human being (insān) 
into a distinct relationship with his or her interior (bāṭin) and exterior (ẓāhir), and with the realms 
of private life (ḥayāt shakhsiyya) and public life (ḥayāt ʿāmma). Al-Qaraḍāwī outlined – and at the 
same time reconfigured – the boundaries of these traditions in a programmatic text in the early 
1990s. The text was published seven years later as a prologue to his treatise Taysīr al-fiqh li-l-
muslim al-muʿāṣir fī ḍaw al-qurʾān wa-l-sunna, “The Facilitation of Jurisprudence for the 
Contemporary Muslim in the Light of the Qurʾan and the Sunna”, to which we now turn.294 
                                                        
292 His book-length publications on gender-related issues include, among others, al-Qaraḍāwī 1979; 1988a; 
1994a; 1996a; 1996b; 1999a; 2004a; 2007a; 2007c; 2008a; 2011a. Episodes of his weekly program al-Sharīʿa wa-l-
ḥayāt in which he has tackled questions related to gender include al-Qaraḍāwī 1996e; 1997c; 1998a; 1998b; 
1998c; 1998d; 1999f; 1999h; 2000b; 2003; 2004e; 2004f; 2005b; 2005c; 2006c; 2007; 2008e; 2008f; 2008g; 2008h; al-
Qaraḍāwī/al-Qarā Dāghī 1998. 
293 One important shift in al-Qaraḍāwī’s position on women’s rights has been highlighted by Barbara 
Stowasser (2001). As I discussed earlier (p. 40), this shift signals the emergence of “a new gender paradigm” 
among the religious establishment (Stowasser 2001: 101), with the focus on women’s rights to political 
participation rather than the equality of the sexes in terms of personhood or rights to education and work. A 
second shift concerns al-Qaraḍāwī’s markedly heightened attention to the subject of gender relations during 
the last three decades. Many of his publications are set against the backdrop of international conferences 
such the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in the summer of 1994, the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 or the International Conference of Scholars to Proscribe 
Abuse of the Female Body in Cairo in 2006. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s mediations on Islam and its normative provisions 
reveal themselves as deeply grounded in a reality (wāqiʿ) in which the dialogical encounter with the voice of 
the non-Muslim other takes a central place. 
294 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c. 
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2. The Subject of Knowledge 
ﻢﻠﻌﻟ% ﻻ ﺪﺑ !ﻟ ﻦﻣ !ﻮ#ﻗ ﺎﺻﻮﺼﺧ& ﻢﻠﻌﻟ% !ﻮﺴﻨﻤﻟ' 
ﻰﻟ# ﷲ  
To knowledge, bonds are inevitable, 
particularly knowledge related to God.295 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
“If we wanted to summarize Islam in two words”, al-Qaraḍāwī begins his reflections in the 
prologue to his programmatic treatise Taysīr al-fiqh, 
!"# ,$ﻼﺳﻹ! (ﺈﻓ ! "ﻮﻠﺳ& 'ﺪ)ﻘﻋ ﻮ, :ﺎﻨﻠﻗ ,ﻦ)ﺘﻨﺛ3 ﻦ)ﺘﻤﻠﻛ ﻲﻓ 8ﺼ)ﺨﻠﺗ ﺎﻧ=>!.ﻞﻤﻋ$ %ﺎﻤ'( $  !ﺎ#ﺒﺑ ﻞﻔﻜﺘﻤﻟ, ﻢﻠﻌﻟ,0
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we would say: it is an article of faith (ʿaqīda) and conduct (sulūk) – or faith (īmān) and action 
(ʿamal). The knowledge (ʿilm) that is responsible for the elucidation (bayān) of the article of 
faith (ʿaqīda), its teachings and its comments is “the science of theology” (ʿilm al-tawḥīd). And 
the knowledge that is responsible for the elucidation (bayān) of action (ʿamal) and the 
perception (maʿrifa) of its value in relation to a legal rule (ḥukm sharʿī) is “the science of 
jurisprudence” (ʿilm al-fiqh). And there is a knowledge that is devoted to the interior actions 
(al-aʿmāl al-bāṭina). This is to say: what concerns the actions of the hearts, be they desirable 
or detested. And this is “the science of mysticism” (ʿilm al-taṣawwuf) or “of conduct” 
(sulūk).296 
Although al-Qaraḍāwī has written numerous works in each of these different branches of 
Muslim science, including works on exegesis (tafsīr), the articles of faith (ʿaqāʾid al-islām), 
literature and poetry (adab wa-shiʿr), theology (ʿilm al-kalām) and ethics (fiqh al-sulūk), it is 
fiqh that has concerned him most over the past few decades.297 In the text in focus here, he 
briefly discerns three different conceptions of fiqh. 
                                                        
295 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008h. 
296 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 5. 
297 Tammam 2009: 57. As David Johnston (2014: 41) adds for consideration, however, it was only in the 1990s 
that al-Qaraḍāwī started to engage with the theoretical principles of fiqh (uṣūl al-fiqh). 
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The first conception he expounds refers to the position of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī 
(d. 505/1111).298 Al-Ghazālī’s understanding of fiqh includes, according to al-Qaraḍāwī, all 
three sciences mentioned above, putting theology, jurisprudence and mysticism “side by 
side”, although al-Ghazālī granted mysticism a central position.299 
                                                        
298 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 5. The research literature on al-Ghazālī is extensive. For a recent bibliography, see 
Tamer 2015; Griffel 2015. For biographical accounts, see e.g. Macdonald 1899; Bouyges 1959; Watt 1963; Griffel 
2009: 19–53. Little research has been done thus far on the reception of al-Ghazālī by contemporary Muslim 
thinkers, although a brief overview of this topic has been provided by Moosa (2006: 21-25). Sabah Mahmood 
has alluded in her study of piety groups in modern-day Cairo to the “frequent invocation of Abu Hamid al-
Ghazali’s spiritual exercises and techniques of moral cultivation, found in popular instruction booklets on 
how to become pious, and often referred to in ordinary conversations within the daʿwa circles” (Mahmood 
2011: 137–138). Al-Qaraḍāwī has dedicated a whole treatise to al-Ghazālī (al-Qaraḍāwī 1988b). Elsewhere, he 
describes him as “my first teacher” (shaykhī al-awwal) (2007b: 7). Al-Khateeb, the producer of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
weekly programme on Al Jazeera, highlights al-Qaraḍāwī’s early inclination to al-Ghazālī: “In his primary 
school, Qaraḍāwī gave his first religious lesson about ‘the repentance of sins’ [(al-tawba)]. He delivered his first 
sermon in his fourth primary year about ‘thanking God’ [(al-shukr li-llāh)]” (al-Khateeb 2009: 88; al-Qaraḍāwī 
2002c: 174, 178). He ascribes this inclination to the traditional milieu in which al-Qaraḍāwī grew up, to the 
influence of Ḥasan al-Bannā, whose relations to his followers al-Qaraḍāwī described as “a relation between 
the shaykh and his disciple (murīd) in a spiritual sense” (al-Qaraḍāwī 2002c: 347; al-Khateeb 2009: 89) and to 
the influence of his shaykh, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd (d. 1978), whom al-Qaraḍāwī describes as a “Sufistic man 
(rajul mutaṣawwif) in [his] ideas, emotions and works” (al-Qaraḍāwī 2002c: 413; al-Khateeb 2009: 90). Al-
Khateeb suggests, however, that this spiritual inclination took a back seat when al-Qaraḍāwī became (more?) 
tied to the Muslim Brotherhood: “He modified his method from reading Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn and preaching about 
thanking God and repentance, and concentrated on renewing fiqh [and on] the notion of ‘comprehensive 
Islam’ (al-islām al-shāmil)” (al-Khateeb 2009: 90; al-Qaraḍāwī 2002c: 314). On the fact that al-Qaraḍāwī 
refocused on al-Ghazālī – who has always been present in his writings – and his notion of fiqh, see below and 
my conclusion in particular. 
299 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 5. As Ormsby remarks, al-Ghazālī’s contributions to the development of Islamic law 
have not yet been sufficiently studied (Ormsby 2007: 35). On al-Ghazālī’s notion of fiqh in relation to ethics, 
see, among others, Moosa 2006: 237–260. For a succinct overview of the state of research on relations between 
Sufism and fiqh in a broader perspective, see Belhaj 2013: 81–83. In recent years, the long-assumed historical 
opposition between Sufism and Islamic law has undergone much revision in academic scholarship, leading 
van Ess, among others, to state that “there has never been any clear and uniform pattern of enmity between 
the jurists and the mystics” (1999: 34). Al-Qaraḍāwī has written about Sufism, striving to (re)harmonize it 
with fiqh, a programme that he circumscribes with the classical notion of fiqh al-sulūk; see al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 
5–27. For al-Ghazālī’s reflections on maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, see chapter III.4 below. 
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The second, earlier, authority that he discusses is Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767).300 Abū 
Ḥanīfa included in his understanding of fiqh both theology (tawḥīd) and the articles of faith 
(ʿaqāʾid, sg. ʿaqīda), denoting this subsequently as greater fiqh (al-fiqh al-akbar).301 
In addition to these two scholars, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, there exist some older 
authorities who included in their works on fiqh the articles of faith (ʿaqāʾid, sg. ʿaqīda) and 
rules of conduct (ʾādāb, sg. ʾadab), such as the Maliki scholar Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī 
(d. 385/996) in his work al-Risāla,302 or the Zahiri scholar and polymath Ibn Ḥazm 
(d. 456/1064) in al-Muḥallā.303 Against the backdrop of these older doctrinal positions, al-
Qaraḍāwī formulates the common understanding of fiqh: 
ﻼﻄﺻﻻ% ﻰﻓ ﺮ)ﺘﺷ% ,ﺬﻟ% ﻦﻜﻟ1 !"#ﺎﺒﻋ ﻦﻣ ,ﻦ)ﻔﻠﻜﻤﻠﻟ /ﺮ1ﺎﻈﻟ" 3ﺎﻌﻓﻷﺎﺑ 8ﻘﻔﻟ" ﻢﻠﻋ #"ﺮﻓ; ﻮ1 ,ﺮﻣﻷ" 8)ﻠﻋ ﺮﻘﺘﺳ"? ,@
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300 On Abū Ḥanīfa’s life, see van Ess 1991: 186–191; Madelung 2013; Yanagihashi 2013. 
301 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 5. Schacht describes the text of the same name, al-Fiqh al-akbar, as “a production of Abū 
Ḥanīfa’s circle” and the “oldest document” of “popular orthodoxy”, having the typical form of “little treatises 
written for the instruction of the people, children and illiterates, which were meant to be learned by heart 
and recited” (Schacht 1953: 36–37). The original form and authorship of al-Fiqh al-akbar are debated (Rudolph 
1997: 61–62; van Ess 1997: 207), although based on al-Qaraḍāwī’s brief reference here, it is unclear if he is 
aware of these debates. According to Johansen, “[u]ntil the middle of the eighth century of our era, the 
second of the Muslim hijra, the term fiqh covers legal, ethical and theological norm constructions, especially 
creeds. Important early creeds came to be known under the titles of Fiqh Akbar, the greater fiqh or Fiqh Absaṭ, 
the shorter fiqh” (Johansen 1999: 1–2). Quoting Wensinck, he highlights that “fiḳh in the technical sense of 
jurisprudence hardly occurs in canonical tradition. Likewise, faḳīh in the literature has not yet received the 
special sense of juris peritus. It usually means ‘theologian’ ” (Wensinck 1932: 110–111). It was only at the 
beginning of the third/ninth century, the time of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), “that jurists tend not to include 
theologians among those whose opinion counts in the consensus of fiqh scholars and not to consider them as 
fuqahāʾ. In the tenth century, this question is definitely settled: a theologian is not a faqīh and his opinion does 
not count in the consensus of fiqh scholars” (Johansen 1999: 2). It is not without a certain irony to remember 
that al-Qaraḍāwī studied Islamic theology (uṣūl al-dīn), not fiqh (al-Qaraḍāwī 2002b: 403). 
302 al-Qayrawānī (n.d.). The Risāla represents a “synopsis of Mālikism” and has been the subject of continual 
study and commentary by Maliki scholars (Idris 1971). The work has been translated into English and into 
French, with translations by Fagnan (1914), Bercher (1952), Russell (1963) and Kenny (1992). Cornell (1998; 
1999) provides an interesting analysis of the epistemological conflict between Sufism and fiqh in Marinid 
Morocco through the case study of al-Qayrawānī. 
303 Ibn Ḥazm 1996. For an overview of the life and work of Ibn Ḥazm, see Adang et al. 2013. A comprehensive 
bibliography of secondary sources on Ibn Ḥazm is provided by Chipman (2012). 
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[The usage of the word], however, that became common in linguistic usage, and on which 
the affair was finally settled, is the particular assignment of jurisprudence (ʿilm al-fiqh) to the 
exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira) of those who are obligated to observe the precepts of religion 
(mukallafūn, sg. mukallaf), pertaining to acts of ritual devotion (ʿibādāt) or social intercourse 
(muʿamalāt), so that through [jurisprudence] the lawful from the prohibited, sound from 
false, permissible from non-permissible might be known (li-yuʿraf) […].304 
Seemingly following the predominant definition of fiqh, then, al-Qaraḍāwī exposes 
jurisprudence as a discipline that enables the subject to enter into an ethically reflected 
relation to his exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira), as the term “recognition” or “distinction” 
(ʿarafa) makes evident in these lines. 
A second approach interlaced with this particular understanding of jurisprudence 
(ʿilm al-fiqh). It is by way of this second approach that al-Qaraḍāwī dissociates his position 
from these older conceptions of fiqh. The programmatic key term at this point is taysīr: 
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304 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 6. Baber Johansen dates the rise of this conception again to the time of al-Shāfiʿī 
(d. 204/820), i.e. to the third/ninth century: “The intentions and motives of other human beings are 
accessible only through the observation of their acts and their enunciations. As al-Shāfiʿī puts it: God alone 
knows what happens in the mind of the human beings. He alone, therefore, can punish individuals if they 
pretend outwardly to be believers but remain unbelievers in their innermost convictions. The human beings, 
the prophet, as well as the rulers and judges are not entitle[d] to take God’s place. Human judges cannot 
punish people for what they think and believe as long as they do not explicitly enounce their convictions. God 
will impose his punishment in the hereafter. In this world human justice has to judge according to the 
appearances of observable acts and enunciations […]. The fiqh has to follow outward experiences” (Johansen 
1999: 23–24). Or as Messick puts it: “[T]his basic legal orientation to the outward and manifest, to the ẓāhir, 
serves to restrain the sort of ‘depth’ analysis that grew up in ‘subjective’ western legal interpretation. In the 
Islamic tradition there was no legal psychology; the classic expert called to court was the physiognomist, the 
specialist in reading outward physical signs as indications” (2001: 177). This observation, which had led 
earlier Orientalist scholarship to denounce Islam as a rigidly legalistic religion, has recently received an 
important correction from Power’s study on the role of intention (niyya) in Muslim legal thought (Powers 
2006). 
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And now, we publish this book that might be regarded as the beginning (al-fātiḥa) of this 
series, encompassing the principles (uṣūl, sg. aṣl) and premises (muqaddimāt, sg. muqaddima) 
that shed light on our programme (manhaj) in this important affair, and on the legitimacy of 
facilitating (taysīr) [jurisprudence], [on the reason] why we embrace it, and on its purpose in 
the domain of understanding (fahm), in the domain of action (ʿamal) and of practice 
(taṭbīq).305 
Al-Qaraḍāwī is aiming, as becomes allusively recognizable here, at the renewal of Muslim 
jurisprudence (tajdīd al-fiqh) at a more fundamental level – a programme in which the 
facilitation of this discipline (taysīr al-fiqh) takes a central place.306 As he points out a few 
lines below, with this programme al-Qaraḍāwī draws on other important thinkers of 
modern Islamism, most notably Sayyid Sābiq (d. 1420/2000). In the 1940s, Sābiq composed 
on behalf of Ḥasan al-Bannā (d. 1368/1949) the popular work Fiqh al-sunna, a book in which 
the project of facilitating Islamic jurisprudence took a central place.307 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s intimate connection with modern Islamism and the prominent 
influence of it on his legal thought are equally reflected in the second programmatic term 
that he introduces at this point: shumūl, the comprehensive validity of Muslim 
jurisprudence for all spheres of life.308 This comprehensiveness of fiqh, al-Qaraḍāwī goes on 
to say in his treatise, has been lost by Muslims in the course of the centuries of recession 
(tarājuʿ), deviation (inḥirāf) and decline (inḥiṭāṭ). In consequence, he complains, fiqh has 
been pruned and reduced to “questions on menstruation and childbirth, on ritual ablution 
                                                        
305 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 6–7. 
306 On tajdīd al-fiqh, see al-Qaraḍāwī 1986. For a social and historical contextualization of al-Qaraḍāwī’s project 
of renewing Muslim jurisprudence, see Krämer 2006: 198; Gräf 2010: 157–165. For an overview of modern 
Muslim debates on fiqh, see Krämer 1999: 49–67; Corrado 2010. 
307 Sābiq 1999. On Sayyid Sābiq, see Salahi 2005. On al-Qaraḍāwī’s relation to Sābiq, see al-Qaraḍāwī 2005; 
Tammam 2009: 57. On Sābiq’s reception in the Cairene mosque movement, see Mahmood 2011: 80–81. Gauvain 
highlights the ongoing presence of Sābiq’s text in the curriculum of Egyptian Salafi institutions; see Gauvain 
2012: 35–37, 62, 108, 274, 284. 
308 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s concept of comprehensiveness is directly shaped by Ḥasan al-Bannā; see al-Qaraḍāwī 1991b; 
2002c: 314. Al-Qaraḍāwī equally applies this concept to the shariʿa or to devotional practice (ʿibāda) (al-
Qaraḍāwī 1970b: 51–53; 1996c: 120–122). On shumūl al-fiqh, see additionally al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 10-11. Dietrich 
Jung has provided a historical account of the construction of Islam as an all-encompassing system within an 
emerging global public sphere, in which both Western Orientalists and Islamists have actively taken part 
(Jung 2011). 
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and prayer, on breastfeeding, divorce and the like that belong to the personal life (ḥayāt 
shakhsiyya) of the Muslim”.309 
The direction of his argument is manifest: al-Qaraḍāwī demands the dissolution of 
the false boundaries of a historically misconceived and privatized fiqh and thus its re-
extension beyond the domain of personal life; a domain that he markedly relates to the 
female body, reproduction and devotional practices.310 This extended and renewed fiqh also 
includes, he continues, the domains of politics and good governance, the economy, 
elections, social justice and postcolonial imperialism. From a secularist point of view, this 
claim has significant repercussions, as al-Qaraḍāwī’s understanding of fiqh is explicitly 
directed against the privatization of Islamic legislation (tashrīʿ) and its restriction to the 
domains of religion, ritual and gender.311 
At this point, questions arise: How does this allegedly renewed and facilitated 
discipline of Muslim jurisprudence – as a comprehensive and de-privatized discipline that 
orders and regulates all aspects of human life – subject the individual to its normative 
rules? How do these norms, which address the individual’s exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira), 
govern and subject this individual’s inner human nature (fiṭra) – its innate and instinctive 
desire for the other sex? And how do they seek to co-opt this individual for the biopolitical 
project and its underlying vision of a pious subject and a perfect society?312 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s text 
provides an interesting, although preliminary, answer to these questions by shifting its focus to 
two further notions: understanding (fahm) and action (ʿamal) or practice (taṭbīq). It is the former 
of these notions – fahm – on which I wish to concentrate. 
                                                        
309 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 12. 
310 The nexus between gender, the private and the public in Islamist thinking is, however, more complicated 
than the present passage suggests. I am grateful to Bettina Dennerlein for directing my attention to this 
point. For an insightful discussion of this relation, see McLarney 2010; McLarney 2015. 
311 This antithetical direction of his argument against a secularist understanding of religion (dīn) is most 
explicit in Shumūl, al-Qaraḍāwī’s commentary on the twenty fundaments (al-ʿuṣūl al-ʿishrīn) of the right 
understanding (fahm) of Islam formulated by Ḥasan al-Bannā. There, he points out that al-Bannā stipulated 
the concept of “comprehensiveness” against the historical backdrop of Western imperialism, its apolitical 
notion of religion, the secular state and the formation of a secular conscience. To affirm the notion of Islam’s 
comprehensiveness, al-Qaraḍāwī draws extensively on the works of Western Orientalists like Brian Vesey-
Fitzgerald, Carlo Alfonso Nallino, Thomas Walker Arnold, Rudolf Strothmann and Duncan Black MacDonald 
(al-Qaraḍāwī 1991b: 53). 
312 As highlighted in the introduction (p. 22), the notion of the “subject” that I use here draws on the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault. 
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3. The Materiality of Knowledge 
ﻢﻠﻌﻟ% ﻲﻘ#ﻘﺤﻟ& ﻮ" !ﺬﻟ$ ﻞﺜﻤﺘ% ﻲﻓ ﻢ"ﻔﻟ% ﻢﻀ#ﻟ%&.  
True knowledge is the one which presents 
itself in understanding and digestion.313 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
Al-Qaraḍāwī has extensively elaborated on the notion of understanding (fahm) in a number 
of writings belonging to different genres and branches of traditional Islamic scholarship.314 
The primacy of understanding (fahm) as knowledge’s right upon its followers (ḥuqūq al-ʿilm 
ʿalā aṣḥābihī) is a recurrent theme in these texts. In the treatise discussed in the previous 
chapter, Taysīr al-fiqh, al-Qaraḍāwī identifies ten points or recommendations on how to 
establish understanding (fahm) within the subject of fiqh.315 They are: 
1. aspiring for simplicity and an intermediate position (tawakhkhī al-suhūla wa-l-
tawassuṭ) 
2. addressing the contemporary mind (mukhāṭabat al-ʿaql al-muʿāṣir) 
3. using contemporary information, measures and terms (istikhdām maʿārif al-ʿaṣr wa-
maqādīrihī wa-muṣtalaḥātihī) 
4. connecting jurisprudence to reality and dropping that which has no relation to it 
(rabṭ al-fiqh bi-l-wāqiʿ wa-ḥadhf mā lā yattaṣil bihī) 
5. elucidating the wisdom of the legislation (bayān ḥikmat al-tashrīʿ) 
6. connecting the legal provisions with each other (rabṭ al-aḥkām baʿḍihā bi-baʿḍ) 
7. reducing the abundance of appendixes and complications (takhaffuf min kathrat al-
zawāʾid wa-l-taʿqidāt) 
8. utilizing modern texts (istifāda min kitābāt al-ʿaṣr) 
9. different levels of books (mustawayāt mukhtalifa min al-kutub) 
10. numbering, tools of elucidation and a precise index (al-tarqīm wa-wasāʾil al-īḍāḥ wa-l-
fihrisa al-daqīqa) 
                                                        
313 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008b: 57. 
314 See, among others, al-Qaraḍāwī 1991b; 2007b: 121–123; 2008b: 57–59. 
315 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 16–23. 
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Each of these items, which aim at the production of understanding (fahm), is further 
divided into several sub-items. Although many of these items concern the renewal of the 
discipline from an epistemological angle, what is most striking is the constitutive role that 
media and language – that is, very material aspects – play in the establishment of 
understanding (fahm). Thus, al-Qaraḍāwī demands, under point (1), the aspiration of 
facilitation and of a moderate position: 
!"#ﺎﺒﻌﻟ" ﻲﻓ ﻒﻠﻜﺘﻟ". ,/ﺎﻔﻟﻷ" ﻲﻓ 2"ﺮﻏﻹ" ﻦﻋ ﺪ9ﻌﺑ ,ﻞ<ﺳ 2ﻮﻠﺳ?. ,ﺔﻄﺴﺒﻣ ﺔﻐﻠﺑ ﺐﺘﻜF G?  
To write in a simplified language (lugha mubaṣṣata) and in a simple style (uslūb sahl), far from 
unusual enunciations (al-ighrāb fī al-alfāẓ) and airs in expressions (al-takalluf fī al-ʿibārāt).316 
And: 
 ﺐﻨﺠﺗ! !"#ﺎﺒﻋ ﻰﻟ) (ﺎ*ﺘﻤﺟﺮﺗ)0 ,ﺺﺼﺨﺘﻤﻟ" ﺮ4ﻏ 6#ﺎﻘﻟ" 8ﺪﻟ :ﻮﻤﻐﻟ" ﻦﻣ ﺮ4ﺜﻛ ﺎ*4ﻓ ﻲﺘﻟ" !ﺎﺤﻠﻄﺼﻤﻟ" F#ﻮﻋ
!"ﺎﻌﻟ& ﺺﺨﺸﻠﻟ ﺔﻣﻮ.ﻔﻣ ﺔﺴﻠﺳ  
Avoiding the difficulty of terms (wuʿūrat al-muṣṭalaḥāt) in which there is much ambiguity for 
the non-specialized reader (al-qāriʾ ghayr al-mutakhaṣṣiṣ), and their “translation” into 
expressions that are smooth and intelligible (ʿibārāt salisa mafhūma) for the ordinary person 
(li-l-shakhs al-ʿādī).317 
Under point (2), he expands: 
ﺔﺒ#ﺎﺨﻣ!ﻞﻘﻌﻟ%!ﺮﺻﺎﻌﻤﻟ'!ﺑﺎ!ﺎﺴﻠﻟ!ﻟ"!ﺬ!ﻦ"ﺒ$!!ﻟ!! [...]ﻞﻤﺸ$!ﻚﻟ#!ﺔﺒ#ﺎﺨﻣ!!"ﻮﻌﻟ"!!ﺎﺴﻠﺑ!!"ﻮﻌﻟ"! ,!"ﻮﺨﻟ"&!!ﺎﺴﻠﺑ!
!"ﻮﺨﻟ"!, ﱟﻞﻜﻠﻓ!!ﺘﻐﻟ!.!ﺘ#ﻠﻘﻋ'  
Addressing the contemporary mind in language that is clear to it. […] This consists of 
addressing ordinary people (ʿawāmm) in the language of the ordinary people, and the elites 
(khawāṣṣ) in the language of the elites. Each one has his language (lugha) and his mentality 
(ʿaqliyya).318 
Similarly, he demands with point (3): 
                                                        
316 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 16. 
317 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 16. 
318 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 16. 
  
 
 
63 
!ﺪﺤﻟ% &ﺎﺤﻠﻄﺼﻤﻟ% ﺾﻌﺑ /%ﺪﺨﺘﺳ%ﻷ" ﻢ$ﻓ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻦ*ﻌﺗ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ "12 ﺔﺜﺣ.[...] ﺔ"ﻋﺮﺸﻟ' (ﺎﻜ  
The use of some modern terms if they help in understanding the legal provisions […].319 
And in regard to the form and shape of the text: 
ﻟ"# ,ﺔﻋﻮﺒﺘﻤﻟ" ﺐ+"ﺬﻤﻟ" ﻲﻓ (/ﻮﺘﻤﻟ") 0ﺑ ﺖﻓﺮﻋ 4ﺬﻟ" ,ﺰﻐﻠﻤﻟ" 8ﺎﺠ;ﻹ" ﻦ>ﺑ ﻂﺳﻮﺘﻟ"ﻮﺼﻘﻤﻟ& 'ﺎﻛ ﻰﺘ!  ﻞ"#ﺴﺗ ﺎ#ﻨﻣ
... !"ﺮ$ﺮﻘﺗ ﻰﻟ) ﺎﻧﺎ,ﺣ. /"ﻮﺤﻟ"2 ,/"ﻮﺣ ﻰﻟ) 32ﺮﺸﻟ"2 ,32ﺮﺷ ﻰﻟ) 6ﻮﺘﻤﻟ" ﺖﺟﺎﺘﺣ" ﻢﺛ ,ﻆﻔﺤﻟ"  !ﺎﻨ$ﻹ& ﻦ(ﺑ*
.ﻚﻟ# ﻰﻟ% ﺔﺟﺎﺣ ﺮ+ﻏ ﻲﻓ ﻞ+ﺼﻔﺘﻟ34 5ﺮﺸﻟ3 ﻲﻓ ﻊﺳﻮﺘ: ;ﺬﻟ3 ,ﻞﻤﻤﻟ3  
An intermediate position (tawassuṭ) between the enigmatic brevity for which the “texts” 
(mutūn, sg. matn) in the well-followed schools of jurisprudence (madhāhib, sg. madhhab) were 
known and whose purpose was to facilitate memorization – with the texts then requiring 
commentaries (shurūḥ, sg. sharḥ), and the commentaries super-commentaries (ḥawāshin, sg. 
ḥāshiyya), and the super-commentaries at times [requiring additional] remarks – … and the 
monotonous length that unnecessarily spreads in the commentary (sharḥ) and the minute 
exposition .320 
When it comes to the book, he writes for point (9): 
 ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ& ﻊﻣ )*ﺪﺘ- ,.&*/ﻹ&1 ﺔﻓﺎﻘﺜﻟ& ﻦﻣ ﻦ8ﻌﻣ :ﻮﺘﺴﻤﻟ <ﺎﺘﻛ ﻞﻛ ,?ﻘﻔﻟ& ﻲﻓ <ﺎﺘﻛ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛC .ﺎﻨE Fﻮﻜ- FC ﻦﺴﺤ-
 ﻢﺛ ,#$%ﺎﺒﻌﻟﺎﺑ +ﺪﺒ-. ,ﺎﻤﻛ. ً ﺎﻔ3ﻛ!"ﺆﺸﺑ  ﻢﺛ ,#ﺮﺳﻷ'ﺑ.ﺎ"ﻠﻛ %ﻘﻔﻟ) *)ﻮﺑ- ﻞﻤﺸ1 ﻚﻟ3 ﺪﻌﺑ ﻢﺛ ,ﺔﻤ"ﻤﻟ) 9ﻼﻣﺎﻌﻤﻟﺎ ! ﻦﻜﻤ$
ﺛﻼﺛ #$ ﻦ&'ﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ /ﻮﻜ' /$ﺔ !ﺎﻛ ﺪﻗ& . ﻰﻟ#ﺰﻐﻟ# ﺪﻣﺎﺣ ﺎﺑ+ ,ﺎﻣﻹ# ﺪﺠﻨﻓ .ﻢ2ﻔ4ﻟﺄﺗ ﻲﻓ #ﺬ9 :ﻮﻋ#ﺮ> :ﻮﻘﺑﺎﺴﻟ# ﺎﻧBﺎﻤﻠﻋ
 !)505 [...] (ﻂ"ﺴﺒﻟ&) ﻢﺛ (ﻂ"ﺳﻮﻟ&) ﻢﺛ (ﺰ"ﺟﻮﻟ&) ﻢﺛ (ﺔﺻﻼﺨﻟ&) :ﺔ"ﻌﻓﺎﺸﻟ& 5ﻘﻓ ﻲﻓ ﻒﻟﺆ: (;.  
It is good that there is more than [a single kind of] book in Islamic jurisprudence – each 
[kind] for a certain level of cultivation (thaqāfa) and intelligence (idrāk), which progress with 
the Muslim [reader] gradually both in quality and quantity: beginning with the ʿibādāt, then 
with the affairs of the family, then with the significant human relations (muʿāmalāt), and 
encompassing after that all fields of Islamic jurisprudence. And it is possible that they are on 
two or three levels. Our earlier scholars used to take this into account in their writing. 
Hence, we find that Imam Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) composed in Shafiʿi 
jurisprudence: The Summary (al-khulāṣa), The Brief Treatise (al-wajīz), The Middle-Sized Treatise 
(al-wasīṭ), The Plain (al-basīṭ) […].321 
                                                        
319 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 17. 
320 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 16. 
321 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 22–23. 
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What is striking in these paragraphs is the centrality of language and its materiality, which 
appear as an obstacle and an indispensable prerequisite at the same time: simplifying 
(taysīr) their form and style is crucial for establishing an understanding (fahm). These 
linguistic and material concerns of a modern Islamic activist and Muslim scholar, however, 
are not unique. 
As Charles Hirschkind has observed in his study of present-day Muslim preachers in 
Cairo, the most visible enunciation of the very material and linguistic foundations of the 
public they seek to address is central to their discourse.322 In this regard, he highlights, 
their notion of an “Islamic” public clearly departs from the concept of a liberal public.323 By 
concealing its own disciplinary, material and social conditions – a certain use of language, 
its material underpinnings, its gendered nature – the liberal public describes itself as a self-
organized autotelic system that exists “by virtue of being addressed”.324 Through this self-
description – and this is crucial – it preserves the image of a space free of power and 
authority to which everybody has access without any presuppositions, due to their natural, 
universal reason.325 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s concept of an Islamic public fundamentally differs from this image of 
a liberal public that disguises and obfuscates its disciplinary preconditions. The difference 
lies not only in al-Qaraḍāwī’s demand to de-privatize religion and to extend its normative 
claims beyond questions on menstruation and devotional practices to the realm of politics; 
but also in the explicit reflection of the precarious material and intellectual capacities of 
the public subjectivities he seeks to address. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s eminent concern for the material and linguistic form of Muslims’ 
normative discourse has likewise been reflected in a number of his earlier writings and 
publications, in which he discusses the adequate instruments for the acquisition of 
“knowledge that each Muslim is obliged to seek (al-ʿilm al-mafrūḍ ṭalabuhu ʿalayhi)” and the 
proper “means for the cultivation of the mind” (wasāʾil al-tathqīf).326 Basically, al-Qaraḍāwī 
                                                        
322 Hirschkind 2006: 106. 
323 Hirschkind 2006: 106. 
324 Warner 2002: 50. 
325 Hirschkind 2006: 106; Warner 2002: 67–74, 114–115. 
326 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 113–115; 2008c: 54–56. As Khaled El-Rouayheb has highlighted, there has been a long 
tradition of Arabic works that are partly or entirely devoted to the proper ways of acquiring knowledge since 
the third/ninth century (2015: 100). 
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discerns four interrelated ways (ṭuruq, sg. ṭarīq) in which knowledge can be acquired: 
attending “sessions of knowledge” (majālis al-ʿilm) and listening (samiʿa) to the oral speech 
(al-mushāfaha) of the scholar; asking sound questions (istiftāʾ); reading books (qirāʾa); and 
consuming new media (iʿlām). The appropriateness and effectiveness of these means and 
instruments, he concedes, varies depending on the intellectual state (aḥwāl, sg. ḥāl) of the 
individual – differentiating between “the literate, educated Muslim (al-muslim al-qāriʾ al-
mutaʿallim)” and “the illiterate” or “uneducated (ummī)”.327 
Although he describes the practices of listening and asking and of consuming new 
media as powerful technologies for the acquisition of knowledge, it is the third technique 
that gets al-Qaraḍāwī’s closest attention and that he depicts as the strongest in effect 
(taʾthīr): the book and the practice of reading (qirāʾa, muṭālaʿa). This valuation is 
apodictically reflected in a few lines in which he draws the following conclusion from a 
comparison of the book to other types of media: 
.] !ﺎﻘﺛ ءﺎﻤﻠﻋ ﺎ)ﻔﱠﻟ- ﺐﺘﻜﻟ ﺔﻌﻟﺎﻄﻤﻟ45 6ء4ﺮﻘﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻣ-5 ,ﻒ"ﻘﺜﺘﻟ'( )"ﺟﻮﺘﻟ' ﻲﻓ ﺎ/ﺮﺛ2( ﺎ3ﺘﻤ"ﻗ ﺔﺑﻮﺘﻜﻤﻟ' ﺔﻤﻠﻜﻠﻟ ﻞﻈﺘﺳ( ,[..
.ً"ﺮﺛ% ﻰﻘﺑﻷ" ,ً"ﺮﻤﻋ ,ﻮ.ﻷ" ﻰ/0  
And what the recitation and reading (al-qirāʾa wa-l-muṭālaʿa) of books concerns that reliable 
scholars have composed […]: the written word will keep its value and its effect in the 
guidance [of the mind] (tawjīh) and [its] cultivation (tathqīf). It has the longest lifespan and 
the most lasting effect (athar).328 
This effectiveness of the written word, however, crucially depends on a number of 
disciplinary norms and conditions that regulate its production and consumption alike, 
thereby simultaneously restricting and enabling the pious reader’s epistemological 
transformation and his or her formation of a virtuous self through it. It is these normative 
conditions that we focus on in the following chapter. 
                                                        
327 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 114. 
328 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007b: 115. 
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II. The Circulation of Norms 
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1. Reimagining the Muslim Reader 
Production … creates the consumer.329 
KARL MARX 
ﻰﻧﺮﺒﺧ& !"ﺎﻣ !ﺮﻘﺗ ؟ !ﺮﺒﺧ%  :ﻦَﻣ ﺖﻧ# !  
Tell me, what do you read? 
And I tell you: who you are! 330 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
...ﻲﻘ#ﻘﺤﻟ& ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ& +,ﺎﻘﻟ& ﻮ" ﺮ"ﻘﻓ  
… the real Muslim reader is poor. 
SULTAN WAHBA 
 
Figure 1 – Sultan Wahba, owner of the Wahba Publishing House, sitting in his office on Republic Street 
underneath the portrait of his father, Wahba Ḥasan Wahba. 
It is 12 December 2011, 7 p.m. local time in Cairo. In a narrow, elongated room whose walls are piled 
with books to the ceiling, I sit opposite Sultan Wahba, owner of the Wahba Publishing House (see Fig. 
1). The publishing house is located on Republic Street (shāriʿ al-jumhūriyya) in downtown Cairo, 
                                                        
329 Marx/Mandel 1992. 
330 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 115. 
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where it reopened its doors in the early 1970s, after several forced evictions, confiscations of its 
inventory and subsequent prison terms for its former owner, Wahba Ḥasan Wahba, Sultan Wahba’s 
father.331 It is here where al-Qaraḍāwī’s first and arguably most influential book al-Ḥalāl was 
published in 1972: 
S. WAHBA:  We began to print a few books by the Muslim Brotherhood, […] … then a few books 
about language, … till we finally made the acquaintance of … or, to be precise … 
once again made the acquaintance of our master (ustādh) … the honourable 
Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī, namely in connection with his book al-Ḥalāl, shortly after it 
had been published by Dār al-iʿtiṣām. And there is a story about the book related 
to this publisher. [He restrains laughter.] Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī – may God bless 
him – submitted to master Asʿad al-Sayyid, who belonged to the first guard of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the manuscript for publication.332 [He takes a deep drag of 
his cigarette.] Al-Sayyid then passed the manuscript to Dār al-iʿtiṣām. And Dār al-
iʿtiṣām took it and passed it in turn to the renowned Shaykh Ḥasan ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr who 
added some comments (taʿlīqāt, sg. taʿlīq) – and then they printed the book like 
this. [He pauses.] Which infuriated al-Qaraḍāwī. But in this way the book got into 
print. And when al-Qaraḍāwī received the edition, it was furnished with some 
responses (rudūd, sg. radd) by Shaykh Ḥasan ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr. Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī 
was furious and wrote for his part some responses (rudūd, sg. radd). And that’s 
how it came about that al-Qaraḍāwī finally got to Cairo, to us, to the Wahba 
Publishing House, where he came to an understanding with father – he was tied to 
father by earlier bonds, an old bond … bonds from prison and bonds from … [He 
breaks the sentence off.] So he submitted al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām to 
father another time for its publication. And he explained to father that Shaykh 
Ḥasan ʿĀshūr had done this and that and that after that he had done that and 
this. But father printed neither the response that Shaykh Ḥasan ʿĀshūr had 
written, nor the response by al-Qaraḍāwī. And he told him: … [He straightens 
himself up.] “Sir! The writing that Ḥasan ʿĀshūr has composed and your response 
                                                        
331 On Wahba Ḥasan Wahba, see Gräf 2013b. 
332 Apart from a reference in al-Qaraḍāwī’s autobiography, I was not able to find any further information on 
this publisher nor the publishing house itself. See al-Qaraḍāwī 2004c: 392–393. 
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(radd) will increase the book’s size. And this is not in the interests of the reader 
(ṣāliḥ al-qāriʾ).” [He pauses. Then he leans forward in my direction.] This was the 
aim of Wahba Ḥasan Wahba – may God have mercy upon him – the affordability 
(mutanāwal) for the Muslim reader. Because he knew that the real Muslim reader 
is poor (al-qārīʾ al-muslim al-ḥaqīqī huwa faqīr). He scrimps and saves for 
books from his daily work (yuwaffir min quwwat yaumihī al-kitāb). And so, as 
I recall, seven or five thousand copies of the book were printed. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s literary oeuvre presently comprises over 170 titles.333 The vast majority of his 
writing is of the type usually known as kitāb islāmī, literally the “Islamic book”, an editorial 
phenomenon that gained currency in the 1970s and that has affirmed its strength ever 
since.334 The emergence of the Islamic book is located at the intersection of a number of 
social, technological and political developments, including secular mass education and 
increased literacy, the spread of new media technologies and Egypt’s economic 
liberalization in the 1970s.335 Profiting from Sadat’s cultural policy, which supported Islamic 
trends in order to control the more progressive ones, as Gonzalez-Quijano has highlighted, 
the amount of Islamic literature printed from 1975 to 1985 made up fifty per cent of the 
total amount of Islamic literature printed since the rise of the press.336 In the late 1990s, the 
Islamic edition had attained an absolutely phenomenal volume of production.337 
                                                        
333 His oeuvre is divided into sixteen thematical series, each comprising between four and seventeen titles. 
Husam Tammam divides his oeuvre into four stages. During the 1960s, al-Qaraḍāwī’s major objective was to 
protect the Islamist project from socialist criticism. This objective was reflected in his series Ḥatmiyyat al-ḥall 
al-islāmī (The Inevitability of the Islamic Solution). In the second stage, spreading over the 1970s and the 
1980s, it was the Islamic awakening (al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyya) that came to the fore. The third stage was much 
influenced by the proliferation of Islamic currents, during which al-Qaraḍāwī dedicated his efforts to 
establishing a common ground for cooperation between them. The fourth stage was dominated by questions 
on forming an Islamic state, globalization and interreligious dialogue. See Tammam 2009: 65–66. 
334 Although several studies have appeared on the Islamic book, the central reference remains Gonzalez-
Quijano 1998. Gonzalez-Quijano locates the earliest beginnings of this new genre in the 1960s. However, it was 
only in the 1970s that this new editorial phenomenon gained currency and affirmed its strength (Gonzalez-
Quijano 1998: 194). 
335 Eickelman/Piscatori 1996: 39; Gonzalez-Quijano 1998: 194; 2003; McLarney 2015: 16. 
336 Gonzalez-Quijano 1998: 193. 
337 Gonzalez-Quijano 1998: 193. 
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Although the Islamic book (al-kitāb al-islāmī) draws on older forms and traditions of 
Muslim writing and modes of arguments, its appearance points to a new set of political, 
social and technological conditions within which “older commitments and themes have 
been given a new direction, shape, and form”.338 In its outer appearance, the Islamic book 
clearly differs from the kitāb al-turāth – the book of the cultural heritage.339 Its material 
form, its visual vocabulary and its relatively low price apparently address a wider audience 
that transgresses the exclusive circle of Muslim scholarship at large.340 This shift in the 
imagined readership appears likewise to be reflected in al-Qaraḍāwī’s autobiography, 
where he relates Sultan Wahba’s story of the publication of al-Ḥalāl from his own point of 
view: 
 ﻖ"ﻠﻌﺗ [...] :ﺎ'ﻨﻣ *+ﺎﺘﻜﻟ/ ﻰﻠﻋ 232ﺮﻟ/ ﺾﻌﺑ 7ﺮ'8 ﺪﻗ3»!ﺎﺼﺘﻋﻻ' (') « ﺔﻨﺳ $ﺎﺘﻜﻟ) ﺖﻌﺒ- ﻲﺘﻟ)1972 !
ﻟ" ﺪﻌﺳ& 'ﻷ" )ﺎﻛ, .-ﺪﻋ /ﺎﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻔﻟﺎﺨﻤﻟﺎﺑ 9:ﻠﻋ ﺖﺒﻘﻋ, !ﻮﻨ$ %ﻧﻷ ؛)ﺎﺘﻜﻟ. ﻊﺒﻄ$ 23 ﻲﻨﻣ ﺐﻠ8 ﷲ %ﻤﺣ< ﺪ>ﺴ
 !ﺎﺘﻜﻟ& 'ﻮﻜ) *+ﺪ)ﺪﺟ ﺔ/ﻣﻼﺳ3 ﺮﺸﻧ 7&8 ءﺎﺸﻧ3ﺎ"ﺗ$ﻮﻛﺎﺑ !!ﻟ !"ﺎﺼﺘﻋﻻ( )(ﺪﻟ ,ﺎﺘﻜﻟ( ﻰﻄﻋ0 !ﺪﻌﺑ )(3 4ﻟ ﻦﻜ6 ﻢﻟ ﺎﻤ
 ﻢﻠﻋ $%&% '(ﺎﺘﻜﻟ- ﺐﻠﻗ ﻲﻓ 2%ﺮﺸﻧ 6ﺬﻟ- (ﺎﺘﻜﻟ- ﻰﻠﻋ -%&9% ':ﺮﺼﺘﻟ- -ﺬ< 9-ﺪﻟ- ﻰﻠﻋ $ﻮﻤﺋﺎﻘﻟ- Bﻮﺧﻹ- :ﺮﺼﺘﻓ
!" #ﻔﻟﺆﻣ .!ﻧ#$  
There appeared some responses (rudūd, sg. radd) to the book, and among them […] the 
comment (taʿlīq) by [the publishing house] Dār al-iʿtiṣām that printed the book in 1972 CE 
which contradicted it on numerous points. Brother Asʿad al-Sayyid, may God have mercy 
upon him, had asked me [for permission] to print the book, because he intended to establish 
a new Islamic publishing house of which the book should be the first fruit. Since he did not 
yet have a publishing house, he gave the book to Dār al-iʿtiṣām. The brothers in charge of the 
publishing house proceeded arbitrarily with a right of disposal, responding (raddū) to the 
book and publishing [those responses] inside the book (fī qalb al-kitāb) without its author’s 
knowledge or his approval.341 
At this point, however, al-Qaraḍāwī presents the events in a slightly different frame, which 
attenuates the economic reasoning provided by Sultan Wahba: 
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 ﺔﻘ#ﻘﺤﻟ&'ﺎﻣ ﻰﻟ% ﺎ&'ﻓ )ﻮﻔﻠﺘﺨ/ 0ﺎﻨﻟ2 ﻞﻈ'ﺳ ﻲﺘﻟ2 ﺔ'ﻓﻼﺨﻟ2 9ﻮﻣﻷ2 ﻰﻠﻋ <ﺰﻛ9 ﺎ&ﻧﻷ ؛ABAﺮﻟ2 DﺬF ﻰﻠﻋ ﺐﻘﻋI ﻢﻟ ﻲﻧI 
ﷲ ءﺎﺷ ﺮ"ﺴ"ﺘﻟ& :ﻮ() *+ﺑ&ﻮﺻ ﻰﻟ/ ﺖﻨﻧﺄﻤ5&) *ﻲﺴﻔﻨﻟ +ﺗﺮﺘﺧ& :ﺬﻟ& ﻲﺠ=ﻨﻣ ﻖﻓ) ﺮ"ﺴ"ﺘﻟ& ﺐﻧﺎﺟ ﻰﻟ/ ﺎ="ﻓ ﺖﻠﻣ ﺪﻗ) *
 !ﻮﻋﺪﻟ& ﻲﻓ ﺮ*ﺸﺒﺘﻟ&. /ﻮﺘﻔﻟ& ﻲﻓ [...]!ﻷ#!ﻲﺠ#ﻨﻣ!ﻻ" :#ﺎﻌﻟ'!ﻊ"ﺿ$!ﺖﻗﻮﻟ%!ﻲﻓ!!"ﺮﻟ%!!"#!!"ﺮﻟ%!ﻻ"!ﺎﻤ#ﺳ!ﻲﻓ!ﺎ"ﺎﻀﻘﻟ&!
ﻲﺘﻟ$!ﻻ!ﻲ"ﺘﻨ%!!ﻼﺨﻟ%!!ﺎﻤﻋﻷ&' [...] ﺎ()ﻓ!ﺮﺼﻗ$!ﺲﻔﻧ$%!ﻣﻦ!!"!ﺎ"ﻘﻔﻨﻧ!ﻲﻓ!!"ﺪﺟ!ﺲ"ﻟ!!ﻟ!!ﺮﻤﺛ!ﺔ"ﻠﻤﻋ!ﻲﻓ!.ﺔ"ﺎ$ﻨﻟ'  
And the truth is that I did not follow up on (ʿaqqaba) these responses (rudūd, sg. radd), 
because they focussed on controversial affairs (umūr khilāfiyya) on which people will keep 
disagreeing (ikhtalafa) for as long as God intends. And I tended [in these affairs] to the side of 
facilitation (taysīr) according to the programme (manhajī) that I had chosen for myself, and 
of whose rightness I was certain: facilitating (taysīr) the formal legal opinion (fatwā) and 
announcing the glad tidings (tabshīr) in the call (daʿwa) […] and because my general 
programme (manhajī al-ʿāmm) is that I don’t waste time on responding (radd), and on 
responding to the response (radd al-radd), and particularly in affairs on which the dispute 
(khilāfa) will never end […]. Lives are too short and too precious to waste them in a debate 
without a practical result in the end.342 
The economic rationale allegedly foregrounded by Sultan Wahba’s father for excluding the 
scholarly debate in favour of its poor Muslim reader is hence overwritten in al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
autobiographical retrospective. His programmatic and pragmatic rationale justifies the 
absence of a scholarly disagreement (ikhtilāf) in terms of it having no ultimate solution and 
thus being pointless. The book’s true objective is to mediate a clearly defined programme 
(manhaj) to its imagined readership, to whose sensibilities and intellectual capacities a 
particular argumentative form and the material shape of the text correspond. 
Despite al-Qaraḍāwī’s early embracement of new media, he perceives the authorized 
Islamic book (kitāb islāmī muʿtamad) and the written word (kalima maktūba) as the primary 
means for acquiring an understanding (fahm) of Islam’s religious teachings, and as the most 
effective instrument for the epistemological cultivation of a pious Muslim self.343 At the 
same time, however, he considers the book to be the most sensitive and even dangerous 
way of mediating. Thus he blends older reservations of Islamic scholarship against writing 
and reading with contemporary critiques of the print market and modern consumer 
culture. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī reflections take their point of departure from the image of a Muslim 
reader who is distinguished by his capacity to learn from books as means of an 
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epistemological self-cultivation. His practice of reading is regulated by the need to read 
suitable kinds of books: 
 !"# $ﻒﻘﺜﺘ) !"# $*ﻤﺋﻼ) ﺎﻣ ﺎ0ﻨﻣ "ﺮﻘ) !" *3ﻠﻋ ﺐﺠ) $ﺐﺘﻜﻟ: ﻦﻣ ﻢ0ﻔﻟ: ﻦﺴﺤ)# $ﻢﻠﻌﻟ: ﻦﻣ ﺎﻈﺣ CDE" ﻢﻠﺴﻣ ﻞﻜﻓ
ﻲﻌ#.  
Each Muslim who attains a portion of knowledge, and masters learning from books (wa-
yuḥsinu l-fahm min al-kutub) is required to read (yaqraʾ) [those books] that suit him (yulāʾim) 
and to refine his knowledge (yatathaqqaf) and to remember [them] by heart (yaʿī).344 
This idea of suitable books is elucidated in the following lines, in which al-Qaraḍāwī draws 
on source-critical categories of orthodox Muslim scholarship, presenting the reception of 
al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn as an exemplary case in point: 
 :ﺮﻄﺨﻟ% ﺾﻌﺑ ﺎﻨ+ ﻦﻜﻟ. !"ﺮﻜﻨﻣ '( ﺔﻋﻮﺿﻮﻣ ﺚ./ﺎﺣ( ﻦﻣ ﻮﻠﺨﺗ ﻻ ﺐﺘﻛ :ﺎﻨ;' !<ﺎ=ﻠ=ﺋ?ﺮﺳﻹﺎﺑ "ﻮﺸﺤﻣ ﺐﺘﻛ :ﺎﻨEﻓ
 ﺮ"ﻏ $ﺎ&ﺎﺠﺗ) ﺎ*"ﻓ ﺐﺘﻛ /ﺎﻨ&1ﺔﻤ#ﻠﺳ [...]  !"ﺬﺤﻟ& ﻊﻣ )ﺮﻘ,ﻓ !.ﻨﻣ ﺔﻨ,ﻌﻣ ﻊﺿ&ﻮﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻻ6 !ﻻﻮﺒﻘﻣ8 ﺎﻌﻓﺎﻧ ;ﻮﻜ= ﺪﻗ8
 !ﺎﺘﻛ ﻞﺜﻣ“ءﺎ#ﺣﻹ&”  ُﺗ ﻊﺿ%ﻮﻣ ()ﻓ ﻦﻜﻟ. /ﺔﻌﻣﺎﺟ ﺔﻋﻮﺳﻮﻣ. /ﻊﻓﺎﻧ 7ﺎﺘﻛ ﻮ:ﻓ ﻲﻟ%ﺰﻐﻟ% >ﺎﻣﻺﻟ ﱠﺘ َﻘ ُﺗ# ﻰ ْﺤ ِﺬ ﻲﻐﺒﻨ%& '(
!"ﺎﺴﺣﺈﺑ ﻢ)ﻌﺒﺗ ﻦﻣ/ ﺔﺑﺎﺤﺼﻟ4 ﻦﻣ ﺔﻣﻷ4 ﻒﻠﺳ 9:ﻠﻋ "ﺎﻛ ﺎﻣ/ !ﺔﻨﺴﻟ4/ ">ﺮﻘﻟ4 ﻰﻟB ﺎCDE  !" ﺔ$%&! ﺚ()ﺎﺣ" ,$ﻓ ." ﺎﻤﻛ
.ﺎ"#ﻠﻋ ﺪﻤﺘﻌ* +, -ﻮﺠ* ﻼﻓ 2ﺎ"ﻟ ﻞﺻ, ﻻ 7, ﺔﻋﻮﺿﻮﻣ  
But here are some dangers: there are books filled with narratives from the Bible (isrāʾīliyyāt). 
And there are books with fabricated or denounced traditions (aḥādīth mawḍūʿa aw-munkara). 
And there are books with impaired tendencies (ittijāhāt ghayr salīma). […] And [there are 
books that are] useful and accepted with the exception of some particular topics [that the 
reader has to] read with caution (ḥidhr), like the book al-Iḥyāʾ by Imam al-Ghazālī. This is a 
useful book, and a most comprehensive work (mawsūʿa jāmiʿa). But therein are passages to be 
beware of and to be on one’s guard from, which have to be traced back to the Qurʾan, the 
sunna and the exemplary deeds of the pious forefathers of the umma, the companions and 
their successors. Just as there are feeble, fabricated or traditions without basis therein. 
Hence it is not permitted that one relies on them.345 
A similar criticism is formulated in al-Ḥayāt al-rabbāniyya wa-l-ʿilm, where al-Qaraḍāwī 
particularly refers to the category of old books (kutub qadīma).346 Here, the success of 
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reading as a technique of an epistemological self-cultivation is more explicitly grounded in 
a proper relationship between the quality of the text and the intellectual capacity of the 
reader: 
 !"ﺎﺤﻠﻄﺼﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺎ*+ﻓ ﺎﻤﻟ ﺎ*ﻤ*ﻔﻟ ﺔﺻﺎﺧ ﺢ+ﺗﺎﻔﻣ5 "6578 ﻰﻟ: ;ﺎﺘﺤﺗ ﻲ*ﻓ !ﺪﺣ8 ﻞﻛ ﺎ*ﻨﺴﺤD ﻻ ﺔﻤDﺪﻘﻟ6 ﺐﺘﻜﻟ6 Iء6ﺮﻗ5
!ﺎﻨﻟ% ﻦﻣ ﺮ)ﺜﻛ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎ/ﻤ/ﻓ ﻖﻠﻐﺘﺴ6 7ﺔ)ﻘﻄﻨﻣ; ﺔ)ﻋﺮﺷ; ﺔ6ﻮﻐﻟ 7ﺔﻔﻠﺘﺨﻣ @ﻮﻠﻌﺑ ﺔﻠﺼﺘﻣ ﺔ)ﻤﻠﻋ ﺎ6ﺎﻀﻗ;  
Not everybody masters the reading of old books. It requires particular instruments (adawāt, 
sg. adāh) and keys (mafātīḥ, sg. miftāḥ) for understanding them, due to the terms (musṭalaḥāt, 
sg. musṭalaḥa) and scientific topics they contain, which are linked to various, linguistic, 
juridical and logical disciplines whose understanding (fahm) is obscure (yastaghliq) to many 
people.347 
With these two more traditional kinds of reservations on reading, al-Qaraḍāwī blends a 
third kind of critique. This third kind is related to the institution of the modern print 
market and modern consumer culture. He invokes the sheer number of books that are 
published every day, confronting the Muslim reader with the necessity of making a 
reflective choice of consumption: 
ﻋ ﺎ#$ﺮﻘ' ﻲﺘﻟ+ ﺐﺘﻜﻟ+ ﺮ.ﺨﺘ' 01 ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻠﻟ ﻲﻐﺒﻨ'9 !ﻮ# ﻞﻛ &ﺮُﺨﺗ ﻊﺑﺎﻄﻤﻟ1 2ﺈﻓ 5ﺔﺻﺎﺧ 9ﻨ#; ﺎ<ﻨﻣ ﻢﻠﻌﺘ# ﻲﺘﻟ1C 5ﺔﻣﺎ
 ﺎﻔﺻ ﺎﻣ ﺬﺧﺄ( )* ءﺮﻤﻟ/ ﻰﻠﻋ3 45ﺎﺿ ﻞ8ﺧ9 ﻦﻣ ﺎ;8ﻓ ﻢﻛ3 4ﻊﻓﺎﻧ ﻞ8ﺻ* ﻦﻣ ﺎ;8ﻓ ﻢﻜﻓ 4 ﱠC ﱠﺮﻟ/3 ﺪ(ﺪﺠﻟ/3 4ﺚﻐﻟ/3 ﻦ8ﻤﺴﻟ/
!ﺪﻛ ﺎﻣ &ﺪ'(.  
It behoves the Muslim to select (takhayyara) [those] books that he reads in general and those 
that he learns his religion (dīn) from in particular. The printing houses release every day the 
thick and the thin, the new and the worn. How much in them is of pure origin (aṣīl) that is 
useful, and how much in them is not genuine (dakhīl) and harmful. And it is upon one[self] to 
take what is pure and to leave aside what is cloudy.348 
In these lines, al-Qaraḍāwī addresses the Muslim reader as a conscious consumer of the 
modern print market, who is obliged to make a reflective choice about which books he or 
she reads. One’s pattern of consumption seems to stand in a revealing relation to one’s 
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identity, as he concludes his remarks: “And one of the wise men said: Tell me what you 
read. And I tell you who you are!”349 
A similar image of the Muslim reader as a consumer is found in al-Fatwā bayna l-
inḍibāṭ wa-l-tasayyub. Here, al-Qaraḍāwī merges the image of the contemporary reader with 
a comprehensive critique of the ethics and temporal sensibilities of modern consumer 
culture: 
ﺔﻌﻓﺎﻨﻟ' ﺐﺘﻜﻟ' '+,ﺮﻘ/ 0, 0+ﺪ/ﺮ/ ﻻ 3ﺎﻨﻟ' 0, ,ﺮﺼﻌﻟ' 'ﺬ6 7ﺎﻓ8 ﻦﻣ+ ,ﺔ"ﻠﺻﻷ& ﺐﺘﻜﻟ& +ء&ﺮﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ 12ﺮﺒﺼ5 ﻻ2 ,
!ﻷ# ﺾﻌﺑ '( ﻰﺘﺣﺑ ﻰﻟ# $ﻮﺴﻠﺠ) *+ *ﻮﻘ-ﻄ) $/0ﺎﻋ ﺎﻣ 4ﺎﻨﻟ$ *+ ﻲﻨﻌ) ,(ﺶﺗ/ﺪﻨﺴﻟ$) ﺮﺼﻋ ,ﺮﺼﻌﻟ$ $ﺬ> ﻲﻤﺴ) ءﺎ
 ,ًﺎﻌ$ﺮﺳ (ًﺎﺸﺗ)ﺪﻨﺳ) ﻢ-ﺮﺜﻛ0 ﺪ$ﺮ$ ﺎﻤﻧ3 ,ﻞ5ﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ :ﻮﻗﺮﺼﻨ$) ,>ﺎﻧ0 ﻲﻓ :ﻮﻠﻛﺄ$ ,ﻦﻣﺰﻟE ﻦﻣ ﺔﻋﺎﺳ >ﺪﻤﻟ ﺔﻠﻓﺎﺣ >ﺪﺋﺎﻣ
.ﺐﻛ#$% &ﺎﻣ ﻮ*% +ﻤ-ﺘﻠ0  ﺎﻣ# .ﺔﻌ&ﺮﺳ )*ﺮﺸﻧ- ,.ﺮ/ﻐﺻ ﻞﺋﺎﺳ4 #ﺮﻘ& 6# 74ﺎﻘﻟ* ﺪ&ﺮ& ,ًﺎﻀ&# ﺔ/ﻓﺎﻘﺜﻟ* ﺔ/ﺣﺎﻨﻟ* ﻚﻟﺬﻜﻓ
 !ﺎﻨﻟ% ﻦﻣ ﺮ)ﺜﻛ ﺪﻨﻋ ﺲ)ﻠﻓ ,1ﺣﺮﺷ 45 67ﺎﺨﺒﻟﺎﻛ ﺚ;ﺪﺤﻟ% ﻲﻓ ً%ﺪﻤﺘﻌﻣ ً ﺎﺑﺎﺘﻛ 45 ,ﺮ)ﺜﻛ ﻦﺑﺎﻛ ﺮ)ﺴﻔﺘﻟ% ﻲﻓ ً ﺎﺑﺎﺘﻛ 5ﺮﻘ; F5
.ﺔﻋﺮﺴﻟ& ﺮﺼﻋ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻟ+ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﻠﺠﻟ&0 ﺔﻗﺎﻄﻟ& ﻦﻣ  
[One] of the displeasures of this age is that people don’t want to read useful books. They 
don’t have the patience (lā yaṣbirūn) to read original books (al-kutub al-aṣīla) so that some 
intellectuals (al-udabāʾ, sg. al-adīb) call this age the age of the “sandwich”. By this they mean 
that people are not accustomed to sitting at the table for a full hour, eating patiently and 
leaving slowly. Rather, the majority of them want a fast “sandwich”, swallowing it up while 
walking or driving. And likewise, [in] the cultural sphere: the reader wants to read short 
treatises (rasāʾil ṣaghīra) and swift publications. Yet, to read a book on a commentary of the 
Qurʾan (tafsīr) like [the one by] Ibn Kathīr, or an authorized book (kitāb muʿtamad) on the 
tradition (al-ḥadīth) like [the one by] al-Bukhārī or his commentary – there are not many 
people who have the ability and the endurance for that in this time of haste (ʿaṣr al-surʿa).350 
These remarks are interesting because they complement al-Qaraḍāwī’s earlier textual 
criticism based on classical disciplines of Muslim scholarship with a straightforward 
critique of modern consumer culture. 
There is, however, another and, as the texts unambiguously make plain, an 
indispensable resource that regulates, restricts and enables the success of this ethical 
cultivation through reading: the mediation by the scholar. This scholarly mediation 
assumes, according to al-Qaraḍāwī, two different but interrelated forms: an epistemological 
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one and an oral/aural–physical one. The first invokes the book as an object of scholarly 
dismembering and source-critical restoration: 
 !ﺎ#ﺧﻮ&ﺷ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎ#&ﻘﻠﺗ ﻦﻣ ﺪﺑﻻ2ﺎ"ﻟﻮﺻ& ﻰﻟ( ﺎ)* ﱡ,ﺮ.* /ﺎ)0ﻮﻣ2 3ﻮﻜﻔ6ﻟ  
It is thus necessary to receive [old books] from the masters of the disciplines so that they 
[can] decipher (fakka) their symbols (rumūz, sg. ramz) and attribute them to their sources 
(uṣūl, sg. aṣl).351 
In al-Fatwā bayna al-inḍibāt wa-l-tasayyub, al-Qaraḍāwī extends this epistemological 
mediation from old books to any kind of book: 
!ﺑ #ﻮﺛﻮﻣ ﻢﻟﺎﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺪﻤﺘﻌﻣ0 ﻖﺛﻮﻣ ﻮ2 ﺎﻣ ﻻ4 ﺐﺘﻜﻟ7 ﻦﻣ ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ7 :ﺮﻘ= ﻻ: ﺐﺠ= 7ﺬ@ﻟ0  ,!"ﺎﺠﺗ& ﺔﻣﻼﺳ ﻲﻓ- ,!ﻤﻠﻋ ﻲﻓ
ﻌ" ﱢﺮﻓﺮﻣ $% &ﻮﺒﻘﻣ *ﺎﺒﻜﻟ. .ﺬ0 1% ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ. 6.!ﺎﺿ $% ﻊﻓﺎﻧ ,)ﻮ  
And thus it is necessary that the Muslim does not read any books other than those that are 
attested and authorized (muwaththaq wa-muʿtamad) by a scholar who is reliable in his 
knowledge (ʿālim mawthūq bi-hī fī ʿilmihī) and in the soundness of his orientation (fī salāmat 
ittijāhihī), letting the Muslim [reader] realize whether this book is acceptable or to be 
rejected, useful or harmful.352 
The acquisition of knowledge by reading hence appears to be inextricably bound to the 
epistemological mediation and intervention of the reliable scholar: his decipherment and 
source-critical restoration of any “symbols” in the text, and his attestation and 
accreditation of the usefulness and acceptability of the text. 
This epistemological mediation is complemented by a second, related form: the 
bodily companionship and corporal co-presence of the scholar. In his subsequent warning 
against the acquisition of knowledge from “those who adhere to pages alone” (ṣuḥufiyyūn, 
sg. ṣuḥufī), al-Qaraḍāwī clearly draws on older lines of argumentation against the private 
and unattended reading of religious texts, which lacks the direct companionship and 
immediate presence of the scholar.353 His critique of those who read books “without living 
in the schools of knowledge (madāris al-ʿilm), together with its adherents, mingling with its 
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masters and disciples”354 builds on the recitation of the Qurʾan as the exemplary paradigm 
for the embodied mediation of the written word: 
ﻘﻟ#.ﻢﻠﻌﻟ% ﻚﻟﺬﻛ) ,ﻦ+ﻨﻘﺘﻤﻟ% ء% ﱠُﺮﻘﻟ% 4ﺧﻮ+ﺷ 8ﺪ:; ﻰﻠﻋ 4ﻘﻠﺘ: ﻢﻟ) ,>ﺪﺣ) ﻒﺤﺼﻟ% ﻦﻣ 4ﻤﻠﻌﺗ ﻦﻤﻣ ﺬﺧﺆ: ﻻ GHﺮ  
The Qurʾan is not to be taken from the one who has learned it from its written copy (muṣḥaf) 
alone and who has not obtained it from the hands of its (or: his) shaykhs, the perfect readers 
(al-qurrāʾ al-mutqanūn) – and likewise knowledge (ʿilm).355 
These epistemological and corporal forms of scholarly mediation that regulate the practice 
of reading are subsequently extended to the reading of those “short treatises (rasāʾil 
ṣaghīra) and swift publications (nasharāt sarīʿa)” that correspond to modern consumers’ 
sensibilities in the age of the “sandwich”: 
!"ﺟﻮﺘﺑ ﺔﻘﺛ ﻢﻟﺎﻋ ./ﺮﺷﺈﺑ ﺎ!ﻨﻣ ﺪ"ﺠﻟ/ 7ﺮﻘ"ﻠﻓ ,ﺔﺼﺨﻠﻤﻟ/ ﺐﺘﻜﻟ/ ?ء/ﺮﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺪﺑﻻ Dﺎﻛ Dﺈﻓ! ...  
If reading abridged books (al-kutub al-mulakhkhaṣa) is inevitable, then the faultless (al-jayyid) 
parts of them are to be read under the auspices of a scholar who is trustworthy in his 
guidance (bi-ishrāf ʿālim thiqa bi-tawjīhihī)...356 
What conclusions may we draw from al-Qaraḍāwī’s remarks on reading? Although al-
Qaraḍāwī describes the book and the practice of reading as a central technique for the 
cultivation (tathqīf) and refinement (tathaqquf) of a pious subject, his texts reveal that the 
success of this formation depends on a number of critical conditions, regulations and 
interventions: the reader’s intellectual capacity, a certain set of sensibilities informed and 
corresponding to the modern print market and modern consumer culture, a particular 
quality of orthodox text criticism, and not least the vital mediation by the scholar – as a 
translator, compiler, supervisor and a corporal companion whose bodily presence is 
indispensable for reading as a technique of cultivating a pious self. The imagined reader 
and the practice of reading hence remain inextricably bound to the aural and oral sense as 
the privileged path for the transmission of knowledge and the accomplishment of the 
religious duty (farḍ) to seek knowledge (ṭalab al-ʿilm). The book and the practice of reading 
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as critical resources for the ethical and epistemological cultivation (tathqīf) of a pious 
Muslim subject are informed both by the classical imaginary of varying intellectual 
capacities, (un)sound traditions (aḥadīth, sg. ḥadīth) and (un)verified authenticity, and also 
by the modern imaginary of the commodity market that obliges the consuming subject to 
make a well-considered choice. It is at the intersection of these overlapping norms and 
reservations that al-Qaraḍāwī locates the authorized Islamic book (kitāb islāmī muʿtamad) 
and the practice of reading as critical resources for the cultivation of a pious Muslim 
subject. 
In the following chapter, we will investigate how these normative principles on the 
Islamic book translate into practice. Given the vast number of al-Qaraḍāwī’s publications, 
we will confine our analysis to his first text, al-Ḥalāl, generally considered his most 
prominent. Drawing on our earlier insights, we will complement this analysis with two 
further questions: (1) How does al-Qaraḍāwī’s project of a renewed and facilitated 
discipline of Muslim jurisprudence, with its particular emphasis on understanding (fahm) 
and comprehensiveness (shumūl), manifest in al-Ḥalāl? And (2) how does fiqh, being 
assigned to the realm of the individual’s exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira), engage, regulate and 
subject the individual’s natural and inner truth: its innate desire for the other sex? 
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2. Revisiting the Subject of Desire 
It appears that al-Ḥalāl anticipates many of the programmatic principles that al-Qaraḍāwī 
would formulate in his later theoretical works: fiqh’s assignment to its subject’s (mukallaf) 
exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira);357 its claim to comprehensiveness (shumūl);358 the primacy of 
the subject’s rational understanding (fahm);359 and the particular material and linguistic 
form that the facilitation (taysīr) of this understanding demands. Two of these principles – 
the primacy of fahm and fiqh’s claim to comprehensiveness – as I will argue, viscerally 
manifest in the book’s overall architecture, and mark a decisive rupture with the 
established traditions of Muslim normative writing. 
As a number of academic scholars have argued, fiqh writings follow a distinct and 
supposedly universal pattern that first became established in the second/eighth century, 
and that has been claimed to have remained unchanged ever since.360 In this structure, acts 
of devotion and religious observances (ʿibādāt) invariably precede non-ritual and social 
ones (muʿāmalāt).361 This longstanding tradition that “no jurist ever violated” was, Hallaq 
argues, more than “an emblem of symbolic importance and priority” and “by no means 
haphazard or interchangeable”.362 Rather, it was “carefully structured” to yield a 
“subliminal, programmatic, and deeply psychological” function designed to cultivate in the 
shariʿa’s subject “the foundations for achieving willing obedience to the law”:363 
Indeed, no law under the purview of muʿāmalāt can be properly understood (especially as 
functioning within a social site) without the ʿibādāt and the technologies of the self they had 
produced, which is to say that no “law proper” could be complete or deemed proper without 
the underlying substrate of the ʿibādāt. In both doctrine and practice, the ʿibādāt partook in 
                                                        
357 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 6. 
358 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 12. 
359 See, among other works, al-Qaraḍāwī 1991b; 2007b: 121–123; 2008b: 57–59. 
360 Heffening 1935; Johansen 1999: 35; Reinhart 2014: 67–69; Hallaq 2014: 83–85. 
361 Or, as Hallaq emphatically puts it: “It bears repeating that whatever the arrangement of these 
chapters/sections/‘books,’ the materials dedicated to the elaboration of so-called rituals are always prior, 
having universal precedence over all else” (Hallaq 2014: 84–85). On the problematic of translating ʿibādāt, see 
e.g. Reinhart 2014. 
362 Hallaq 2014: 83. 
363 Hallaq 2014: 84–85. 
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constituting the muʿāmalāt. And it is for this reason that they were aptly labelled the “pillars of 
religion”, the moral foundations upon which the Sharīʿa is supposed to rest.364 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s al-Ḥalāl clearly deviates from this paradigmatic, and presumed universal 
structure.365 The book is divided into four chapters (abwāb, sg. bāb), each chapter being 
meticulously itemized in the comprehensive index (fihris) at the end of the book.366 
Conspicuously, the book opens with a brief definition (taʿrīf) of the lawful (ḥalāl), the 
prohibited (ḥarām) and the detestable (makrūh) in Islam.367 In the following first chapter, al-
Qaraḍāwī proceeds to expound eleven principles that govern the lawful and the prohibited 
in Islam (mabādīʾ al-islām fī al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām).368 The emergence of these principles, many 
of which he elaborates in his later writings, is thereby set off against the negative backdrop 
of the pre-Islamic jāhiliyya.369 Following that, Islamic legislation (tashrīʿ) is put into an 
evolutionary framework in which it subsequently reforms (iṣlāḥ) and transcends the 
aberration and corruption (al-ḍalāl wa-l-taḥrīf) of merciless Hindu Brahmanism (al-
barhamiyya al-hindiyya al-qāssiyya), fierce Christian monasticism (al-rahbāniyya al-masīḥiyya 
al-ʿātiya) and other schools that rest on the chastisement of the body (taʿdhīb al-jasad) on the 
one hand; and the absolute libertinism (al-ibāḥa al-muṭlaqa) and the violation of innate 
human nature (fiṭra) by Persian Mazdaism on the other.370 By providing a number of well-
measured principles, al-Qaraḍāwī ends his narrative, Islam established a just balance (al-
mawāzīn al-qisṭ) and engendered a moderate umma – a figure based on the Qurʾanic notion 
of being {a community of the middle way (ummatan wasaṭan)} (Q 2: 143). This idea, which re-
emerges in many of al-Qaraḍāwī’s later publications, has become one of his leitmotifs in the 
following decades.371 The crucial point, however, is that the succinct definitions (taʿrīfāt, sg. 
taʿrīf) and clear enunciation of the evolutionary principles (mabādīʾ, sg. mabdaʾ) that govern 
                                                        
364 Hallaq 2014: 137–138, emphasis in the original. Hallaq criticizes Western academic scholarship for drawing 
a discursive and conceptual segregation between the ʿibādāt and the muʿāmalāt, believing that in doing so it 
has largely missed and overlooked the constitutive role of “ritual” for the “strictly legal” (Hallaq 2014). 
365 This departure has already been noted (but not analysed) by Gräf (2010: 125–129) and Gräf and Skovgaard-
Petersen (2009: 5). 
366 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 319–324. 
367 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 17. 
368 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 19–40. 
369 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 21. 
370 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 21. 
371 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 22. 
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the lawful and the prohibited in Islam structurally – and unprecedently – replace the ʿibādāt 
as “the foundations for achieving willing obedience in Sharīʿa’s subject”.372 Or, to put it in a 
nutshell: rational clarification replaces embodied ritual. 
On structural grounds, al-Ḥalāl exposes a particular architecture that reveals a 
significant departure from the one of older fiqh writings. These older fiqh writings, as 
Hallaq outlines, 
depending on the school and the jurist, began their second installment of exposition with 
either the contractual and pecuniary subjects (such as sales, agency, pledge, partnerships, 
rent, etc.) or family law (marriage, various forms of divorce, custody, maintenance, 
inheritance, etc.). Usually following these rules are sections dealing with offences against 
life and limb, some regulated by the Qurʾān (ḥudūd), others by principles of retaliation or 
monetary compensation (qiṣāṣ). The last sections of legal works usually treat adjudication 
and rules of evidence and procedure and often include an exposition of jihād, although in 
some schools or juristic writings, this latter section appears earlier in the treatise.373 
Again, al-Qaraḍāwī deviates from these older arrangements. Following his introductory 
definition of the principles that govern the lawful and the prohibited in Islam (mabādīʾ al-
islām fī shaʾn al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām) in the first chapter, the rest of al-Ḥalāl is divided into three 
chapters (abwāb, sg. bāb).374 The second chapter outlines the lawful and the prohibited in 
the sphere of a Muslim’s private life (ḥayāt shakhsiyya).375 This private sphere comprises 
food and drink (aṭʿima wa-ashriba), the slaughtering of animals (dhakāh), hunting (ṣayd), 
wine (khamr), drugs (mukhaddirāt), clothing and adornment (malbas wa-zīna), the household 
(bayt) and earnings and professions (kasb wa-iḥtirāf).376 The fourth chapter is on Muslim 
public life (ḥayāh ʿāmma).377 It tackles the tenets of faith and the submission to authority (al-
muʿtaqadāt wa-l-taqlīd), social intercourse (muʿāmalāt), entertainment and recreation (lahw 
wa-tarfīh), social relations (ʿalāqāt ijtimāʿiyya) and the Muslim’s relationships with non-
Muslims (ʿalāqat al-muslim bi-ghayr al-muslimīn).378 The third chapter on the lawful and the 
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374 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 219–224. 
375 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 41–138. 
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prohibited in marriage and family life (al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-zawāj wa-ḥayāt al-usra) is 
deliberately situated between the other two.379 This tripartite division is crucial to al-
Qaraḍāwī’s notion of Islamic normativity as a balanced and comprehensive system, in 
which gender and sexuality literally provide the organic link between the individual and 
society. It is by regulating the individual’s sexuality that society is perfected. But how does 
al-Qaraḍāwī, who assigns fiqh, as we have seen, to an individual’s exterior actions (afʿāl 
ẓāhira),380 engage with and translate the discipline in the framework of this biopolitical 
project into practice? 
In the third chapter of the book, on marriage and family life (fī al-zawāj wa-ḥayāt al-
usra), it is apparently the exterior dimensions of gender and sexuality that al-Qaraḍāwī 
addresses. Thus, he writes in its first subchapter, on the field of instincts (fī majāl al-gharīza), 
about topics like the solitude (khalwa) with a stranger of the opposite sex,381 the regulation 
of the gaze (al-naẓar), the female body’s exterior adornment (zīna) and the outward display 
of women’s charms (tabarruj), about the intimate parts of the male and female body (ʿawra), 
women’s interaction with their husbands’ male guests, fornication (zinā), sexual deviance 
(shudhūdh jinsī), homosexuality (liwāṭ) and onanism (istimnāʾ bi-l-yad).382 Similarly, he 
discusses in the second subchapter, on marriage (zawāj), the (il)legitimacy of seeing the 
fiancée (al-naẓar ilā al-makhṭūba) prior to marriage, prohibited courtship (khiṭba muḥarrama), 
temporary marriage (zawāj al-mutʿa) and polygamy (taʿaddud).383 On the relations between 
husband and wife (al-ʿalāqa bayna al-zawjayn), he writes about the couple’s sensuous and 
bodily relations (ʿalāqa ḥissiyya), the legitimate positions of intercourse and the prohibition 
of anal sex (ittiqāʾ al-dubr), birth control (tanẓīm al-nasal), abortion (isqāṭ al-ḥaml) and a wife’s 
repudiation by her husband (ṭalāq).384 
For this assignment of fiqh to the individual’s exterior actions (afʿāl ẓāhira),385 al-
Qaraḍāwī’s chapter on homosexuality – or “sexual deviance” (shudhūdh jinsī) – provides an 
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exemplary case in point.386 The notion of al-shudhūdh al-jinsī, as Joseph Massad has pointed 
out, only gained currency in the twentieth century.387 Following the Arabic translations of 
Freud in the 1950s and of Foucault’s History of Sexuality in the 1990s, the term jins and its 
more novel derivative jinsiyya gradually acquired the connotation of “biological sex” and 
“sexuality”.388 In parallel, Arab translators of psychology books and behavioural 
psychologists coined the notion al-shudhūdh al-jinsī to render the European expression 
“sexual deviance”, which turned into “the most common term used in monographs, the 
press, and polite company to refer to the Western concept of ‘homosexuality’ ”.389 
Despite his use of this modern terminology, however, al-Qaraḍāwī’s chapter on 
“sexual deviance” (shudhūdh jinsī) sticks to a premodern framework, in which “the act of 
the people of Lot” (ʿamal qawm Lūṭ) or, more briefly, liwāṭ (lit. “sodomy”) is still an outer 
act.390 Hence he denounces the latter as 
[…] ﺔﺛﻮﻧﻷ& ﻖﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔ,ﺎﻨﺟ0 1ﺔﻟﻮﺟﺮﻠﻟ 4ﺎﺴﻓ70 189&ﺬﻘﻟ& 8ﺄﻤﺣ ﻲﻓ ?ﺎﻤﻐﻧ&0 18ﺮﻄﻔﻟ& ﻲﻓ ?ﺎﻜﺘﻧ& ﺚFﺒﺨﻟ& ﻞﻤﻌﻟ&  
a repulsive deed (ʿamal khabīth) that is an inversion of human nature (intikās fī al-fiṭra), an 
immersion in a mire of impurity (inghimās fī ḥamaʾat al-qadhāra), a corruption of masculinity 
(ifsād al-rujūla) and a criminal offence against the rights of femininity (jināya ʿalā ḥaqq al-
unūtha).391 
The modern notion of homosexuality as an individual’s natural inner identity and 
orientation is in this definition largely absent. 
There are, however, a number of other provisions in al-Ḥalāl that stand in a certain 
tension to fiqh’s alleged focus on the individual’s outer actions (afʿāl ẓāhira). Thus, we find in 
the subchapter on the relations between spouses (al-ʿalāqa bayna al-zawjayn) the reference 
to their mutual duty to have patience with their partner (an yaṣbir ʿalā ṣāḥibihī), invoking one 
of the cardinal virtues in Islamic ethics.392 Or, in the subchapter on instincts (gharāʾiz, sg. 
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gharīza), the warning against gazing at the other sex with desire (al-naẓar ilā al-jins al-ʾākhar 
bi-shahwa), since “the eye is the key of the heart (miftāḥ al-qalb), and the look is a messenger 
of desire (fitna) that carries the message of fornication (zinā)”.393 
The implied tension between fiqh’s focus on an individual’s exterior actions in 
theory and al-Qaraḍāwī’s references to a number of (un)lawful inner dispositions and 
virtues in practice eventually re-emerges in the book’s epilogue (al-khātima), where he 
revisits the distinction between an individual’s internal dispositions and his or her exterior 
acts, and their respective places in Muslim normative thought in more general terms.394 
Surprisingly, he highlights the relevance of “the actions of the hearts” (aʿmāl al-qulūb) and 
“the movements of the souls, the sentiments and desires” (aʿmāl al-nufūs wa-l-ʿawāṭif wa-l-
irādāt) like envy (ḥasad) and covetousness (ḥiqd), pride (kibr) and arrogance (ghurūr), 
hypocrisy (riyāʾ) and ostentation (nifāq), and greed (shuḥḥ) and lust (ḥirṣ) in Islamic 
normative thinking.395 Quoting the two Qurʾanic verses {God changes not what is in a 
people, until they change what is in themselves} (Q 13: 11) and {the day when neither 
wealth nor sons shall profit except for him who comes to God with a pure heart} (Q 26: 8–9), 
he argues that it is “the soundness of human’s spiritual existence (al-kiyān al-maʿnawī), the 
‘heart’ (al-qalb)” that represent “the fundament” for cultivating a pious subjectivity and a 
virtuous society at large.396 
This primacy of “human’s spiritual existence” (al-kiyān al-maʿnawī) and the purity of 
the heart is further elaborated by reference to a Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth nabawī), in 
which the qalb is invoked as the bodily locus for governing the self, and which provides al-
Ḥalāl its title: 
 !" #ﻮ%ﺸﻤﻟ) *ﺜ,ﺪﺣ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻠﺳ4 *5ﻠﻋ 7" ﻰﻠﺻ ﻰﺒﻨﻟ) ﺮﻛ> ﺎﻨ@ ﻦﻣ4“! "ّﻦ%ﺑ '(ﺮﺤﻟ(! "ّﻦ%ﺑ ,ﻼﺤﻟ( !" !ﺎ#ﺒﺘﺸﻣ ﺎﻤ#ﻨ*ﺑ
 ﻲﻓ ﷲ ﻰﻤﺣ '() ﻰﻤﺣ ﻚﻠﻣ ﻞﻜﻟ '0) 123ﺮﺤﻟ3 ﻊﻗ3ﻮ9 '( ﻚﺷ)( ﺎ<=ﻓ ﻊﻗ) ﻦﻣ) 1?ﺿﺮﻋ) ?ﻨ9ﺪﻟ (ﺮﺒﺘﺳ3 ﺪﻘﻓ ﺎHﺎﻘﺗ3 ﻦﻣ
!ﻣ#ﺎﺤﻣ !ﺿ#' […] ﻠﺻ ﺖﺤﻠﺻ %&' ﺔﻐﻀﻣ ﺪﺴﺠﻟ% ﻲﻓ 2'3 ﻻ5 ﻲ"# ﻻ% .&ﻠﻛ ﺪﺴﺠﻟ- ﺪﺴﻓ /ﺪﺴﻓ -01# 2&ﻠﻛ ﺪﺴﺠﻟ- ﺢ
ﺐﻠﻘﻟ%”.  
Hence, the Prophet – God bless him and grant him salvation – recalls in his renowned 
tradition (ḥadīth): “The lawful (al-ḥalāl) is clear, and the prohibited (al-ḥarām) is clear. And 
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between the two, there are doubtful matters (mushtabahāt). Whoever avoids them has 
cleared himself [from suspicion] (istabraʾ) in regard to his religion and his honour (li-dīnihī 
wa-ʿirḍihī), while whoever engages in them is on the verge of falling into the prohibited. 
Truly, every king has a protected sanctuary (ḥimā), and the sanctuary of God on His world is 
what He has prohibited. […] In the body, there is a piece of flesh. If it is sound the whole 
body is sound, while if it is corrupted the whole body is corrupted, and that is the heart.”397 
The moral physiology that marks the heart as the central bodily site for governing the self 
is made stronger in the following interpretation of al-Qaraḍāwī: 
ﻠﻛ ﺔ$ﻋﺮﻟ( ﺢﻠﺼﺗ ﻲﻋ(ﺮﻟ( (ﺬ. /ﻼﺼﺑ2 3ﺎ5ﻠﻛ 6ﺣ8(ﻮﺟ ﻲﻋ(82 3;ﺪﺒﻟ( ءﺎﻀﻋ@ ﺲ$ﺋ8 ﻮ. ﺐﻠﻘﻟﺎﻓﺪﺴﻔﺗ %&ﺎﺴﻔﺑ) *ﺎ+. 
 :!ﺎﺴﻠﻟ&' ()ﻮﺼﻟ& ﻻ -ﺔ/ﻨﻟ&' ﺐﻠﻘﻟ& ﻮ3 ﷲ ﺪﻨﻋ 7ﻮﺒﻘﻟ& !&ﺰ/ﻣ'“ ﻰﻟ# ﺮﻈﻨ' ﻦﻜﻟ* ﻢﻛ-ﻮﺻ ﻰﻟ# ﺮﻈﻨ' ﻻ ﷲ 2#
ﻢﻜﺑﻮﻠﻗ” “!ﻮﻧ ﺎﻣ &ﺮﻣ( ﻞﻜﻟ ﺎﻤﻧ-. /ﺎ0ﻨﻟﺎﺑ 3ﺎﻤﻋﻷ( ﺎﻤﻧ-”.  
The heart is the chief of all organs of the body and governs all its limbs. When the ruler is 
sound, all its subjects are sound, and when it is corrupted, they are corrupted. The scale to 
weigh one’s acceptance (mīzān al-qubūl) with God is the heart and the intention (al-qalb wa-l-
niyya), not the outer form and the tongue (al-ṣūra wa-l-qalb): “God does not look at your 
(outer) form, but He looks at your hearts.” “Deeds [are judged] by intentions (al-aʿmāl bi-l-
niyyāt), and everyone [will be judged] according to what he intends.” 398 
Despite the relevance of the purity of the heart (al-qalb) and the affairs of the soul (al-umūr 
al-nafsiyya), however, al-Qaraḍāwī concedes that he has not dealt with the acts of the heart 
in his text. The reason for this omission, he elaborates, lies in the particular order of 
Muslim knowledge (ʿilm), which assigns “the sphere of ethics” (al-akhlāq) to the disciplines 
of mysticism (ʿilm al-taṣawwuf); a perspective that is consistent with the ideas he later 
sketches in Taysīr.399 
Remarkably, al-Qaraḍāwī has revisited the “just balance” (mīzān) between the 
individual’s outer actions and “the acts of the hearts” (ʿamāl al-qulūb) in a number of his 
later writings, drawing his ideas on fiqh increasingly closer to the work of Abū Ḥāmid al-
Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), as we shall see. In doing this, he gradually shifts and reconfigures the 
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disciplinary boundaries between fiqh and the science of ethics (ʿilm al-akhlāq) itself. 
However, before pursuing this development in al-Qaraḍāwī’s texts – and its provisional 
conclution in a re-edition of al-Ḥalāl more than half a decade after its first publication – we 
will tackle another tool (wasāʾil, sg. wasīla) by which knowledge (ʿilm) circulates and is 
consumed and by which a pious self is cultivated. This means has captured the attention of 
both al-Qaraḍāwī and Western scholarship alike in the past few decades: the question (al-
suʾāl), or more narrowly, the fatwa. 
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3. The Beauty of the Question 
ﻦﺴﺣ !"ﺆﺴﻟ" ﻮ" ﻒﺼﻧ ﻢﻠﻌﻟ%.  
The beauty of the question is half the truth.400 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
It is 21 May 2006, 9 p.m. local time in Mecca. The camera captures the image of a middle-aged man in 
a suit of grey flannel. He sits in front of a wall inlaid with carved wooden latticework (mashrabiyya). 
A voluminous dark moustache sprawls over his upper lip. His head is slightly inclined to the right. 
ﻓﻮﺗﻖ" !":  !ﻢﻌﻧ ﺎﻣ !ﺪﻣ ﺔ"ﻤ$% !ﺬ# !ﻮﺘﻔﻟ& ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻟﺎﺑ !ﺎ#ﺤﻟ ؟ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ' ﻞ"# ﺐﺠ# !"ﻠﻋ !" ﻲﺘﻔﺘﺴ% ﻲﻓ ﻞﻛ !ﺮ#ﻐﺻ 
!ﺮ#ﺒﻛ& ﻦﻣ ؟"ﺗﺎ%ﺣ  
TAWFĪQ ṬAHA: Yes. What is the extent (madā) [He lifts his hands to chest level, gesturally 
epitomizing the “extent” between the palm of his right and his left] of the fatwa’s 
importance in relation to the daily life of a Muslim (ḥayāt al-muslim)? Is he 
obliged to request a fatwa for each minor and major affairs of his life? 
The camera rests on the anchorman while al-Qaraḍāwī’s voice sounds from off-screen. 
!"ﺎﺿﺮﻘﻟ(:  !ﺬ# ﺮﻣ# ﻢ"ﻣ !ً#ﺪﺟ !"# !ﺎﻛ !ﺎﺴﻧﻹ& !ﻤ#$ ﺮﻣ# ﻦ"ﺪﻟ% ﻞﺻﻷ$ !" !ﺎﺴﻧﻹ&  .. ً ﺎﺻﻮﺼﺧ !ﺎﺴﻧﻹ& ﻦ"ﺪﺘﻤﻟ' 
ﺲ"ﻟ  ً ﺎﻧﺎﺴﻧ%  ً ﺎﺒﺋﺎﺳ ﻞﻌﻔ$ ﺎﻣ ءﺎﺸ$ ﻢﻜﺤ$% ﺎﻣ !ﺪ#ﺮ# ﻻ ﻞﺑ ﻮ" !ﺎﺴﻧ% ﺪ"ﻘﻣ ﻢ"ﻟﺎﻌﺘﺑ ﺐﺠ# !" ﻻ !ﺎ#ﺎﻄﺨﺘ' 
!ﺎﻜﺣﺄﺑ ﺐﺠ# !" ﺎ"ﻘﺒﻄ& ﻲﻓ !ﺗﺎ$ﺣ ﺔ"#ﺮﻔﻟ' ﺔ"ﺮﺳﻷ&' ﻻ"#!ﺔ#ﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟ !"ﺈﻓ !ﺎﻛ !ﺮﻌ$ !ﺬ# !ﺎﻜﺣﻷ& 
ﺔﻘ#ﺮﻄﺑ ﻦﻣ !"ﺮﻄﻟ& !ﺎ#ﺳ%& ﺎ"#ﺮﻗ ﻲﻓ !"ﺎﺘﻛ ﺲﻠﺟ ﺪﻨﻋ ﺾﻌﺑ ءﺎﻤﻠﻌﻟ' ﺢﺒﺻ$% ﺎ"ﻓﺮﻌ& ﺎﻤﻓ !"ﻠﻋ 
!ءﻲﺷ !"# ﻢﻟ ﻦﻜ# ﺎ"ﻤﻠﻌ& !ﺮﻔﻓ !"ﻠﻋ !" !ﺄﺴ$ ﻦَﻣ ﻢﻠﻌ$ ﷲ" ﻰﻟﺎﻌﺗ !ﻮﻘ$ }!ُﻮَﻟﺄْﺳَﺎﻓ  َﻞ$َْ%  ِﺮْﻛﱢﺬﻟ( !"  ُْﻢﺘﻨُﻛ 
ﻻ  َ"ﻮَُﻤﻠَْﻌﺗ {ﻞ"ﺎﺠﻟ& !ﺄﺴ$ ﺎﻌﻟ$ﻢﻟ.  
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ: This is a very important affair if somebody cares about religion (amr al-dīn). 
[Now, the camera switches to al-Qaraḍāwī, who sits at a semicircular brownish 
table, and slowly zooms in on him, while the anchorman who sits opposite him 
                                                        
400 al-Qaraḍāwī 2010c. 
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fades off-screen. Al-Qaraḍāwī holds on to a sheet of paper spread on the tabletop 
in front of him.] The principle (al-aṣl) [His right hand lets the paper go to 
gesturally underline the syllable stressing of his words in the air] is that somebody 
… especially somebody religious (al-insān al-mutadayyin) is not a lax human 
being who [Now, his hand twice makes a dismissive gesture away from his torso 
towards off-screen] does what he wishes, and rules what he wants, no – rather he 
is somebody bound [His thumb touches his index and his second finger, and his 
hand makes a short, vertical movement] by the teachings – that he must not 
disregard [He draws a number of points in the air]; and by the rules [Again, the 
short vertical gesture] – that he must apply in his individual, familial and societal 
life. If he knows these rules in any way, studying them [He makes a shovelling 
gesture towards the anchorman Tawfīq Ṭaha], reading them in a book [Again, the 
shovelling gesture], sitting with some scholars [And again], and he gets to know 
them, there’s nothing upon him [He lifts his hand up and directs its open palm 
towards the anchorman]. If he does not know them, it is a duty (farḍ) upon him 
[He points with his index to his opposite] to ask the one who knows. And God – may 
He be exalted – says: {Ask the people of the remembrance, if it should be that you 
do not know}. [He pauses] The one who does not know (al-jāhil) [His hand 
describes an arch from right to left] asks the one who knows (al-ʿālim).401 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s normative deliberations on writing and reading as effective means for 
seeking knowledge (wasāʾil li-ṭalab al-ʿilm) are, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
embedded in a set of broader reflections that mirror the classical imaginary of his readers’ 
varying intellectual capacities, the traditional categories of Muslim orthodox text criticism 
and the predicaments of modern consumer culture. In doing this, al-Qaraḍāwī addresses 
the Muslim reader as a conscious consumer of the modern print market, who is obliged to 
make a well-considered choice about books as commodities. 
The success of reading as a technique for the cultivation (tathqīf) and refinement 
(tathaqquf) of a pious self, however, remains inextricably bound to the mediation and 
critical intervention by the scholar – as a translator, compiler and a corporal companion – 
whose bodily presence is indispensable for the sound mediation of the text. It is at the 
                                                        
401 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006g. 
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intersection of these overlapping norms and reservations that al-Qaraḍāwī locates the 
authorized Islamic book (al-kitāb al-islāmī al-muʿtamad) – in whose material body these 
normative regulations are viscerally inscribed – and the practice of reading as powerful 
technologies for the formation of a pious self. 
As I will show in this chapter, these observations can be extended to al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
normative reflections on a number of other practices for the transmission and acquisition 
of knowledge. These comprise the oral–aural practices of listening (samāʿ), attending 
“sessions of knowledge” (majālis al-ʿilm) and – most prominently – asking and answering 
questions (suʾāl).402 
A primary way to gain understanding, and the only suitable way for the illiterate is, 
al-Qaraḍāwī argues, the acquisition of knowledge by learning (talaqqā) and listening (samāʿ) 
to the oral speech (mushāfaha) of the scholars, “trustworthy in their knowledge and their 
piety (thiqāt fī ʿilmihim wa-taqwāhum), and who [really] understand religion and reality 
together (ḥasuna fahmuhum li-l-dīn wa-l-wāqiʿ maʿan)”.403 This primacy of listening maintains 
at once the classical privilege of the auditive sense over vision (baṣar). Whereas the former 
is associated with knowledge transmitted by revelation (al-ʿilm al-manqūl ʿan al-waḥy) and 
the religious disciplines, the latter serves as the basis for material knowledge grounded in 
observation and experiment; a knowledge which al-Qaraḍāwī remarkably relates to the 
heart (fuʾād) as the central bodily locus of the rational sciences.404 
                                                        
402 Al-Qaraḍāwī has outlined these aural and oral technologies first in Ṭarīq (2007b: 114–116), where he 
describes knowledge (ʿilm) – in comparison to mystical revelation (kashf) and inspiration (ilhām) – as the 
privileged path towards God, and later in al-Fatwā (2008c: 56–57). In the present chapter, I seek to provide a 
systematic and not a chronological account of these technologies in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings. 
403 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 114. For a discussion of “reality” as a hermeneutical principle that informs the ethico-
legal practices of the scholar, see chapter III.1. 
404 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996: 232. On the perception of the heart as the bodily site of reason, Powers writes in his 
seminal study on intention (niyya) in medieval legal texts: “[T]he texts reflect the belief prevailing in 
medieval Islamicate lands that the qalb (known to be an organ located in the chest) was the seat of the 
intellect, the ʿaql (mind or rational faculty). The qalb was […] [seen] as what Wensinck calls the ‘the central 
organ of intellect and attention’. […] Prior to the Islamicate adoption of Galenic medicine, which held the 
brain (Arabic: [dimāgh]) to be the organ of perception and intellection, this view held sway. In fact, this 
position was widely held until long after the Greek medical system was circulating in Arabic; Greek thought, 
in general, took greater hold among the Islamicate philosophers than among the jurists or the general 
population. Classical fiqh texts reflect this understanding of the ‘heart’ as the seat of the intellect, and even 
  
 
 
89 
One way (ṭarīqa) related to this aural–oral method for acquiring knowledge that al-
Qaraḍāwī describes in a later text is to attend “sessions of knowledge” (majālis al-ʿilm); that 
is, the acquisition of knowledge by seeking the bodily (co-)presence of the scholar.405 
Although he refers in this context to the invocation of God (dhikr) by dervishes (darāwīsh, 
sg. darwīsh) and impostors of Sufism (adʿiyāʾ al-taṣawwuf), he distances the practice from 
their “groans, utterances and gestures”. Rather, he invokes the more useful orthopraxis of 
the companions of the Prophet and their successors: 
ﺮﻛ#ﺬﺗ& '(#ﺮﺤﻟ#& +ﻼﺤﻟ# ﺮﻛ#ﺬﺗ& 'ﷲ .ﺎﺘﻛ 1&ﻼﺗ& 'ﻦ3ﺪﻟ# 5ﻮﻣ8 ﺮﻛ#ﺬﺗ  .ﺮﻛ# ﻢﻈﻋ' ﻮ) *ﺬ) .,ﻘﻔﻟ*0 ﺚ2ﺪﺤﻟ*0 ﺮ5ﺴﻔﺘﻟ*
ﻊﻓﺎﻨﻟ& ﺮﻛﺬﻟ& *ﻧ,  
To remind each other (tadhākur) of the affairs of religion, the recital of the Book of God, to 
remind each other of the lawful and the prohibited (al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām), to remind each 
other of the Qurʾan’s exegesis (al-tafsīr), of the tradition (al-ḥadīth) and of jurisprudence (al-
fiqh). This is the most significant invocation. It is the useful invocation (dhikr nāfiʿ).406 
This proper kind of dhikr that seeks to cultivate a specific knowledge – ʿilm nāfiʿ, a useful 
knowledge – preserves in the individual an epistemological state that al-Qaraḍāwī describes 
in physiological terms as “enlivening the heart” (ḥayyaya al-qalb), which is a recurrent 
motif in his texts.407 
In al-Qaraḍāwī’s theoretical discussions, the question (suʾāl) is the third and most 
prominent way (ṭarīq) for knowledge to be acquired and a pious self to be formed.408 By 
positioning the question in this way, he grounds his discussions in a particular genre: the 
ethics or etiquette of the fatwa (adab al-fatwā). 
Being perceived as a “meeting point between legal theory and social practice”, 
Western academic scholarship has developed a profound interest in the fatwa in the past 
few years.409 Often rendered as a non-binding legal opinion issued by a scholar (muftī) as a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
many modern legal scholars retain it” (Powers 2006: 35–36). On the old-Arabic notion of “heart”, see 
Seidensticker 1992. 
405 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 57. 
406 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 57. 
407 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 57. 
408 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 57; al-Qaraḍāwī 2007b: 116. 
409 Caeiro 2006: 661. The existing research literature on the fatwa is extensive. The obligatory starting point 
for a study of the fatwa today is still Masud et al. 1996. 
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reply to an individual enquirer’s (mustaftī) question,410 the fatwa’s function has been 
conceptualized by academic scholarship in various ways: as a legal tool for brokering a 
stable relationship between law and society;411 as a means of establishing a sense of order 
and identity;412 or as an instrument for inducing legal change.413 
More recently, Alexandre Caeiro has suggested defining the fatwa – drawing on a 
notion of Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad – as a discursive tradition.414 In this view, the 
fatwa represents an instituted practice whose performance is defined and learned 
according to a correct model.415 Since authority rests in this model on “a collaborative 
achievement between narrator and audience, the former cannot speak in total freedom: 
there are conceptual and institutional conditions that must be attended to if discourses are 
to be persuasive”.416 
The reflections on these conceptual and institutional conditions that define the 
correct performance of iftāʾ (the delivering of a fatwa) have produced in Muslim normative 
thought a theory of its own. This theory has been spelled out in the adab al-fatwā or adab al-
muftī wa-l-mustaftī literature.417 Existing research has paid relatively minor attention to this 
literature because of what Caeiro argues is the incorrect assumption “that, as an idealized 
account, the genre would have little to reveal about the history and dynamics of iftāʾ”.418 
Despite this presumed ahistorical character of the genre, al-Qaraḍāwī’s normative 
reflections reveal – in comparison to those of his older predecessors – some decisive shifts 
in the moral universe of iftāʾ.419 In his reflections, he begins with the image of a Muslim 
                                                        
410 See e.g. Tyan 1965. For an innovative critique of this legalistic notion of the fatwa, see Agrama 2010. 
411 Dallal 1995. 
412 Hallaq 1994; Skovgaard-Petersen 1997: 13. 
413 Hallaq 1994; Johansen 1999. 
414 Caeiro 2006. A tradition, as Asad put it in his influential essay, “consists essentially of discourses that seek 
to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it 
is established, has a history” (Asad 1986: 14). 
415 Asad 1986: 15. 
416 Asad 1993: 210. 
417 Research on the genre in European languages includes Masud 1984; Messick 1986; Jackson 1992; Reinhart 
1994; Krawietz 1995; Masud et al. 1996; Skovgaard-Petersen 1997; Masud 2009. 
418 Caeiro 2006: 663. This perspective has been prominently advocated by Masud et al. 1996: 15, among others. 
419 Caeiro 2006: 669–672. 
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enquirer whom he locates in an initial situation of difficulty, obscurity and epistemological 
ambiguity: 
 ﻲ"# $ﺮﻌ' ﻻ) *ﺎ,-ﻓ /ﻮﻣﻷ3 4-ﻠﻋ 4ﺒﺘﺸﺗ *ﺔ-ﻣﻮ' <ﻼﻜﺸﻣ ﻦﻣ 4ﻟ ﻦﻌ' ﺎﻣ) */ﻮﻣ# ﻦﻣ 4ﻟ Aﺮﻌ' ﺎﻤ-ﻓ ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ3 Eﺄﺴ'
!"ﺮﺤﻟ" ﻦﻣ !( )ﻼﺤﻟ" ﻦﻣ.  
The Muslim asks about those matters which get in his way and about those daily problems 
which arise before him where the affairs are obscure to him and he does not know whether 
they pertain to the lawful (al-ḥalāl) or to the prohibited (al-ḥarām).420 
In a similar vein, he begins his meditation on the question (al-suʾāl) in a later text, where he 
qualifies that the act of asking is even a normative obligation: 
!ﺮﻓ$!ﻰﻠﻋ!ﻢﻠﺴﻤﻟ&!!"!!ﺄﺴ$!ﻲﻓ!ﻞﻛ!ﺎﻣ!!ﺿﺮﺘﻌ&!ﻦﻣ!ﻞﺋﺎﺴﻣ!!"!!ﻼﻜﺸﻣ!ﻞ"ﺠ$!ﺎ"#ﻓ!!ﺮﺸﻟ% ﻢﻜﺣ.  
It is a religious duty (farḍ) for the Muslim to ask about all those problems and issues that 
stand in his way, and about which he doesn’t know the rule of law (ḥukm al-sharʿ).421 
The act of asking is thus represented as an empowering – and simultaneously binding – 
technique that enables the individual to overcome an initial situation of difficulty, 
obscurity and ambiguity. As a tool (wasīla) of the questioner’s epistemological 
transformation towards clarity, the question is structured and regulated by a set of distinct 
norms and principles that al-Qaraḍāwī subsequently captures with the term ḥusn al-suʾāl – 
the excellence or beauty of the question.422 
The first of these conditions concerns the question’s legitimate addressee, whom he 
variously invokes as “those who know” (ahl al-ʿilm, ahl al-maʿrifa), “those who have 
experience” (ahl al-khibra), “those who remember” (ahl al-dhikr) or, adopting another 
Qurʾanic term, “those in authority” (ūlū al-amr). But who are “those in authority”?423 
As several academic scholars have pointed out, answering this question is a central 
concern in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings.424 He spelled out the normative foundations of this 
                                                        
420 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 57. 
421 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007b: 116. 
422 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996: 214–217; 2008c: 43–55. 
423 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996: 212; 2008c: 57. 
424 See e.g. Skovgaard-Petersen 2004; Caeiro 2006. 
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authority first in the prologue to his fatwa collection Hudā or Hady al-islām,425 which he later 
expanded into two articles in the journal al-Muslim al-muʿāṣir.426 The two were eventually 
published together in a separate booklet in order, as he put it, to popularize his insights 
beyond the limited readership of intellectual journals (majallāt fikriyya).427 
In the prologue to the first volume of his fatwa collection, he frames his normative 
thoughts on the fatwa in an autobiographical account.428 There he highlights his early 
vocation for fiqh while still at primary school in his village, his ongoing dedication to 
Muslim normative thought and practice during his studies of Islamic theology (uṣūl al-dīn) 
at the Azhar, his liberation from all kinds of “doctrinal dogmatism, blind submission and 
fanaticism” (tamadhhub wa-taqlīd wa-taʿaṣṣub) due to his affiliation to the Islamic movement 
(al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya) and his continuous attachment to the principle of taysīr that put him 
in opposition to the scholars of his village who followed the school of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) 
– a school which he considers among the most severe (min ashadd al-madhāhib) in affairs of 
ritual purity.429 
After this initial stage, he continues, he held regular study circles (nadawāt, sg. 
nadwa) at the mosque of Zamālik in Cairo following the Friday sermon, when those who 
had prayed used to approach him with their written questions (asʾilatuhum maktūba) to 
which he used to provide oral responses.430 In the same period, he began to publish some 
fatwas in Islamic magazines (al-majallāt al-islāmiyya), namely in Nūr al-islām, issued by the 
Azhar, and Minbar al-islām, edited by the Egyptian Ministry for Religious Endowments 
(wizārat al-awqāf al-miṣriyya), where he wrote – due to his ongoing surveillance by the 
Egyptian state – under the pseudonym of Yūsuf ʿAbd Allāh. His continuous engagement 
with fiqh resulted in the publication of his first book, al-Ḥalāl, which was soon followed by 
his dissertation, Fiqh al-zakāt.431 
                                                        
425 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 5–36. 
426 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 5. 
427 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 5. 
428 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 5–36. 
429 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 5–8. 
430 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 8. This contradicts Hallaq’s statement that in the process of providing fatwas, paper is 
generally involved (Hallaq 1994: 31). Our perspective on the involvement of oral communication in the fatwa, 
however, has meanwhile been complicated by the insights of Masud et al. (1996: 23–24). 
431 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 8; al-Qaraḍāwī 2004b: 292. 
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With his move to Doha and arrival of broadcasting in Qatar in the late 1960s, al-
Qaraḍāwī was entrusted with providing fatwas to Qatari citizens in a weekly radio 
programme entitled Nūr wa-hidāya, and then from the early 1970s on television in the 
programme Hady al-islām.432 Eventually, he was approached by many of his listeners and 
viewers, asking him to collect and publish his fatwas in a written volume.433 To these fatwas 
from his radio and television programmes, he added a number of written fatwas, some of 
which had already been published. This anthology formed the first volume of his fatwa 
collection, published under the title Min hady al-islām.434 
In the following subchapter of his introduction to this first volume, he outlines six 
programmatic principles that shaped his approach to the fatwa (nahj fī al-iftāʾ).435 These 
principles would later be reproduced in the two previously mentioned articles in the 
journal al-Muslim al-muʿāṣir and subsequently re-edited in the separate booklet al-Fatwā.436 
While al-Fatwā partly reproduces his earlier arguments, however, it replaces al-
Qaraḍāwī’s autobiographical account with a depersonalized introduction.437 The reason for 
this programmatic reframing is revealed in the text’s opening, namely the increasing 
fragmentation of Muslim authority due to the Islamic revival and the arrival of new media: 
 ﻦ"ﺑ $ﻮﺘﻔﻟ))ﻻ"ﺎﺒﻀﻧ ! (ﺐ"ﺴﺘﻟ&'ﻮﻜﺸﻟ% ﺖّﻤﻋ *ﺬﻟ% ,ﻮﺿﻮﻤﻟ% %ﺬ.! !ﻨﻣ ﺮﺼﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻤ(ﺳﻻ+ ,,ﻮ(ﻟ/ !ﺎ#ﺋﺎﻀﻔﻟ(, 
!ﺪﺼﺘﻠﻟ ﻦ(ﺮ*ﺜﻛ -ﺎﻧ0 10ﺮﺟ ﻦﻣ 4ﺗ6ﺮﻓ0 ﺎﻣ8 ء"ﻮ$ﻟ" ﻲﻠﻋ )ﻮﺘﻔﻠﻟ, ﺤ" ﻻ ﺎﻤ&ﻓ (ﻮﺨﻟ, ﻦﻋ ,ﻮﻋ/ﻮﺘ" 12 134!ﻮﻨﺴ. 
ﺪﺑ# $%ﺰ'ﺎﺟ ﻢ+ﻓ! !ﻮﺘﻔﻠﻟ, ﺔﺳﺎ$ﺴﻟ'( ﺔﻟ(ﺪﻟ'( ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ'( .ﺮﺳﻷ' 1ﻮﺌﺷ( 5ﻼﻣﺎﻌﻤﻟ'( 5'9ﺎﺒﻌﻟ' ﻲﻓ  !ﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻ'(
ﺔ"ﻟ$ﺪﻟ& 'ﺎﻗﻼﻌﻟ&$... ﺎﻣ ﺎﻣﻮ$ ﻢ&ﺪﺣ) *ﻮﻘ$ ﻻ-: !"#$ ﻻ. !ﺬ# $% &% !"#ﺎﺸﻣ# ﺔﻌﺟ*ﺮﻣ# ﺚﺤﺑ ﻲﻟ1 2ﺎﺘﺤ4 5ﻮﺿﻮﻤﻟ* .
 ﻦﻣ ﺮ$ﺬﺤﺘﻟ)* ,+ﻮﺘﻔﻠﻟ ﻂﺑ)ﻮﻀﻟ) ﻊﺿ* 4ﺎﻛ )ﺬ7ﻟﻟ",ﺎ"ﻘﻟ%ﺰﻤ .ًﺎ#$%ﺮﺿ ﻞﺑ ,ﺎﻤ+ﻣ ً-ﺮﻣ. ؛ﺎ+ﺗﻼ2ﺆﻣ% ,ﺎ+ﺣ%ﺮﺷ 6ﺎ7ﺑ%  
                                                        
432 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 9. For further information on these two programmes, see Gräf 2010: 201–209. 
433 The process was lengthy, he remembers, for several reasons: “Among them was that the nature of the 
improvised language (al-lugha al-murtajala) in which these fatwas were cast is unlike written language (al-
lugha al-maktūba): the improvised expression needs some refinement and forming (al-tahdhīb wa-l-ṣiyāgha) to 
make it ready for printing and editing, and that requires time and effort. And among [these issues was] that 
some questions were repeated, and thus their answers were repeated. While their content was largely the 
same, their form and style (al-siyāgha wa-l-uslūb) differed” (al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 9). 
434 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 10. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s media fatwas have been extensively analysed by Bettina Gräf both in 
her dissertation (2010) and in a number of essays (2007; 2008; 2014), where she tackles the question of how 
media usage transforms relations of religious authority in Sunni Muslim contexts, among other issues. 
435 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 11–32. 
436 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 5. 
437 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 5–8. 
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“The Fatwa between Discipline and Neglect” – this topic about which grievances have 
become prevalent today, particularly in the age of satellite television, and the many bold 
people that it has spawned who embark upon the fatwa live on air, without restraining from 
discussing what they are not able to [discuss]. They are always ready for a fatwa, concerning 
devotional practices (al-ʿibādāt), social intercourse (al-muʿamalāt), the affairs of the family, of 
society, of the state, of economics, politics, of international relations … and not one of them 
ever says “I don’t know” or “The topic requires [further] study, consultation and 
deliberation.” Therefore, it was a crucial imperative to write down the general rules of the 
fatwa (al-ḍawābiṭ li-l-fatwā), and to warn of its perils, and to set apart its comments and its 
qualifications; an important, even indispensable imperative.438 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s later text thus writes against this perceived fragmentation of Muslim 
authority, seeking, as Caeiro has aptly put it, to reassert the monopoly of interpretation of 
the ʿulamāʾ and to re-establish their authority in the face of secularization, the 
authoritarianism of the postcolonial nation–state, the arrival of new media and a 
polyphonic Islamic public sphere fostered by Sadat’s policy of economic liberalization in 
the 1970s.439 This objective is neatly reflected in the text at hand, where al-Qaraḍāwī 
restates in three subsequent chapters the importance and particular conditions of the 
fatwa (makān wa-shurūṭ al-fatwā), its perils (mazāliq, sg. mazlaq) and a contemporary method 
or programme (manhaj) for its provision.440 
In the first chapter of al-Fatwā, following the prologue, al-Qaraḍāwī accentuates the 
loftiness of the office of [issuing] a fatwa (jalālat manṣib al-fatwā), which makes the mufti one 
who takes the Prophet’s place (qāʾim maqām al-nabī); and he highlights the awe (tahayyub), 
hesitation (tarayyuth) and caution (taḥdhīr) which the companions of the Prophet felt when 
providing fatwas.441 These historical and ethical constraints are subsequently reinforced on 
social grounds by denying contemporary practitioners the right to provide fatwas if their 
knowledge has not been mediated by the authoritative body of Muslim scholarship: 
                                                        
438 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 3. 
439 Caeiro 2006: 670. The fragmentation of Muslim scholarly authority by print culture in Egypt in the early 
twentieth century has been investigated by Smith (1973; 1999), among others. With regard to new media, this 
fragmentation has been prominently explored by Eickelman and Anderson (1997; 2003). 
440 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c. The first two chapters on the conditions (al-shurūṭ) and the perils (al-mazāliq) reflect the 
conventional chapter structure of premodern adab al-fatwā literature (Masud 1984: 15; Caeiro 2006: 664). 
441 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 18. According to Masud et al. (1996), the early scholars al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) and Ibn 
Khaldun (d. 808/1406) had already outlined several types of caution (taḥdhīr) that they attributed to early 
practitioners of iftāʾ, “including the founders of major Sunni law schools” (16). 
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Many of these are not from the “people of remembrance (ahl al-dhikr)” in the sciences of the 
shariʿa, nor did they bother themselves to sit with the people of remembrance and to learn 
from them and to be trained at their hands. Rather, they produced their cultivation 
(thaqāfatahū) by swiftly reading contemporary books, but between the original sources and 
their reading [matter] – there are a hundred and one veils in between. And if they would 
read them, they would not understand them, because they do not possess the particular keys 
to understand and digest them. Each knowledge has its language and terms that only its 
acknowledged possessors (ahluhū al-ʿārifūn) and its specialists (al-mutakhaṣṣiṣūn fīhī) 
understand.442 
The particular epistemic culture (al-ʿilm wa-l-thaqāfa) mediated through the confined body 
of the scholarly community entails a profound entrenchment in the authoritative texts, the 
virtue of understanding the Arabic language and its sensibility (malakat fahm lughat al-ʿarab 
wa-tadhawwuqahā) and a practical knowledge of Muslim scholars: “their disagreement 
(ikhtilāfahum), the plurality of their perceptions (madārikahum) and the diversity of their 
orientations”.443 
These epistemic and practical insights – the “smell of fiqh” (rāʾiḥat al-fiqh), as al-
Qaraḍāwī dubs them a line below – are paralleled by a set of ethical virtues (al-jānib al-
akhlāqī fī al-muftī) which are even given priority over the former.444 They comprise honesty 
                                                        
442 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 27. 
443 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 29. These conditions largely correspond to those which al-Qaraḍāwī formulated for the 
practice of ijtihād (1985). According to Masud et al., early “adab al-mufti treatises generally distinguish several 
levels of competence in relation to ijthad, or interpretation, the highest being the absolute (muṭlaq) or 
independent (mustaqill) mufti. […] This exemplar engages in unfettered ijtihad based on knowledge of the […] 
sources […], the fiqh literature […] and its areas of consensus (ijmāʿ) and disagreement; and the Arabic 
language including grammar, syntax, and the related linguistic sciences. The basic interpretative techniques 
combine the capacity to identify relevant shariʿa source texts, with various methods of reasoning or 
derivation from those texts, to ascertain the legal assessment or rule (ḥukm) applicable to the specific matter 
in question” (Masud et al. 1996: 16–17). It appears, however, that “in later periods this ideal status was 
considered by some Sunnis to be unattainable” (Masud et al. 1996: 17). 
444 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 29. 
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(amāna) and piety (taqwā), the humbleness to admit one’s ignorance or another mufti’s 
superior knowledge, to acknowledge if one has erred, and the courage to speak the truth in 
the face of adversary power.445 
While many of these normative thoughts reproduce the traditional concerns of 
premodern Muslim scholarship on the regulation of iftāʾ, others instead reflect, as 
Alexandre Caeiro has pointedly remarked, recent shifts and reconfigurations in the “moral 
universe” of iftāʾ.446 This applies particularly to al-Qaraḍāwī’s notion of “reality” (al-wāqiʿ). 
Drawing on the third/ninth-century scholar Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and the five 
necessary qualities (khiṣāl, sg. khaṣla) which the latter defined for the mufti,447 al-Qaraḍāwī 
highlights the necessity of combining the scholar’s epistemic and ethical cultivation with a 
profound “knowledge of people” (maʿrifat al-nās) and his entrenchment in ordinary people’s 
reality: 
ﺘﺣ #$ﻨﻋ ﻞﻓﺎﻏ ﺮ,ﻏ #ﻊﻗ/ﻮﻠﻟ ًﺎ,ﻋ/4 5ﻮﻜ7 58 ﺐﺠ7 ﺮ,ﺼﺒﻟ/ ﻲﺘﻔﻤﻟ/ 5@ﺎﻨﻟ$ %ﺎ&ﺤﺑ )$ﻮﺘﻓ ﻂﺑﺮ/ ﻰﻻ ﻮ#ﻓ %&  ﺐﺘﻜ$
 ُ" ﻻ$ %&ﺎ"ﺮﻈﻧ !ﺒﻨ$% &ﺔﺻﺎﺧ +-ًﻮ/ﻗ ﻊﻀ$% &ﺔﻨ/ﻌﻣ +5ًﻮﻣ6 ﻲﻋ+ﺮ$ ﻲﺘﻔﻤﻟ+ ﻞﻌﺠﺗ ﻊﻗ+ﻮﻟ+ Aﺎﻋ+ﺮﻣ% &B+ﺮﻓ ﻲﻓ D+ﻮﺘﻓ ﻲِﻘْﻠ
ﺔﻤ#ﻣ %&'ﺎﺒﺘﻋ& ﻰﻠﻋ.  
The insightful mufti has to be conscious of reality (wāʿīan li-l-wāqiʿ) and not careless about it 
so that he connects his fatwas to people’s lives (ḥayāt al-nās). He does not write theoretical 
reflections, nor does he deliver his fatwas in a void. The consideration of reality (murāʿāt al-
wāqiʿ) induces the mufti to consider specific affairs, to establish particular stipulations and to 
call one’s attention to significant reflections.448 
With his subsequent reference to a fatwa on birth control (taḥdīd al-nasl) by Ḥasan al-Bannā 
(d. 1949), in which the latter demands a balanced pairing of the fiqh of religion (fiqh al-dīn) 
with the fiqh of life (fiqh al-ḥayāt), al-Qaraḍāwī suggests an illustrative example for this 
realistic approach.449 The reference also shows the profound imprint of Islamic activism on 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with the Muslim scholarly tradition of iftāʾ. 
                                                        
445 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 41. Here, al-Qaraḍāwī invokes the passion and imprisonment of Ibn Taymiyya 
(d. 728/1328) as an exemplary figure embodying these virtues. 
446 Caeiro 2006. 
447 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1991: 148.  
448 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 33. 
449 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 33–37. For a detailed analysis of al-Bannā’s fatwa against birth control, see Shakry 2007: 
185–189. 
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Al-Qaraḍāwī’s eminent concern for reality is likewise reflected in the following 
chapter of al-Fatwā, on the perils (mazāliq, sg. mazlaq) that the mufti faces in our time. 
Again, he warns against a scholar lacking an understanding of the reality (ʿadam fahm al-
wāqiʿ) to which the enquirers’ questions relate.450 
Tellingly, in the third chapter of al-Fatwā, al-Qaraḍāwī describes his contemporary 
program for the fatwa (manhaj muʿāṣir li-l-fatwā) as resulting from a close co-reading (qirāʾa) 
of the foundational texts and reality (al-wāqiʿ).451 The notion of facilitation (al-taysīr) takes – 
again – a highly prominent place in his mediation between these. Taysīr, al-Qaraḍāwī 
maintains, not only reflects the spirit of the Qurʾan and the sunna, but also suits the 
adverse conditions of our times (ʿaṣrunā), which are marked by the predominance of 
“materialism over spirituality, selfishness over altruism, utilitarianism over ethics” and a 
constant attack on religion (dīn) by secularists: 
ﻤﻟ# $ﺮﻔﻟ#' ﻦﻣ ﺪﺠ% ﺎﻤﻧ)* +,ﻨ.ﻌ% ﻦﻣ ﺪﺠ% ﺎﻤﻠﻘﻓ +ﺔﻤﺋ56 ﺔﻛﺮﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻞﺑ +ﺔ.ﺳﺎﻗ ﺔﻨﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺶ.ﻌ% @ﺎﻌﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ5 CﺬE ﻲﻓ ﻢﻠﺴ
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ﺔﻤ#ﺰﻌﻟ' ﺐﻧﺎﺟ  
The Muslim individual (al-fard al-muslim) lives in these [contemporary] societies under a 
merciless trial (miḥna qāsiya), even in a permanent battle (maʿraka dāʾima). He seldom finds 
someone who supports him; on the contrary, he [usually] finds someone who hampers him. 
And therefore, it is necessary that those qualified for the fatwa (ahl al-fatwā) facilitate his 
way (yuyassirū ʿalayhī) as much as they can, and that they present him the perspective of 
permissibility more than the perspective of determination (jānib al-ʿazīma).452 
Part of this facilitation (taysīr) is to address people in contemporary language (bi-lughat al-
ʿaṣr); a language that, rather than stirring their sentiments by exaggeration (ithārat al-
ʿawāṭif bi-l-mubālaghāt), appeals to their minds by logic (mukhāṭabat al-ʿuqūl bi-l-manṭiq).453 
Here, al-Qaraḍāwī refers to his own use of a familiar, simple and plain language (lugha sahla 
                                                        
450 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 67–9. On the other hand, al-Qaraḍāwī argues that reality (al-wāqiʿ) should be rendered 
obedient to the text, and not vice versa (al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 79). On the relation of reality and the normative 
texts in al-Qaraḍāwī’s theoretical thought, see chapters III.1.-4. 
451 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 98. 
452 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 13. 
453 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 15. 
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qarība maʾnūsa) that seeks to speak to a larger imaginary public that transcends the narrow 
circle of a cultivated elite: 
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And maybe I even used some colloquial terms and examples (al-alfāẓ aw al-amthāl al-
ʿāmmiyya) to clarify what I intended, believing that the mass of my viewers and listeners are 
not on a single cultural and intellectual level (mustawā wāḥid min al-thaqāfa wa-l-fikr).454 
To these pragmatic and linguistic principles of the use of contemporary language (al-lugha 
al-muʿāṣira) to reflect the varying intellectual states of his imaginary audience, al-Qaraḍāwī 
adds a further remark on hermeneutical grounds. He demands that a rule’s wisdom and 
reason (ḥikma wa-ʿilla) be explained – an approach that he justifies with reference to these 
present times in which scepticism prevails: 
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The majority of people are not ready to accept a rule (al-ḥukm) without knowing its source 
and its meaning (maʾkhadhahū wa-maghzāhū), [without] becoming aware of its wisdom and its 
objective (ḥikmatahū wa-hadafahū), particularly in [affairs] that do not concern outright acts 
of worship (al-taʿbīdāt al-maḥda).455 
His subsequent demand to “give the fatwa its right of comment and explanation” (iʿṭāʾ al-
fatwā haqqahā min al-sharḥ wa-l-īḍāḥ) deliberately departs from a particular strain of Muslim 
scholarly tradition which advised the mufti to provide short answers; a departure that he 
justifies again by reference to his imaginary audience which transcends the narrow circle 
of a cultural elite: 
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454 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 15; 2008c: 106–107. 
455 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 110. 
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And even if [the provision of short answers] is permitted for some people and in some 
circumstances, it is not permitted as a [general] principle (qāʿida) when it comes to that 
which is [to be] transmitted to the public (yudhāʿ ʿalā jumhūr al-nās) or written in a 
newspaper, a magazine or a book that both the masses and the elite read (yaqraʾuhū al-khāṣṣa 
wa-l-ʿāmma).456 
The success of the imaginary enquirer’s epistemological transformation through the fatwa 
thus crucially depends on the regulation of the scholar’s epistemic and ethical cultivation 
and on the particular linguistic form of his reply, which should reflect both the varying 
intellectual states of his imaginary audience and the social conditions of an age (ʿaṣr) 
dominated by materialism and scepticism. 
Beyond these epistemic, ethical and linguistic conditions that restrict and limit the 
legitimate addressees of a question to a confined discourse community – “those in 
authority” (ulū al-amr) – there exist a number of further criteria and principles (ādāb, sg. 
adab) that guarantee the success of the enquirer’s epistemological transformation through 
asking.457 These principles concern the enquirer (al-mustaftī). Some merely reflect the 
conditions discussed earlier, such as the demand that a question be realistic or, as al-
Qaraḍāwī puts it, a “question about that which is useful or beneficial (nafaʿa)”.458 Another 
condition that is of particular interest to us here relates to the enquirer’s inner disposition 
when formulating his or her question.459 Accordingly, the enquirer’s outer speech act is 
supposed to correspond to an inner, pious and God-fearing (taqwā) position and an attitude 
of attentive self-observation (rāqaba), abstaining from taking the formal legal opinion of 
the scholar (fatwā) as a “pretext for an affair (amr) that he knows from the abode of his soul 
[or his self] (min qarār nafsihī) is legally not lawful (jāʾiz)”.460 The ultimate supervisory and 
undeceivable authority the enquirer has to attest to is, in the end, his conscience.461 
                                                        
456 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 121. 
457 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 43–56. 
458 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996: 214-215; 2008c: 43. A useful question is, as he briefly explains, a question “about a reality 
(wāqiʿa) that either [the enquirer himself] or others take pains with and for which he desires a rule (ḥukm)” 
(al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 43). A similar definition is provided in an earlier text: “And when the Muslim is demanded 
to ask the people of remembrance and experience in each discipline and art (ʿilm wa-fann), so he is equally 
demanded to ask well (aḥsana al-suʾāl) […]: He asks about that which is useful to him in his religion or his 
earthly concerns (fī dīnihi aw dunyāhu) […]” (al-Qaraḍāwī 1996: 214). 
459 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999c: 5-6;  2008c: 48–51. 
460 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 48. 
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The particular linguistic form of the question should correspond to this inner 
position of attentive self-observation. The form is characterized by its bareness of 
“rhetorical decoration” and its articulation in a clear language, not concealing anything 
that affects the qualification of the matter. It exposes the affair in all its clarity (wuḍūḥ) and 
serenity to the scholar, without deceit nor distortion, exposing to him what is hidden 
(khabāyā, sg. khabīʾa) and what is concealed from him (ukhfiya ʿanhu) for his assessment.462 
This inner ethos of the enquirer neatly reflects al-Qaraḍāwī’s understanding of the 
role of the legal scholar and of the discipline of fiqh at large: the mufti passes his 
judgement, just like the qāḍī, based on the visible and perceptible, that is the exterior and 
outward action (ẓāhir) of the legal subject, leaving to God and to the believer’s conscience 
any secret affairs (khafāyā, sg. khafiyya) and his or her inmost thoughts (asrār, sg. sirr).463 
Despite its primal relation to the exterior, however, the fatwa represents in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s perspective a powerful technology of ethical transformation that affects the 
enquirer’s interiority as well. It weaves in his chest (ṣadr), as he puts it, investing his heart 
with confidence (thiqa) and serenity (itmiʾnān), and with calmness (istirāḥa) and certainty 
(yaqīn).464 It is thus not the alignment of exterior action to the outer letter of the law to 
which the fatwa aspires, but rather to the attainment of a particular inner state in the heart 
(qalb), “or in the conscience (ḍamīr), [to use] the words of our time”.465 
The relation of knowledge and power between the scholar and the enquirer is 
exemplified in two significant observations that al-Qaraḍāwī has made during his many 
years of providing fatwas on radio and television. Both are formulated on the final pages of 
the introduction to the first volume of his fatwa collection.466 
                                                                                                                                                                            
461 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 49. 
462 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 48-49. 
463 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 49. As Samira Haj has argued, early Orientalist scholars like William Tisdall represented 
Islam as a rigidly legalistic tradition that ignores the believer’s inner state (Tisdall 1895: 88; Haj 2011: 237–
238). Subsequently, it was assumed that it was only “modernity [that] introduced subjective interiority into 
Islam, something that was previously absent” (Haj 2011: 237–238). This legalistic representation, however, had 
already been corrected by Ignác Goldziher (1925: 88), and later by Talal Asad (2003: 225), among others. For an 
interesting critique that identifies the “correction” by Goldziher, Asad and others as “a troubling tendency in 
the academic study of Islam to privilege interiority over exteriority”, see Powers 2006: 451. 
464 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 50-51. 
465 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 50. 
466 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 33. 
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His first observation qualifies the relation of power between “the religious scholar 
and the general public” (ʿālim al-dīn wa-jumhūr al-shaʿb).467 This relation is described in terms 
of familial affection (maḥabba) and amicable affinity, which al-Qaraḍāwī contrasts to the 
disciplinary and executive power of the state: 
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The public (al-jumhūr) must feel towards the scholar as if he is a father to its minors, a 
brother to its adults and a friend to all of them. And that he is not a “policeman” (shurṭī) that 
strives to arrest them red-handed, nor the “counsel for the prosecution” (mumaththil ittihām) 
that demands the utmost punishment (aqṣā al-ʿuqūba) for them. But rather that he is an 
advocate (muḥāmi) who defends them, even if he is at times a judge (qāḍī) who rules with 
justice for or against them. The legal scholar, the mufti, must be in the eyes of his enquirers 
like the psychologist (al-ṭabīb al-nafsī) in the eyes of his patients (marḍāhū). It is 
indispensable that they trust in him, and that they are inclined to him (yastarīḥu ilayhī), and 
that they open themselves (bi-dhāti anfusihim) to him, and [they expose to him] what is 
concealed in their chest.468 
The institution of iftāʾ represents a moral appeal to the pious subject for voluntary self-
disclosure to the psychological authority of the scholar. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s second observation eventually reveals the profoundly gendered 
nature of his imaginary public. Highlighting the fact that women have a “greater concern 
with religion than men” (akthar ihtimāman bi-dīnihā min al-rajul), he links women’s public 
expression of religiosity – and here, he reproduces an argument which is highly popular 
among proponents of the Islamic revival – to a particular inner-emotional and affective 
disposition that God has endowed them with: 
ﻗﺮﻟ$% ﺔﻤﺣﺮﻟ$% )ﺎﻨﺤﻟ$ ﺮﻋﺎﺸﻣ ﻦﻣ 1ﺑ ﺎ3ﺼﺧ% ﷲ ﺎ7ﺎﺒﺣ ﺎﻣ )9 %ﺪﺒ;%ﺔ ! ﺎ#ﻠﻌﺟ !ﺮﻗ!ﻰﻟ  ﻦﻣ ﺔ$ﻨ&ﺪﻟ) *ﺮﻄﻔﻟ) ﻞﺟﺮﻟ% ,
! ﺐﺠﻋ ﻻ!!  ﺖﻧﺎﻛ, !ﺎ#ﺘﻔﻟ'( )ﺎﺟﺮﻟ' ﻞﺋﺎﺳ/ ﻦﻣ 2ﺮﻏ4( ﺮﺜﻛ4 7ﺎ#ﺘﻔﻟ'( 7'ﺪ#ﺴﻟ' ﻞﺋﺎﺳ/  ﻰﻠﻋ ﻦ%ﺻﺮﺣ )ﻮﻜ,
ﺎﺴﺤﻟ% ءﻮﺳ ﻦﻣ ﻦ+ﻓﻮﺧ. ﺮﺒﻛ2 ﻦ3ﺪﺘﻟ%! !ﻮﻗ$.  
                                                        
467 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 35. 
468 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 36. 
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And it appears that the feelings of tenderness, compassion and mildness (mashāʿir al-ḥanān 
wa-l-raḥma wa-l-riqqa) that God has awarded and endowed her with made her closer to a 
religious nature (al-fiṭra al-dīniyya) than man. No wonder that if the letters of ladies and 
young girls are more numerous and abundant than the letters by men and young males, 
followingly also their desire (ḥirs) for piety greater and their fear of a bad account is 
stronger.469 
As Ellen McLarney has convincingly argued, the gendered nature of this public renders 
women – and gender relations in general – a central place for this public’s cultural and 
biological (re)production.470 By linking the woman to the sphere of the religious, however, 
al-Qaraḍāwī – much like other thinkers and activists of the Islamic revival – ironically 
reproduces the very secular and gendered divide between the private and the public, the 
family and the state, religion and politics, which his notion of Islam as a comprehensive 
system actually seeks to overcome.471 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s fatwas manifestly reproduce this secular association of gender and 
the religious. They capture and delineate a strategic place in the Islamic revival’s 
biopolitical project which seeks to subvert and evade the rule of the (semi-)authoritarian 
state by cultivating a different kind of modern subjectivity at the very place to which the 
secular state has turned a blind eye: the sphere of the private – of gender, sexuality and 
religion. The fatwa, with its particular mechanics of power, provides a tool to occupy and 
fill this gendered and religious space of the private par excellence. Addressing and invoking 
the voluntary self-disclosure of the pious Muslim subject, it rests on a set of mechanisms 
that circumvent the state’s disciplinary control of the public by targeting the individual 
believer’s inner conscience.472 
In the past few decades, the fatwa has been successfully expanded to new media 
technologies. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s normative reflections on the fatwa and its authority have, as 
we have seen above, been motivated and triggered by this development.473 In the following 
chapter, we will engage more closely with al-Qaraḍāwī’s thoughts on new media, their 
                                                        
469 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 34. 
470 McLarney 2015. 
471 McLarney 2015. 
472 Agrama 2010. 
473 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 3. 
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production and their consumption as the new and most effective tool (wasīla) for seeking 
knowledge (ṭalab al-ʿilm) and cultivating (tathqīf) a pious self. 
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4. The Conscious Muslim Viewer 
!ﻼﻋﻹ% ﻮ" ﺔﻠ#ﺳ% ﻦﻣ ﺮﻄﺧ$ ﻞﺋﺎﺳﻮﻟ' ﻲﺘﻟ$ !ﻮﻘﺗ 
ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮ"ﺛﺄﺘﻟ' ﻲﻓ !"ﺎﺴﻧﻹ' ﺮ"ﺛﺄﺘﻟ' ﻲﻓ !ﻠﻘﻋ !"ﺮﻜﻓ& 
ﺮ"ﺛﺄﺘﻟ'( ﻲﻓ !ﻧ#ﺪﺟ& !"ﺮﻋﺎﺸﻣ( ﺮ"ﺛﺄﺘﻟ'( ﻲﻓ !ﺗ#$%& 
!"ﺎﺠﺗ&'  
Media are one of the most momentous means 
for having an effect on someone: an effect on 
one’s mind and thinking, an effect on one’s 
feelings and sensations, an effect on one’s 
will and orientation.474 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
!ﺎﻨ$ ءﺎ#ﺷ% !ﻮﻜ$ ﻞﻛ ﻊﻤﺘﺴﻣ ﺎ"#ﻓ !"ﻘﻓ !ﺴﻔﻧ 
ﺎ"#ﺘﻔﻣ'  
There are affairs in which every listener is 
his own jurist and their mufti.475 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s first appearance on Qatari national television dates back to 1970, shortly 
after the channel’s launch on 15 August in the same year.476 In his memoirs he recalls that 
while he was on vacation in Beirut, he was asked to record six episodes for a weekly 
religious programme Hady al-islām that was to be aired on the newly established channel.477 
After his return from Lebanon, he proposed to Maḥmūd al-Sharīf, later the Jordanian 
minister for information, and Jawād Maraqa, the director of Qatar TV, a new form for the 
                                                        
474 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g. 
475 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996e: 70. 
476 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240. Islamic television emerged in the Arab world in parallel with the arrival of 
television transmissions in the region in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Hroub 2012: 5). These early Islamic 
transmissions – consisting of the recitation of the Qurʾan, weekly coverages of the Friday sermon and 
additional religion-oriented material on religious occasions like Ramadan – were under the full control of the 
state (Hroub 2012: 5). Their “religious dose”, as Khaled Hroub has aptly put it, “had been carefully injected 
and politically calculated, mostly to furnish an Islamic image to the eyes of the public of secular and corrupt 
regimes” (Hroub 2012: 5). 
477 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240. 
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programme, in which he himself would provide oral responses to written questions sent in 
by its viewers, without any interlocutor.478 The idea apparently convinced them. 
When the programme started, it lasted twenty minutes; this was subsequently 
expanded to thirty minutes, and eventually to fifty minutes.479 With the arrival of satellite 
television in the early 1990s, its outreach was boosted, as al-Qaraḍāwī recalls in his 
memoirs (dhikrayāt) – from the Gulf, where it was viewed particularly in the Emirates and 
the Eastern Province (al-minṭaqa al-sharqiyya) of Saudi Arabia, to the Maghreb and other 
countries, with questions on various matters of importance to his audience arriving from 
across the region.480 
Despite this transnational outreach, Ehab Galal argues that, in its set design, its 
visual framework and its performative setting, Hady al-islām remained deeply established 
within the framework of national television.481 By focusing on al-Qaraḍāwī as “the only 
person in the studio, facing and talking directly to the viewer/national audience”, it 
positioned him as the authority “who talks to the viewer but does not expect him or her to 
answer back. This is the univocal dialogue used on public service television with the aim to 
inform and educate the mass audience.” 482 
It was only with the arrival of Al Jazeera’s al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt in 1996 that things 
took a new form. As al-Qaraḍāwī recollects in his memoirs, Hady al-islām lost much of its 
attraction; a loss that he attributes to the fact that al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt “is a live-to-air 
programme” (ʿalā al-hawā) which lends it a distinct aura of “novelty and vitality”.483 In 
contrast to Hady al-islām, al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt provided the host or the presenter (al-
muqaddim) a major role. Set against a background with pictures of global hot spots and 
having people call in to the show by telephone, its “intimate and performative setting”, as 
                                                        
478 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240. Based on al-Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs, Bettina Gräf suggests that this idea was inspired 
by the Egyptian programme Nūr ʿalā nūr, in which al-Qaraḍāwī was – along with other Islamist thinkers like al-
Shaʿrāwī, Abū Zahra, al-Madanī and al-Sanhūrī – interviewed by Aḥmad Farrāj, one of the most prominent 
figures of the Islamic mediascape (Gräf 2010: 208; see also al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 308–310). In addition, al-
Qaraḍāwī produced two Ramadan programmes for Qatar TV, Fī riḥāb al-qurʾān and Min mishkāt al-nubuwwa, 
which he discontinued after two years due to lack of time (al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240). 
479 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240 
480 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240.  
481 Galal 2009: 155. 
482 Galal 2009: 155. Similarly, Skovgaard-Petersen 2004. 
483 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006a: 240. 
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Ehab Galal pointedly observes, “gives the viewer the possibility to identify with the actors 
in the dialogue. The viewer could potentially have been the one sitting together with 
Qaraḍāwī asking the same questions as the host does.” 484 As such, al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt 
marked a decisive shift towards a public space that Eickelman and Anderson have described 
as “discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions 
recognized by state authorities”.485 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s own normative reflections on modern media, and on television in 
particular, date from the early 1990s.486 From the beginning, he characterizes new media as 
“momentous and prompt in effect” (muhimm wa-sarīʿ al-taʾthīr).487 In an interview with the 
journalist Ḥamīd al-Anṣārī broadcast on Al Jazeera’s weekly programme Al-Sharīʿa wa-l-
ḥayāt, he provides a detailed account of Islam’s perspective on media (ruʾyat al-islām li-l-
iʿlām), in which he highlights the tremendous effect (taʾthīr) of the media on the 
intellectual, emotional and sensory formation of their consumers: 
 ﻲﻓ ﺮ$ﺛﺄﺘﻟ)* +,ﺮﻜﻓ* .ﻠﻘﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺮ$ﺛﺄﺘﻟ) +2ﺎﺴﻧﻹ) ﻲﻓ ﺮ$ﺛﺄﺘﻟ) ﻰﻠﻋ 8ﻮﻘﺗ ﻲﺘﻟ) ﻞﺋﺎﺳﻮﻟ) ﺮﻄﺧ@ ﻦﻣ ﺔﻠ$ﺳ* ﻮD 8ﻼﻋﻹ)
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Media are one of the most momentous tools (wasāʾil, sg. wasīla) for having an effect (taʾthīr) 
on someone: an effect on one’s mind (ʿaql) and thinking (fikr), an effect on one’s feelings 
(wajdān) and sensations (mashāʿir, sg. mashʿar), an effect on one’s will (irāda) and orientation 
(ittijāh). They direct one’s thoughts (afkār, sg. fikr) and tastes (adhwāq, sg. dhawq), one’s 
personal and political inclinations and one’s cultural and intellectual orientations. They 
accompany one in one’s life, they come into one’s room and they come into one’s 
bedroom.488 
                                                        
484 Galal 2009: 155–156. 
485 Eickelman/Anderson 2003: 2; Galal 2009: 155. 
486 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 115. 
487 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 115. Despite this characterization, however, the discussion of them in this particular 
text is only brief – a surprising fact, given its late publication date. It is only some years later, in the fourth 
volume of his fatwa collection Min hady al-islām and in a number of public appearances on satellite television 
and the internet, that he tackles the issue more thoroughly (al-Qaraḍāwī 2012: 686–718). 
488 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g. 
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In al-Qaraḍāwī’s view, new media’s effect (taʾthīr) rests on their all-pervasiveness and their 
intimate attachment to human bodily sensations, extending beyond individuals’ 
consciences to society at large, directing “its thoughts (tawjīh afkārihim), inclinations 
(muyūl, sg. mayl) and sensitivities (adhwāq, sg. dhawq)”.489 This effect has increased both 
with media’s tapping on new sensory channels and its enlarged circulation, which with 
satellite television has reached global dimensions.490 
New media’s effectiveness and pervasive influence, however, stand in stark contrast to – al-
Qaraḍāwī’s maintains – the absence of any normative provision for them from an Islamic 
legal perspective.491 With this claim of neutrality for new media, al-Qaraḍāwī clearly takes 
an opposing position to those Muslim scholars who had rejected any kind of visual media, 
either based on (what al-Qaraḍāwī perceives as) a wrongly interpreted ban on images or 
based on a charge of undue innovation (bidʾa).492 In a fatwa issued when an anonymous 
enquirer (mustaftī) asked a question about whether “watching programmes, films and series 
shown [during Ramadan] spoils fasting (ṣawm)”, al-Qaraḍāwī asserts the principled 
neutrality of media: “Television is one of a number of tools (wasīla min wasāʾil): there is good 
and there is evil in it.” 493 
                                                        
489 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g. 
490 Al-Qaraḍāwī highlights the influence of new media in a telling comparison with another technology for the 
dissemination of knowledge – “teaching” (taʿlīm) – pointing out their common linguistic root in Arabic in the 
word for “knowledge” (ʿilm). “But teaching (taʿlīm)”, he continues, “accompanies the human being at school, 
at university and in places of study, whereas media accompany him wherever he is […]. Even when he is in the 
car, he can listen to the radio, and some cars are even equipped with televisions” (al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g). 
491 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 319-320. A similar observation in regard to al-Qaraḍāwī’s position on media has been 
made by Skovgaard-Petersen (2004: 161). 
492 Already in Ḥalāl, al-Qaraḍāwī had invoked the prominent position of the former Egyptian Mufti 
Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Mutīʿī (d. 1353/1935) on the legitimacy of photographic images (al-jawāb al-kāfī fī ibāḥat 
al-taṣwīr al-fūtūghrāfī). A photograph, for them, is not an act of creation (ʿamaliyyat al-khalq), but rather a 
capturing of creation’s shadow (ḥabs li-l-ẓill). The colloquial term for “photography” in the Gulf region – 
“reflection” (ʿaks) – expresses this conception, al-Qaraḍāwī argues, in an exemplary manner. Later, he drew 
on the same argument against those “stern zealots who prohibit all ‘reflection’ (ʿaks) even if they are ‘on 
television’ ”, and who wrongly believe the reflection is identical to God’s creation (al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 109–110; 
2009a: 699). For a broader discussion of the engagement of Muslims with images, see Ibric 2006; Naef 2007. For 
positions on television taken by contemporary proponents of Wahhabism and Deobandism, see Görke 2010. 
493 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 319-320. 
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Despite this alleged neutrality, al-Qaraḍāwī has developed in the past few years a 
number of conditions (shurūṭ, sg. sharṭ) and general rules (ḍawābiṭ, sg. ḍābiṭ) to qualify and 
regulate the consumption and production of the media, which he would eventually 
subsume under the term fiqh iʿlāmī, “media fiqh”.494 A central criterion is the content. The 
qualification of television as lawful or otherwise arises out of the qualification of “the thing 
(shayʾ) that is watched in the apparatus, not out of the apparatus itself. When it is good, 
then its viewing and its audition are permitted, [...] and when it is vicious [...] its viewing is 
prohibited [...].” 495 
The second condition that al-Qaraḍāwī highlights is “the judgement of the aims” 
(ḥukm al-maqāṣid);496 here he is using a term from Muslim legal philosophy that has beccome 
prominent in recent years, though he takes it in a somewhat unexpected direction. As he 
apodictically puts it: “In ordinary affairs, to the tools (wasāʾil, sg. wasīla) applies the 
judgement of the aims (ḥukm al-maqāṣid): if the aim is lawful (mashrūʿ) [...], then [from this] 
the means acquire its judgement. The means is not forbidden in itself.” 497 
In order to highlight this primacy of the aims, al-Qaraḍāwī draws an analogy 
between television and the gun: 
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In the hands of the Islamic freedom fighter (al-mujāhid), [the gun] is an aid for the holy war 
(jihād), supporting truth and opposing falsehood, while in the hand of the robber it is an aid 
for crime, for spoiling the land and frightening mankind. Thus also television: the one who 
                                                        
494 al-Qaraḍāwī 2012a: 705. Tellingly, al-Qaraḍāwī introduces the term fiqh iʿlāmī first in a fatwa on the 
appearance of women on television, where he seeks to provide a systematic outline of the notion. 
495 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 319-320. Or as he formulates it more drastically with respect to the cinema: “[Let] its 
themes steer clear of impudence and moral depravity and everything that contradicts the doctrines of Islam, 
its revealed laws and its morals. When it comes to films that arouse the worldly instincts (gharāʾiz al-dunyā) 
and incite misdeeds or bring about crime or induce perverse thoughts or circulate false beliefs and so forth: 
they are prohibited, and it is not permissible for the Muslim to watch them or to promote them” (al-Qaraḍāwī 
2014c). 
496 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014c. 
497 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014c. 
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uses it to learn the news and to follow useful cultural, political and economic programmes -
and – under certain rules and conditions – even programmes that provide relaxation, there 
is no doubt of the permissibility (al-ibāḥa) and legitimacy of this. Rather, it transforms [the 
watching of television] into a [virtuous] act performed in order to come closer to God (qurba) 
and a ritual act [which brings the creature into contact with his creator] (ʿibāda) through 
[its] pious intent (bi-l-niyya al-ṣāliḥa).498 
The legal status of media is hence determined by whether the aims are lawful (maqṣad 
mashrūʿ) and their consumer’s inner intention (niyya), which might even transform their 
consumption into an act of devotional practice (ʿibāda).499 
This centrality of the aims of media and intentions of their consumers is further 
highlighted in a subchapter of another fatwa published on al-Qaraḍāwī’s website in 2014, 
where an anonymous enquirer asks about the moral precepts and orders on media work in 
Islam: “What are the general legal rules (ḍawābiṭ, sg. ḍābiṭ) to which the worker in the field 
of media has to turn his attention?” 500 
In his reply, al-Qaraḍāwī expands the question, suggesting that the matter 
comprises both “the informed (al-muʿlam) as the one whom media reach (waṣala), the 
informer (al-muʿlim) who communicates (waṣṣala) his message through them, and the 
instrument (adāt) that you use – language (lugha)”.501 “When it comes to the informer”, he 
opens his line of argument, 
ﺎﻣ#! ِﻠﻌُﻤﻟ'ﻢ!ﻼﻓ!ﺪﺑ!!"!!ﻮﻜ$! ً ﺎﻧﺎﺴﻧ%! ً ﺎﻔﻘﺜﻣ! ً ﺎﻈ$ﻔﺣ! ً ﺎﻤ$ﻠﻋ!!"! ً ﺎ#ﻮﻗ!!ًﺎﻨ%ﻣ'! ً"#$ﺎﻗ!ﻰﻠﻋ!!"!ﻞﺻﻮ$!!ﺬ#!ﺔﻟﺎﺳﺮﻟ&!!ﺮﻌ$%!ﺔﻧﺎﻣ%!
ﺔﻤﻠﻜﻟ&!؛ﺎ#ﺘ%ﻟﻮﺌﺴﻣ+!ﻚﻟﺬﻟ$!ﻲﻐﺒﻨ%!!ﻧ#!!ﺎﺘُﺨ&!!ﺬ#ﻟ!ﻞﻤﻌﻟ%!!ﺎﺴﻧﻹ&!!"ﺎﻘﻟ&!ﻰﻠﻋ!ﻞﻤﺣ!!ﺬ#!ءﺐﻌﻟ%[…] ﻊ"ﻄﺘﺴﻧ .!!"!ﺺﻠﺨﻧ!
ﻦﻣ!!ﺬ#!ﺮﻣﻷ$!!ﻧ#!!ﺮﺘُﺸ&!ﻦﻤ#ﻓ!ﻞﻤﻌ$!ﻲﻓ!!ﺎﺠﻣ!!!ﻼﻋﻹ!!"!ﻖﱠﺒُﻄﺗ!!"ﻠﻋ!!ﺪﻋﺎﻘﻟ'!ﻲﺘﻟ$!ﻖﱠﺒُﻄﺗ!ﻰﻠﻋ!!"!ﺔﻔ#$%!)!"!ﺮ"ﺧ!
ﻦﻣ!!ﺮﺟﺄﺘﺳ'!!ﻮﻘﻟ%!ﻦ"ﻣﻷ%!(!ﻻ!ﻲﻔﻜﺗ!ﻂﻘﻓ!!ءﺎﻔﻜﻟ'!!ﺔ#ﻨ%ﻤﻟ(!ﺎﻤﻧ$%! ً ﺎﻀ$%!ﻲﻐﺒﻨ%!ﺮﻓ#ﻮﺗ!ﺔﻧﺎﻣﻷ&!!"ﺰﺘﻟﻻ"'!.ﻲﻘﻠﺨﻟ&  
he needs to be an educated (muthaqqafan) person, attentive (ḥafīẓan) and informed (ʿalīman) or 
firm and reliable (amīnan), talented [and able] to convey his message, aware of the integrity of 
words (amānat al-kalima) and his responsibilities. And therefore it is necessary that a person is 
chosen [for this work who is] able to carry this burden. […] Finally, we can arrive in this affair to 
the conclusion that for the one who works in the field of media it is a prerequisite that the [same] 
principle applies that applies to any job: {Indeed the best you can hire is a powerful and 
                                                        
498 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014d. 
499 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014d. 
500 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014b. 
501 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014b. 
  
 
 
110 
trustworthy man} (Q 28: 26). The professional qualification alone does not suffice. Rather, plenty 
of integrity (al-amāna) and moral commitment (al-iltizām al-khulqī) are necessary, too.502 
The second, recurrent element that al-Qaraḍāwī invokes in his reflections on new media is 
“language” (lugha). Although he addresses “language” in this context as a mere device 
(adāt), it is actually much more than this in his view. Being firmly grounded in its use in the 
Qurʾan as the central vehicle of divine revelation (tanzīl), the Arabic language has a sacred 
aura and plays a constitutive role for the identity of the Muslim umma.503 
Given the unique influence of new media on the formation of the individual and 
society, the regulation of the language of the media is thus an important issue for al-
Qaraḍāwī. He argues that two points have to be taken into consideration: first, the 
prevention of the spread of an ungrammatical Arabic with many mistakes (laḥn) in 
grammar, morphology, expression and style; and second, the use of Classical Arabic (fuṣḥā) 
– the only language deemed suitable for use in the media – rather than colloquial Arabic 
(ʿammiyya).504 
Apart from this strikingly brief reference to the professional, moral and linguistic 
standards on the production side, al-Qaraḍāwī’s central concern is the responsibility of the 
consumer of media. As the consumer “is not in a position to change any reprehensible 
actions (munkarāt, sg. munkar)” in the media, it is 
...  !ﺔ#ﺗ%& ﺔﺑﺎﻗ* (+,ﺮﺘﻨﻛ) 1ﺪﻨﻋ 4ﻮﻜ7 !8ﻟ ﺢﻠﺼ7 ﻻ ﺎﻣ, 8ﻟ ﺢﻠﺼ7 ﺎﻣ ﻦ#ﺑ ﺰ#ﻤ7 ﺚ#ﺤﺑ !ًﺎ#ﻋ%, 4ﻮﻜ7 4E ﺪﺑﻻ [...]
!ﻖ#ﻠ% &ﺬ() ﻖ#ﻠ% ﻻ &ﺬ( +ﻮﻘ% ﻲﻨﻌ% ..1#ﻠﻋ ﻲﻠﻟ& ﻮ( 4ﺎﺴﻧﻹ&[...] ﻔﻧ# ﻊﻨﻤﻧ ﻲﻨﻌ) ﺎﻤﻛ ﺔﻣﻮﻤﺴﻤﻟ' ﺔ(ﺬﻏﻷ' ﻦﻣ ﺎﻨﺴ[...] 
ﺔ"#ﺎﻤﻟ' ﺔ"ﺬﻏﻷ' ﻦﻣ ً'ﺮﻄﺧ ﺪﺷ3 ﺔﺛﻮﻠﻤﻟ'7 8ﺔﻣﻮﻤﺴﻤﻟ' :ﺬ; ﺔ<ﻧ'ﺪﺟﻮﻟ'7 ﺔ"ﺮﻜﻔﻟ' ﺔ"ﺬﻏﻷ' AB CD3 ﺎﻧ3.  
indispensable that he is heedful (wāʿin) insofar as he distinguishes between (mayyaza) that 
which is appropriate (ṣalaḥa) for him and that which is not appropriate for him, [so that] he 
has the “control” (control) [sic!], [and an ability to carry out] self-censorship (raqāba dhātiyya). 
                                                        
502 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014b. 
503 See e.g. al-Qaraḍāwī 2014e. 
504 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014e. As Skovgaard-Petersen has highlighted, al-Qaraḍāwī’s public use of language in the 
media differs markedly from that of al-Shaʿrāwī (d. 1998), “the most popular Islamic television star ever”: 
“When Shaʿrawi uses ʿammiyya, the vernacular, it is not because he is upset, as was the case with al-Qaradawi, 
but because he uses direct speech, playing the role of the prophet Joseph or some other Qurʾanic figure. Or he 
switches to ʿammiyya to break with the fictional framework and give a contemporary comment” (Skovgaard- 
Petersen 2004: 164). On al-Qaraḍāwī’s use of ʿāmmiyya in al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt, see Kaplony 2011. 
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[…] The human being is the one who has to say: “This is appropriate and that is not”, […] just as 
we deny ourselves poisoned food […]. And I deem this intellectual and mental (wajdānī) “food”, 
[when it is] poisoned and soiled, more perilous than any material food.505 
In this statement, al-Qaraḍāwī thus evokes the modern Muslim media consumer as an 
autonomous and self-regulated receiver (mustaqbil) who evaluates media content according 
to its suitability and appropriateness (ṣalaḥiyya), “profiting from the good and avoiding the 
harmful”.506 This primacy of the consumer’s autonomous self-regulation is highlighted in 
the broadcast discussing Islam’s view on the media, already discussed above, where al-
Qaraḍāwī refers, in striking brevity, to a further element in the regulation of modern media 
– the role of the state: 
ﺐﺟ#ﻮﻟ# &'! –ﻲﻓ!ﺔﻘ#ﻘﺤﻟ&-  !"!ﺔﻟ#ﺪﻟ%!ﻢﻈﻌﻣ%!ﻮﻨﻘﻟ%!"!!ﺬ#$!ءﺎ#ﺷﻷ&!ﺎﻤ#ﻜﻠﻤﺗ!!"#!!ﺎﻧ$ﻼﺑ ﻲﻓ!ﺐﺟ#ﻮﻟﺎﻓ!!"!ﺔﻟ#ﺪﻟ%!ﻞﺧﺪﺘﺗ!
 ً ﺎﻀ$%!ﻞﻤﻌﺘﻟ!!"ﺬ$!ﺎﻤﻛ!!ﺮﻧ!ﻲﻓ!ﺮﻄﻗ!!ﻞﺒ$ﻜﻟ' ًﻼﺜﻣ!ﻲﻨﻌ$!ﻞﻤﻌ$ﺑ!ﻧﻮ!!ﻦﻣ!ﺔﺑﺎﻗﺮﻟ'!ﻻ!!ﺄﺑ !ﺎ#ﺑ!ﻲﻓ!!ﻧ#!ﺰﺠﺤ$!ﺾﻌﺑ!
!ءﺎ$ﺷﻷ'! ً ﺎﺻﻮﺼﺧ'!ﻲﻓ!ﺎﻧﺮﺼﻋ!ﺢﺒﺻ$!!ﺎﻨ$!ءﺎ#ﺷ% !ﺔﺤﺿﺎﻓ!ﻻ"!!ًﺎﻗﻼ&' ﻖ)ﻠﺗ!ﻲﻨﻌ$%!!ﺎﻨﻟ%!ﻠﻤﻋﻮﺎ"!!"ﺎﺠﺗ!!ﻲﻨﻌ$!
ﺪﺑﻻ!ﺎﻨﻧ$!ﺪﻨﻋ!ءﻲﺷ!ﻦ"ﻌﻣ!!ﻮﻘﻧ!ﻷ! "!"!ﻢﻟ!!ﺪﺤ$!!"ﺬ$!!ﺎﺴﻧﻹ&!ﻮ"!ﻲﻠﻟ$!ﻲﻨﻌ$ ..%&ﻠﻋ!!ﻮﻘ$!!ﺬ#!ﻻ!ﻖ"ﻠ$!!ﺬ#$!ﻖ"ﻠ$  
It is a necessity – in reality – that the state (dawla) … and in our countries, states possess the 
majority of the [television] channels and [similar] things … it is a necessity that the state also 
interferes in order to act [upon] this. Just as we see, for instance, that the cable [television] 
(kaybal) in Qatar exercises a kind of censorship (raqāba). There should be no objection [to the 
fact] that some things are withheld, particularly in our times: nowadays some things have 
become disgraceful. They are not suitable at all. However, some people have made a business 
out of them. This means that it is inevitable that we, in a particular matter, must say “no”. 
When this does not happen … the human being, he is the one upon whom … that is to say, he 
must say: “This is not appropriate, and this is appropriate.” 507 
Although al-Qaraḍāwī thus demands that the state should censor and supervise (raqāba) its 
media, the brevity of his mention of this is striking.508 Rather, it is – again – the individual 
consumer whom he holds accountable. 
                                                        
505 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014b. 
506 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014b. A straightforward definition of exactly what qualifies as “suitable” or “good” and 
“harmful” respectively is left unanswered in this fatwa. 
507 al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g. 
508 Just a few lines below, he adds that states are capable of abusing media for their own propaganda purposes 
(al-Qaraḍāwī 1999g). 
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What conclusions may we draw at this point from al-Qaraḍāwī’s remarks on new 
media (iʿlām), and beyond that, on media in general? 
In the present and the previous chapters, I have investigated four different tools 
(wasāʾil, sg. wasīla) by which knowledge is acquired: reading books (qirāʾa); attending 
sessions of knowledge and listening (samiʿa) to the oral speech (mushāfaha) of the scholar; 
asking sound questions (istiftāʾ); and consuming new media (iʿlām). Al-Qaraḍāwī represents 
these means as powerful technologies for the transmission and acquisition of a normative 
knowledge (ʿilm) located within the disciplinary tradition of fiqh. 
Media consumption causes within the the reader (qāriʾ), the receiver or the enquirer 
(mustaftī) an epistemological transformation towards an understanding (fahm) of his 
outward actions (afʿāl ẓāhira) in regard to their ethico-legal value. The success of this 
transformation, however, crucially depends on the disciplinary regulation of the 
production and consumption of media, simultaneously restricting and enabling the 
subject’s epistemological transformation through them. 
Among these regulations, the self-regulation by a conscious (wāʿin) and autonomous 
reader, viewer or enquirer holds a central place. This centrality of the Muslim’s inner self-
regulation appears to be located at the intersection of various practices and traditions of 
the acquisition or consumption of knowledge: in the case of asking for a fatwa, conscience 
(al-ḍamīr) has always played a central role in Muslim normative theory.509 When it comes to 
the consumption of books and new media, however, the prominence of this inner 
dimension appears rather to be related to the rise of the liberal consumer market. 
Besides being an effective and powerful tool (wasāʾil, sg. wasīla) for transmitting 
knowledge (ʿilm), however, new media have a second function in al-Qaraḍāwī’s view: the 
mediation of reality. In this regard, al-Qaraḍāwī contrasts modern media like “newspapers, 
periodicals, magazines, official and unofficial circulars and publications” with the classical 
medium of Islamic scholarship, the book. Whereas the latter is assigned to the realm of 
knowledge, a realm seemingly detached from the reality of people’s ordinary lives, modern 
media appear indispensable for the Muslim activist’s and scholar’s immersion in reality, 
that is, their “realist culture” (al-thaqāfa al-wāqiʿiyya).510 It is this second function that I want 
to focus on in the following chapters. 
                                                        
509 Johansen 1999. 
510 Or as al-Qaraḍāwī puts it: “It is not enough that the activist has acquired the Islamic sciences, roamed the 
authoritative references of literature, language and history and has taken his share from human and 
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III. The Normative Force of 
Reality 
                                                                                                                                                                            
experimental studies, if – in spite of all of this – he does not know the world that he lives in, and what systems 
(nuẓum, sg. niẓām) are built on it, and what schools (madhāhib, sg. madhhab) rule it, and what elements move it, 
and what forces wrestle with one another in it, and what currents flow through it, and which hardships its 
people suffer from […]” (2009b: 134). 
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1. Mediating Reality 
!"ﻘﻔﻟ& ﻖﺤﻟ$ ﻦﻣ !"#ﺰ% ﻦ"ﺑ ﺐﺟ#ﻮﻟ# ﻊﻗ#ﻮﻟ#&.  
The legal scholar is the one who marries 
obligation to reality.511 
IBN QAYYIM (d. 751/1350) 
Al-Qaraḍāwī has reflected extensively upon the normative (self-)positioning of the scholar 
and Islamic activist vis-à-vis reality.512 In a number of longer essays that were first 
published in the magazine Daʿwa issued by the Muslim Brotherhood, and later compiled in 
his book Thaqāfat al-dāʿiya, “The Culture of the Activist”, he highlights the importance of 
the activist (dāʿiya) having an intimacy with the “reality of present life” (wāqiʿ al-ḥayāt al-
ḥāḍira) and “the world of the people […] inside the Islamic world and outside it” (dākhil al-
ʿālam al-islāmī wa-fī khārijihī).513 A similar argument is made in a later text on the position of 
the mufti or the legal scholar (faqīh), for whom – “besides mastering jurisprudence and 
legal deduction” – it is appropriate to have “insight into and knowledge of daily life and 
people”.514 Or, as he puts it most concisely, citing the eight/forteenth-century scholar Ibn 
Qayyim (d. 751/1350): 
ﻮ" #$ﻘﻔﻟ( )* ﻊﻗ#ﻮﻟ#& ﺐﺟ#ﻮﻟ# ﻦ*ﺑ ,&#ﺰ. ﻦﻣ.  
The legal scholar (faqīh) is the one who marries obligation (wājib) to reality.515 
The engagement with reality thus forms a crucial condition for the success of both the 
scholar’s ethico-legal discourse and the activist’s daʿwa, whereas the absence of this 
engagement leads to their failure and fiasco.516 
                                                        
511 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1991: 220; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 44. 
512 E.g. al-Qaraḍāwī 2009b: 134–140; 2008c: 67–68; 1985: 48–49; 2007c: 44–46; 2011c: 18–19. 
513 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009b: 134–140. On the genealogy of Thaqāfat al-dāʿiya, see Tammam 2009: 61. 
514 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 28. 
515 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1991: 220; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2007c: 44. 
516 In regard to the mufti, al-Qaraḍāwī provides the following categorical formulation: “The one who lives in 
sensuous (ḥissī) and spiritual (maʿnawī) hermitage, not paying attention to the reality of people (wāqiʿ al-nās) 
nor taking notice of their problems, is not allowed to give a formal legal opinion (aftā) to the people” (2008c: 
29). 
  
 
 
115 
In the refinement of his awareness of reality (al-thaqāfa al-wāqiʿiyya), the media 
occupy a central place. As mentioned above, al-Qaraḍāwī draws a clear distinction between 
modern media – “newspapers, periodicals, magazines, official and unofficial rounds and 
publications” – and the classical book as the traditional medium of Islamic scholarship.517 
He assigns the latter to a presumed pure realm of scholarly erudition existing detached 
from ordinary people’s lives; it is the modern media that provide the scholar and activist 
with an insight into the mundane affairs of ordinary people. The consumption of modern 
media thus represents an indispensable means for cultivating and honing the scholar’s and 
activist’s realist culture: 
 ﻲﻓ ﺎ$ﺪﺠ' () ﺔ+ﻋ-ﺪﻟ- ﻦﻜﻤ' , 2 ًّﺮﻤﺘﺴﻣ 29 ﱢﺪﺠﺘﻣ ﺔ+ﻣﺎﻧ ﺔﻓﺎﻘﺛ ﻲ>ﻓ , ﺎ$ﺪﺣ@ ﺐﺘﻜﻟ- ﻦﻣ ﱡﺪﻤﺘﺴﺗ ﻻ ﺔﻓﺎﻘﺜﻟ- Fﺬ$ () ﻰﻔﺨ' ﻻ
.ﺔ"ﻤﺳﺮﻟ' ﺮ"ﻏ) ﺔ"ﻤﺳﺮﻟ' *'ﺮﺸﻨﻟ') *ﺎ./)ﺪﻟ') *ﻼﺠﻤﻟ') ﻒﺤﺼﻟ'  ﻒ"ﺮﻤﻟ& ﱢﺲﺤﻟ& , ﻆﻘ,ﻟ& ﻞﻘﻌﻟ& /0 ﺔ,ﻋ&ﺪﻟ&/
 ﱢﻞﻛ ﻦﻣ ً'ﺪ)ﺪﺟ ً'+ﺪﻣ ﺬﺧﺄ) /0 ﻊ2ﻄﺘﺴ) ﺧ" ﻦﻣ ﺔ&ﻣﻮ&ﻟ) *ﺎ&ﺤﻟ) ﻊﺋﺎﻗ0 ﻦﻣ 1ﻟﻮﺣ ﺎﻣﺒ , ءﺎﺒﻧﻷ& 'ﻻﺎﻛ** ﻒﺤﺼﻟ& /ﺎ
 ﺎ"ﻔﱢﻨﺼ' , (ﺎﺒﺧﻷ,- ﻊﺋﺎﻗﻮﻟ, 3ﺬ5 ﻦﻣ 8 ﱡﻤ"' ﺎﻣ 8;ﻓ = ﱢ-ﺪ' , ﺎﻔ;ﺷ(@ -@ ﻼﺠﺳ ﻚﻟﺬﻟ ﱠﺪﻌ' =@ 8ﻨﻜﻤ'- , ﻦ;ﻘﱢﻠﻌﻤﻟ, Jﺎﻘ;ﻠﻌﺗ-
! "ﺳ$ﺪ& 'ﺬﻟ! , ﺪﻐﻟ! ﺦ&$ﺎﺗ ﻲ/ 0ﻮ2ﻟ! 3!ﺪﺣ5 6ﺈﻓ , ﺎ9ﻧﺎﻜﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺟﺎﺤﻟ! ﺪﻨﻋ ﺎ9ﻌﻀ&D.!"ﺪﻗﺎﻨﻟ( )ﻠﱢﻠﺤ-" !ﻮﺳ0(ﺪﻟ  ﻰﻠﻋ
 !ﻮﻜ$ %ﺬ'ﻟ , !ﺎ*+, ﻲﻓ ﺎ*/ﻮﻀﺣ2 ﺎ*ﱠﺪﺟ ﻮ*2 , ﺔ7ﺿﺎﻤﻟ% /ﺎﺒﺧﻷ%2 =%ﺪﺣﻷ% ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﱠ$ﺰﻣ =%ﺪﺣﻷ%2 /ﺎﺒﺧﻷ% Cﺬ'ﻟ !,
.ﺮ"ﺛﺄﺘﻟ'( ﻊﻗ'ﻮﻟ' ﻎﻠﺑ/ ﺎ1ﻟ  
As everybody knows, this [realist] culture does not derive from books alone. Rather, it is a 
culture that is progressive, evolving and continual that the activist is able to find in official 
and unofficial newspapers and journals, periodicals and [other] publications. The reasonable 
and vigilant, sensuous and sensitive activist (al-dāʿiya dhū al-ʿaql al-yaquẓ, al-ḥissal al- murhaf) 
is able to gain new supply from everything that is around him and that pertains to the 
events of daily life – from the news of the newspapers and the news agencies, and the 
comments of commentators, enabling him to draw up for this purpose a record or an 
archive, recording therein the events and news that interest him, classifying them and 
putting them, when required, in their place. The events of today are the history of tomorrow 
that students will study and critics will analyse. Yet, this news and these events have an 
advantage over the events and the news of the past, and this is their recency and their 
presence in [people’s] minds. Therefore, they have a more lasting effect and influence (al-
taʾthīr).518 
Engaging with reality thus entails the scholar’s engagement with modern mass media and 
their distinct logic of temporality, their claims of being up-to-date and their attention 
                                                        
517 See p. 113 above. 
518 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009b: 139–140. 
  
 
 
116 
economy. In this view, the practices of following, archiving and classifying media forms a 
constitutive element in honing and refining the attentive activist’s and legal scholar’s 
realist culture, thereby reinforcing the impact (taʾthīr) both of his daʿwa and of his ethico-
legal discourse. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s regular appearances on Al Jazeera can be read, by 
implication, as an exemplary expression of this understanding of realism and the 
constitutive role that the media play in the media-savvy activist’s and scholar’s 
discourses.519 
This ethos, however, is contrasted with a second ethical principle that is recurrent 
in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings: the injunction not to submit oneself to “the pressure of reality” 
(khuḍūʿ li-ḍaghṭ al-wāqiʿ).520 This pressure includes “the reality of global forces hostile to 
Islam, represented by the dreadful triangle [of] global Judaism, worldwide crusaderism and 
international communism”; or “evangelization”, “imperialism” and “orientalism”; or “the 
reality of contemporary intellectual currents”, like leftism and Marxism, secular liberalism 
and nationalism, and “the reality of dissident sections of Islam”, like the Bahai and the 
Aḥmadiyya, who represent opponents from within.521 Reality thus represents a constant 
concern to the scholar and the activist: its ongoing engagement forms simultaneously a 
crucial condition of success and a perpetual menace to their ethico-legal project. Whereas 
ignoring it, a seclusion and retreat to a world of books and of pure scholarly knowledge, 
leads to failure, the all-too-ready submission to its antagonistic forces can result in a 
similar fiasco. 
                                                        
519 This is made evident in the anniversary episode of al-Qaraḍāwī’s weekly programme al-Sharīʿa wa-l-ḥayāt 
(Shariʿa and Everyday Life) on Al Jazeera, where he explains the title of his programme (al-Qaraḍāwī 2006d). 
520 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 76–78. 
521 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009b: 135–140. Among the most powerful aberrations from within the Islamic movement that 
is unmentioned here, but that has received much attention in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings since the 1970s, is 
Islamic extremism and its presumed intellectual father figure, Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966). Al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
engagement with Quṭb, which will be summarized below, has to be put into the larger context of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s critical engagement with Quṭb’s thought during the so-called “prison debate” following the 
movement’s mass persecution under President Nasser (d. 1970) in 1965 (Zollner 2007). This internal debate 
was, in my view, crucial in shifting the organization’s strategic focus away from the state as its primary target 
towards – as McLarney (2015) convincingly argues – more gradual tactics (al-tadarruj, lit. “gradualism”), 
targetting primarily the private sphere of the family and gendered relations, of females’ bodies and of the 
sexual division of labour. 
  
 
 
117 
Gender and in particular the Muslim woman (al-marʾa al-muslima) have evolved into 
a central arena (maydān) for a necessary but prudent engagement with reality in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s publications over the past few decades.522 A key notion that has germinated in 
his later writings for describing and evaluating this gendered reality is the notion of 
jāhiliyya.523 
The concept of jāhiliyya has a long genealogy in modern Muslim thought. One of the 
most prominent Islamic thinkers and activists to apply the term to describe the reality of 
contemporary society at large was Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966).524 Born in 1906 in the village of 
Mūshā in the Asyūṭ governate, Quṭb carried out his studies at the same institution as Ḥasan 
al-Bannā (d. 1949), the Dār al-ʿUlūm.525 Working later as a teacher and then as an 
administrative officer in the Ministry of Education (wazīrat al-maʿārif), he was sent on an 
educational mission to the United States for two years only to join the Muslim Brotherhood 
after his return to Egypt in 1951. Despite having initially had close ties with Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (d. 1970) and the Free Officers Movement during the July 1952 revolution, Quṭb soon 
parted with the new leaders on ideological grounds, since he believed that Islam should 
provide the foundation for Egypt’s new regime. Soon after becoming editor-in-chief of the 
Brotherhood’s newspaper and one of the movement’s most articulate voices, Quṭb was 
arrested the first time in 1954 – together with al-Qaraḍāwī and other members of the 
Brotherhood. Following the assassination attempt on Nasser in Alexandria’s Manshiyya 
Square, he was again arrested on 26 October 1954. In the following year, he was sentenced 
to fifteen years in prison. Due to the intervention by the Iraqi president ʿAbd al-Salām ʿĀrif 
(d. 1966), Quṭb was released in 1964, and started to publish his major ideas in Maʿālim fī al-
ṭarīq (1964), which later came to form “the ideological nucleus of modern Sunnī 
                                                        
522 See al-Qaraḍāwī 1979: 5; 1996a: 6; 2004a: 3–5; 2008a: 3–4; 2010a: 10; 2011a: 5. 
523 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s central reference here is Abū Shuqqa’s influential Taḥrīr al-marʾa fī ʿaṣr al-risāla (1990). For al-
Qaraḍāwī engagement with and involvement in this work, see below. 
524 As Jansen pointedly notes, “[a]ll books on modern Islam discuss Sayyid Ḳuṭb” (1997: 118). Among them, 
Gille Kepel’s Muslim Extremism in Egypt (1985: 63–69), Sivan’s Radical Islam (1985: 21–28) and John O. Voll’s 
Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world (1991: 368–372) are important references. In addition, numerous essays 
and monographs have tackled various aspects of the life and work of Quṭb. See, among others, Haddad 1983a; 
1983b; Shepard 1989; 2003; Jansen 1997; Khatab 2002; 2006; Damir-Geilsdorf 2003; Musallam 2005; Calvert 2009; 
Toth 2013. 
525 The summary of Quṭb’s biography here is informed by Kepel 1985: 36–67; Siwan 1985: 16–49; Mousalli 1992; 
Tripp 1994; Jansen 1997; Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 19–60; Musallam 2005; Calvert 2009; Toth 2013: 12–94. 
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fundamentalism”.526 On 9 August 1965, he was arrested for the third time. Accused of 
treason and of planning a coup d’état, he was sentenced to death by a military court and 
executed on 29 August 1966. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī has extensively and – given Quṭb’s major significance for Islamism – 
inevitably dealt with Quṭb’s influential writings, focusing, as he puts it, on “the rectification 
and criticism of some of [Quṭb’s] fundamental thoughts”.527 One of the most prominent of 
these thoughts, which al-Qaraḍāwī locates in the last stage of Quṭb’s intellectual biography 
and with which he alleges Quṭb stood “alone in the arena of daʿwa”, was the idea that “the 
society that we live in is a jāhilī society (mujtamaʿ jāhilī)”.528 
The jāhiliyya of contemporary society rested, following al-Qaraḍāwī’s concise 
summary of Quṭb’s thought, on its rejection of the sovereignty of God (ḥākimiyyat Allāh) as 
the ultimate resort “in the definition of revealed and positive laws (sharāʾiʿ wa-qawānīn), the 
establishment of values and scales, or moral orders and concepts, on whose foundation life 
                                                        
526 Jansen 2011: 118. Al-Qaraḍāwī divides Quṭb’s thinking into three stages: the stage of literature and literary 
criticism, the stage of Islamic activism (daʿwa islāmiyya) and the stage of the Islamic revolution (al-Qaraḍāwī 
2006a: 51–62). This tripartite division is in line with Western academics’ periodization of Quṭb’s life and 
thought. 
527 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 186; see additionally Qaraḍāwī 1985: 186-213; 2006a: 48–69; 2008b: 230-234. Despite his 
critique of some of Quṭb’s thought, al-Qaraḍāwī expresses sentiments of profound sympathy and affection 
towards Quṭb in his texts. According to Motaz al-Khateeb, “al-Qaraḍāwī’s project counters Quṭb’s project” (al-
Khateeb 2009: 194). Although al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution to the Islamic revival might have been crucial as a 
counter to Quṭb, I would argue that his engagement with the latter has to be put into a larger context. Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s reception of Quṭb has been analysed by Damir-Geilsdorf (2003: 324-334), and I am grateful to 
Ulrich Rudolph for directing my attention to her work. 
528 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 186. This widely held view that Quṭb was alone in considering modern society as a jāhilī 
society has been corrected, to a certain degree, by Shepard (2003). As Shepard notes, the idea of jāhiliyya as a 
contemporary condition has always been present in Muslim thought (2003: 523–524). Consequently, other 
earlier modern Islamist thinkers had already adopted this notion in order to describe the conditions of their 
time – Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), Abū al-Aʿlā al-
Mawdūdī (d. 1979), Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Nadawī (d. 1999) and Sayyid Quṭb’s brother, Muḥammad Quṭb (d. 2014), 
whose ideas influenced Quṭb. However, Shepard confirms that Quṭb’s engagement with this notion falls into 
his late radical phase, after 1964, when he published Maʿālim fī al-ṭarīq (1964), a new edition of al-ʿAdāla al-
ijtimaʿiyya fī al-islām (1964) and other writings (Shepard 2003: 524). 
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and society progress”.529 From this perspective, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, Quṭb opposed 
contemporary society in all its dimensions: 
!" #ﺪ%ﻘﻌﻟ) ﻲﻓ ﺮﻜﻔﻟ% !" !ﺮﻔﻟ% &ﺎ(ﺣ ﻲﻓ , -ﻮﻠﺴﻟ% !" #ﺮﺳﻷ' !" ! " ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ(  ﺔﻤﺋﺎﻘﻟ' (ﺎﻌﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟ' ﻞﻛ .ﺎﺒﺘﻋ'
ﻲﻓ !ﺎﻄﻗ%  ﻢﻟﺎﻌﻟ%- ! ﺎ"ﻨﻣ ﺔ"ﻣﻼﺳﻹ' (ﺎﻄﻗﻷ' - ﺔ"ﻠ$ﺎﺟ 'ﺎﻌﻤﺘﺠﻣ.  
In dogma (ʿaqīda), in thought (fikr) or in conduct (sulūk), in the life of the individual, of the 
family or society, he considered all existing societies in the regions of the world – and 
among them the Islamic regions – as jāhilī societies.530 
It was this “dangerous thought”, as al-Qaraḍāwī continues his reading of Quṭb, that opened 
the door to violence, giving rise to societies who declared millions of Muslims in the world 
as infidels (takfīr) and who fought their own people, regarding “Muslim’s blood and 
Muslim’s property as fair game. Because they understood the ‘There is no god but God’ [of 
the testimony (shahāda)] not in its right sense, that has – in [Quṭb’s] view – no other sense 
than God’s ‘sovereignty’ (ḥākimiyya).” 531 
                                                        
529 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008b: 231. The notion of ḥākimiyya, al-Qaraḍāwī has repeatedly claimed, is neither an 
invention of Mawdūdī nor of Quṭb, but rather a well-established concept in Muslim thinking (al-Qaraḍāwī 
2006a: 63–65; 2008b: 230). In contrast, Gomaa (1983), Arjomand (1989) and others maintain that ḥākimiyya is a 
neologism that was coined by Mawdūdī’s Arabic translators, and that it has no counterpart in medieval 
Muslim thought (Akhavi 1997: 396; Arjomand 2004: 185). As George Makdisi (1963: 527) and Henri Laoust 
(1979: 22) have pointed out in regard to the Hanbali scholars Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Ibn Taymiyya 
(d. 728/1328), the idea of a space of politics outside the purview of shariʿa has a long genealogy in Muslim 
thinking. This insight clearly contradicts al-Qaraḍāwī’s presentation of ḥākimiyya as a well-established 
concept. 
530 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008b: 230–231. 
531 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008b: 441. Al-Qaraḍāwī has published against these violent tendencies a number of writings. 
See e.g. al-Qaraḍāwī 1970a. Quṭb’s impact on violent Islamist movements in the years following his death and 
the reception of his ideas is more multi-layered, complex and contentious than al-Qaraḍāwī’s account 
suggests. Shepard, for example, relativizes the influence of Quṭb’s doctrine of jāhiliyya on violent movements, 
because it is, he argues, “too pessimistic”: “Activists prepared to risk or sacrifice their lives in the cause look, I 
think, for more immediate returns than Qutb’s doctrine offers them. They want to believe that killing the kāfir 
ruler or toppling the kāfir regime will bring in the Islamic society in short order. The jāhiliyya doctrine 
promises them a much longer struggle. Many radicals have undoubtedly hoped that the imposing jāhili 
society could be toppled with one blow, as the Twin Towers were” (2003: 535–538). On the complex and often 
contentious reception of Quṭb’s ideas among various actors in Egypt, including the Muslim Brotherhood, see 
e.g. Kepel 1985: 59–60; Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 249–357; Zollner 2007; Calvert 2009: 273–292. 
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This perspective, as al-Qaraḍāwī outlines, had decisive consequences on Quṭb’s 
engagement with Islamic scholarship and with Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh) in particular.532 
Contemporary society first needed, in Quṭb’s view, to (re-)embrace Islam and the 
understanding of the meaning of “There is no God but God” (lā ilāh illa Allāh) properly.533 
Only once it had re-entered Islam by professing this dogmatic truth, was the recourse to 
the legal discipline of Islamic scholarship (fiqh) and its legal reasoning (ijtihād) for solving 
its problems legitimate.534 Before that occurred, Quṭb rejected any recourse to Islamic 
legislation in order to solve the problems of contemporary society, because “Islamic 
jurisprudence can only develop and respond to the issues of life in a truly Islamic society 
that has first and foremost submitted itself to Islam and to the sovereignty of God 
(ḥākimiyyat Allāh)”.535 
This primacy of dogma (ʿaqīda) over jurisprudence (fiqh) historically corresponded, 
al-Qaraḍāwī further outlines in his view on Quṭb’s position, to the revelation of Islam in 
Mecca, where it kept, for the first thirteen years, “engendering the dogma in the souls, 
whereas the ethics (akhlāq) emanated from this dogma”.536 It was only later, once a 
powerful state had been established in Medina, that the prescriptions of religious law were 
revealed and a practical system (niẓām) that met the real needs of Muslim society was 
embraced. According to al-Qaraḍāwī, this was Quṭb’s argument in his Maʿālīm (Milestones) – 
thus identifying contemporary society with the Meccan society of the jāhiliyya.537 
Al-Qaraḍāwī rejects Quṭb’s notion of jāhiliyya on several grounds.538 First, 
contemporary Muslim society is not the same as the jāhilī society of Mecca that Muḥammad 
faced when he spread the call to Islam.539 Whereas the latter was “a pure jāhilī society” 
(mujtamaʿ jāhilī ṣirf), contemporary society – in contrast – blends elements of Islam and 
                                                        
532 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 186–194. These consequences – most prominent among them, the primacy of creed 
(ʿaqīda) and of re-adhering to God’s sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) over fiqh that emerged in Quṭb’s writings from the 
1950s – have been investigated among others by Damir-Geilsdorfer 2003: 111–117; Shepard 2003: 531. 
533 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 188. 
534 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 188–189. 
535 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 188. 
536 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 188. 
537 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 188. 
538 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 194–213. 
539 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 195. 
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jāhiliyya.540 And although there are people “who clearly apostatize” – a small class of rulers 
and leading personalities in socialist and secularist parties – and others who merely 
“parade Islam in front of the people, whereas their interior is a ruin of belief (īmān)” – the 
so-called hypocrites (munāfiqūn) – the vast majority are “committed to Islam” with 
“singular devout piety. They perform the obligatory cultic practices. At times they are 
neglectful in some of them. Or they practice some of them reluctantly. But overall, they fear 
God – may He be exalted.” 541 
Contrary to Quṭb, al-Qaraḍāwī argues that neither fiqh nor its specific modes of 
reasoning have lost their value for contemporary society. Its application (al-taṭbīq), 
however, requires a renewal of Muslim normative thinking and its rediscovery of the 
shariʿa’s innate capacity and flexibility (saʿa wa-murūna) to adapt to all places, times and 
circumstances, while at the same time preserving its core of unchangeable rules.542 To 
rediscover this capacity, fiqh requires a renewal (tajdīd) from within. And the first and 
foremost instrument to do so is ijtihād – the scholar’s independent legal reasoning.543 
The second striking departure from Quṭb’s view is al-Qaraḍāwī’s restricting of the 
notion of jāhiliyya to the context of gender.544 This restriction becomes most evident in his 
preamble to the influential work Taḥrīr al-marʾa fī ʿaṣr al-risāla by the Egyptian scholar and 
Islamic activist ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa (d.  1995).545 In his preface, al-Qaraḍāwī describes 
                                                        
540 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 195. 
541 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 195. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s critique has decisive implications on theological grounds. He has 
spelled out these implications in a small but significant booklet, Ẓāhirat al-ghulūw fī al-takfīr, published in 1970, 
among other places. Daniel Lav (2012) provides us the larger perspective to put this text into its historical 
context. 
542 al-Qaraḍāwī 1997. 
543 al-Qaraḍāwī 1997e: 80.  
544 al-Qaraḍāwī’s departure from Quṭb has to be put into a larger historical context, in which leading members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood critically engaged with Quṭb’s intellectual legacy in the mid-1960s. This critical 
engagement was crucial to re-define the movement’s tactics and strategy, away from violence as a legitimate 
means to topple President Nasser’s un-Islamic regime towards moderation and a politics from below (Zollner 
2007; 2009). This strategic shift has been reflected in several publications by al-Qaraḍāwī (e.g. al-Qaraḍāwī 
1970a; 1982; 1999b). 
545 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 7–25. As Ellen McLarney (2015: 70) points out, Taḥrīr al-marʾa became a central point of 
reference for Islamic discourses on women’s liberation in the 1990s. According to Künkler (2004: 381), Abū 
Shuqqa’s work and its underlying methodology of ḥadīth criticism – a method that he developed together 
with al-Qaraḍāwī’s mentor and later teacher, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996) – found a reception even among 
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contemporary Muslim gender relations as being moulded by two contrary tendencies, 
which he designates in a later publication – taking up a concept of Abū Shuqqa – as two 
jāhiliyyas (jāhiliyyatayn) of the fourteenth/twentieth century.546 
                                                                                                                                                                            
scholars in Iran. Al-Qaraḍāwī relates in his autobiographical retrospective that Taḥrīr al-marʾa came into 
existence in the course of over twenty years of close cooperation and relentless discussion between the 
author and himself (al-Qaraḍāwī 2011a: 690). For al-Qaraḍāwī’s personal account of his relation to ʿAbd al-
Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa, see al-Qaraḍāwī 2011a: 687–695. 
546 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 9; al-Qaraḍāwī 2008a; 2008h. 
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2. The Two Jāhiliyyas 
ﻦﺤﻨﻓ ﻒﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ !ﺬ# ﺎ"ﺎﻀﻘﻟ& ﺔ"ﺳﺎﺴﺤﻟ( !"ﺎﻋ ﻦ"ﺑ 
!ﺮﻰﻓ !"ﺮﻓﻹ" ﻂ"ﺮﻔﺘﻟ'(  
We usually stand in regard to these sensitive 
affairs between the two extremes of excess 
and neglect.547 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
The image of a two-sided perversion and transgression of sexuality and proper gender 
relations has a long genealogy in al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings that has continually evolved over 
the past few decades. Already in his earliest text al-Ḥalāl (1960), we find a reference to two 
opposing poles of misuse of human’s innate sexual desire (shahwa, gharīza), framing Islam as 
a “posture of justice (ʿadl) and the middle way (al-wasaṭ)” between them.548 
In al-Ḥalāl, al-Qaraḍāwī describes the first of these two extremes as the ideology of 
asceticism and “the mortification [of flesh]” (taqashshuf), which has historically found its 
most vocal expression in Manichaeism and in Christian monasticism. He criticizes their 
doctrine of deprivation (ḥirmān) as representing a pessimistic rejection of life (taṣāʾum) that 
“buries the [sexual] instinct alive” (waʾd li-l-gharīza), hampering it and contradicting its 
underlying wisdom (ḥikma) – the continuation of life through sex.549 
The second extreme position is the complete opposite. It is described as the 
areligious “school of libertinism” (madhhab al-ibāḥiyya) that gives the sexual instinct 
(gharīza jinsiyya) “free rein”: 
.!ﺮُﻋ %& ﻖﻠﺧ %& ﻦ+, ﻦﻣ .ﺎ0ﻋ,ﺮﺗ 2,3%4 ﻻ% .ﺎ0ﻔﻗﻮﺗ ,%ﺪﺣ ﻼﺑ .=ءﺎﺷ ﻒAﻛ% =ءﺎﺷ ﻦ+& ﺢﺒﺴﺗ [...]  !ﺬ# ﻲﻓ&
ﻷ"# $ﺮﻔﻠﻟ $ﺎﺴﻓ,# -."ﻮ0ﺤﻟ" ﺔﺒﺗﺮﻣ ﻰﻟ, .ﺎﺴﻧﻹﺎﺑ :ﺎﻄﺤﻧ" ﻒﻗﻮﻤﻟ"ﺎ"ﻠﻛ ﺔﻋﺎﻤﺠﻠﻟ* +,ﺮﺳ.  
It spreads where it wants and how it wants, without any boundaries (ḥudūd, sg. ḥadd) that 
restrain it nor any restrictions pertaining to religion (dīn), morality (ḥulq) or custom (ʿurf) 
                                                        
547 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996a: 6. 
548 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 141. 
549 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 141. 
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that check it. […] This position implies a decay of the human being to the status of an 
animal, and corruption (infisād) for the individual, the family and for society at large.550 
In his later writings and media appearances, al-Qaraḍāwī has repeatedly revisited this 
figure of a two-sided transgression, describing the two sides – with reference to the 
influential work Taḥrīr al-marʾa fī ʽaṣr al-risāla (1990) by the Egyptian scholar and Islamic 
activist ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa (d. 1995) - as two jāhiliyyas (jāhiliyyatayn) of the 
fourteenth/twentieth century.551 
The first jāhiliyya epitomizes the evils of sternness, of going too far and of the blind 
submission (al-taqlīd) to customs and habits that have been uncritically adopted from the 
past.552 Historically, it is framed as emanating from the ages of backwardness (takhalluf) and 
decline (inḥiṭāṭ) in which the ethico-legal norms on gender relations were applied with 
rigorous severity.553 According to al-Qaraḍāwī, this austere tendency has found its most 
salient expression in an all-too-repressive codification of women’s aural, visual and bodily 
appearance that considers women’s face, their hands and even their voices to be parts of 
the body which are sexually stimulating (ʿawra) and which have to be veiled and hidden 
from men’s perceptions.554 Further, this stern tendency wrongs women and denies women’s 
right to look (ḥaqq al-naẓar) at any man who is not in a degree of consanguinity which 
precludes marriage (maḥram).555 It violates women’s rights in matters of marriage, 
restraining a woman from seeing her fiancé prior to marriage – and vice versa.556 It forces 
women to wed without their prior consent,557 marrying a woman off for the mere sexual 
pleasures (mutaʿ, sg. mutʿa) of her husband “who owns her vulva through the wealth he has 
                                                        
550 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 141. 
551 Al-Qaraḍāwī in the preamble to Abū Shuqqa 1990: 9; al-Qaraḍāwī 2008a; 2008h. 
552 Al-Qaraḍāwī in the preamble to Abū Shuqqa 1990: 9. 
553 Al-Qaraḍāwī in the preamble to Abū Shuqqa 1990: 9. 
554 Al-Qaraḍāwī in the preamble to Abū Shuqqa 1990: 13. In my translation of ʿawra as “that part of the body 
which is sexually stimulating”, I follow Judith Tucker (2008: 226). 
555 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 159. Likewise in al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 30. 
556 al-Qaraḍāwī 1960: 165. 
557 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 11. According to al-Qaraḍāwī, “this is – unfortunately – what the Shafiʿi, the Maliki and 
the majority of the Hanbali school stipulated, building on pieces of evidence that were not sufficiently strong 
for contestation nor able to withstand contrary evidence (ḥujaj, sg. ḥujja), until a man like Shaykh of Islam Ibn 
Taymiyya and his pupil Imam b. Qayyim dismissed them” (Abū Shuqqa 1990: 11).  
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spent – divorcing her whenever he wants”.558 And, reflecting more recent changes in the 
social fabric of Muslim society, this tendency unduly secludes women and excludes them 
from public spaces, dispossessing them of their right to work, to acquire knowledge or even 
to participate in devotional practices in the mosque, imprisoning them in their homes 
because of undue fear of temptation and social strife (fitna).559 
While this first jāhiliyya epitomizes the vices of sternness and blind submission (al-
taqlīd) to the past, the second jāhiliyya in contrast is distinguished by its libertinism 
(ibāḥiyya) and dazzled imitation of the West; a tendency that al-Qaraḍāwī associates with 
the perversion (fasād) of the human nature (fiṭra) and also with the disintegration of 
society.560 This second tendency strives to abolish the boundaries between the West and 
Islam and to suspend the natural differences (fawāriq, sg. fāriq) between man and woman. 
Its depiction is informed by the language of identity and alterity, in which the proper use of 
one’s innate sexuality is intimately tied to one’s belonging to the moral community of the 
umma.561 
While some of al-Qaraḍāwī’s censures in his later writings and media appearances 
apparently reflect earlier reservations in Muslim normative thinking (fiqh) on gender-
related issues, others reverberate more obviously with the particular shifts and transitions 
in the political and ideological landscape of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
including his reflections on modernists’ demands that polygamy be abolished, capitalism’s 
undue exploitation of the female workforce that excludes them from the domestic realm as 
the natural sphere of their activities, Islamic feminists’ insistence on a female reading of 
the Qurʾan (tafsīr niswī) or the international lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
                                                        
558 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 9. 
559 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 10; al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 49. As already mentioned on above, p. 40-41, Barbara Stowasser 
has highlighted a shift in al-Qaraḍāwī’s “intellectual focus from women’s domestic rights and obligations to 
their rights and obligations in the public sphere” (Stowasser 2008). 
560 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 14; al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 51–52. As Wenzel-Teuber has poignantly remarked, Muslim 
critiques of imported solutions from the West transcend the writings of al-Qaraḍāwī (Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 
156, n. 108). Early reformers like Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) were 
already stressing the foreignness of Western systems and criticizing their inadequacy given the nature of the 
Islamic umma. Al-Qaraḍāwī has captured and extended these critiques to contemporary systems like socialism 
and liberal capitalism in a series of writings, notably in al-Ḥulūl al-mustawrada wa-kayfa janat ʿalā ummatinā 
(1977), literally “The Imported Solutions and How They Harmed Our Umma”, and in a plethora of other texts. 
561 al-Qaraḍāwī 2010a: 53. 
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movement’s assault on the institution of marriage by advocating same-sex marriage.562 In 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s view, these later developments and tendencies perpetuate a misconstruction 
of gender relations by transgressing the normative boundaries of the shariʿa, Muslim 
identity and human nature (fiṭra) alike. 
Islam, from this perspective, marks the foundational core of a biopolitical counter-
project that aims to fend off other projects which are seeking to co-opt gender and 
sexuality for their own particular visions of subjectivity and society, including pietistic 
asceticism and stern traditionalism, modern libertinism and – more recently – Islamic 
feminism. These projects jointly provide al-Qaraḍāwī the negative foil for his teleological 
account that depicts Islam as a middle way (wasaṭ), putting divine revelation, mass-
mediated reality and human nature (fiṭra), as part of this reality, into perfect harmony.563 
This contention, as we shall see, is neither new nor original in Islamist thought. However, it 
has some decisive consequences on epistemic grounds. It is here where al-Qaraḍāwī shines 
as a mediator and translator of Islamist arguments into scholarly terms. This translation, 
however, affects al-Qaraḍāwī’s scholarly engagement with the textual foundations of 
Islamic normative thinking (uṣūl al-fiqh) and his reconfiguration of its hermeneutical 
principles in a decisive manner. It is these critical effects that we shall track in the 
following chapters. 
                                                        
562 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996a: 33, 99, 104, 111, 148–149. 
563 Abū Shuqqa 1990: 14. 
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3. Human Nature (Fiṭra) and Divine Revelation - A Perfect Harmony 
!" !"# !ﺎﺒﺳ% ﺔﻨ#ﻜﺴﻟ' !ﺪﻟ ﻦﻣﺆﻤﻟ& !ﻧ# ﺪﻗ !ﺪ# 
ﻰﻟ# !ﺗﺮﻄﻓ ﻲﺘﻟ$ !ﺮﻄﻓ ﷲ !ﺎ#$ﻠﻋ ﻲ"# !ﺮﻄﻓ 
ﺔﻘﺴﺘﻣ ﻞﻛ !ﺎﺴﺗﻻ& ﻊﻣ !ﺮﻄﻓ !ﻮﺟﻮﻟ% ﺮ"ﺒﻜﻟ& !ﻠﻛ . 
!ﺎﻌﻓ ﻦﻣﺆﻤﻟ& ﻊﻣ !ﺗﺮﻄﻓ ﻲﻓ !ﻼﺳ !"ﺎﺋ%% ﻻ ﻲﻓ 
!ﺮﺣ !ﺎﺼﺧ%.  
The primary cause for the tranquillity of the 
believer is that he has been guided to his 
nature according to which God has created 
him. It is a nature that is in perfect harmony 
with the nature of the entirety of existence. 
so that the believer lived in peace and 
harmony with his nature, not in war and 
adversity.564 
AL-QARAḌĀWĪ 
The idea of a perfect harmony between human nature (fiṭra) and revelation has pervaded 
much of modern Muslim thinking.565 Central to this idea is the view that Islam is the 
“natural religion” (dīn al-fiṭra), and that Islamic law (sharīʿa) is in complete congruity with 
the essential needs and motivations of humankind.566 This claim has been proffered by 
prominent modern thinkers and activists of different strands, such as Muḥammad ʿAbduh 
(d. 1905),567 Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966),568 Allāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974)569 and Sayyid Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī 
(d. 1979).570 
As Frank Griffel and Andrew March have pointed out, this modern claim can be 
interpreted as a reflection of a longer debate that has occupied Muslim scholarship since its 
                                                        
564 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007e: 82–3. 
565 Griffel 2007; March 2010; 2015. 
566 March 2010: 189; 2015: 45. The most comprehensive study on fiṭra to date has been carried out by Gobillot 
(2000). 
567 For a succinct outline of ʿAbduh’s position on the relation between human nature and revelation, see Euben 
1999: 107. 
568 Griffel 2007; March 2010. 
569 Johnston 2007; March 2015. 
570 Griffel 2007; March 2010. 
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formative period, and that has been revived and adapted by these thinkers to their modern 
contexts.571 At the core of this debate stands the epistemological issue of how to acquire 
certain moral knowledge about matters that revelation is silent about. Although it is hard – 
not least due to the scarcity of sources – to establish a precise chronology, current research 
assumes that Muslim scholars have adopted three different positions on this issue over the 
course of the centuries.572 
The first position, which has been variously discussed using terms such as “ethical 
objectivism”,573 the “permitted position” 574 and “hard natural law”,575 is that of those 
Muslim thinkers who were convinced that human reason (ʿaql) yielded valid moral 
knowledge by reflecting on human nature (fiṭra) and by observing the manifest world (al-
shāhid) around them. Although this position was later ascribed to the Muʿtazila exclusively, 
it was embraced by representatives of virtually all legal schools at one or another point in 
history.576 The position was grounded in a particular set of theological and ontological 
assumptions. Most central of these assumptions was the optimistic idea that God gracefully 
created the world for the benefit of humankind.577 Nature, by implication, ontologically 
reflected this divine goodness. It was being fused, as Anver Emon succinctly put it, “with 
both fact and value”.578 This fusion opened the way for reasoned observation and the 
deduction of valid moral norms that govern human nature (fiṭra) and the universe (al-kawn) 
at large. Reasoned reflection on nature, in other words, provided objective grounds for 
assessing good (ḥusn) and bad (qubḥ) in empirical terms.579 
As early Muslim critiques did not fail to note, however, there were a number of 
structural problems associated with this position. How should one explain the proscription 
of those manifest things that seemed good to unaided reason, like the consumption of pork 
                                                        
571 Griffel 2007; March 2010; 2015. 
572 This tripartite division is made by Reinhart (1995), Emon (2010) and al-Qaraḍāwī (2013), as well. 
573 Hourani 1985: 58. 
574 Reinhart 1995. 
575 Emon 2010. 
576 Reinhart 1995: 43. 
577 Reinhart 1995: 6, 38–39. 
578 Emon 2010: 21. 
579 Emon 2010: 44–45. Although this position was later often ascribed to “some Greek rationalist virus” which 
infected original and pure Islamic thought, this position, as Reinhart suggests, is a “conservative” and, by the 
fourth Muslim century, even an “archaic Muslim position” (1995: 38). 
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or wine? Or the imposition of such “unreasonable” obligations like ritual worship or 
fasting?580 Further, this perspective had a decisive theological implication. According to the 
objectivists’ position, nature’s beneficial quality represents a constant and unchanging 
style of God: God only does good. Put differently: God – by virtue of His justice (ʿadl) – is 
bound to do good. This perspective, however, fundamentally undercut the notion of His 
divine omnipotence, since God appeared to be held obliged to reward or punish by decree, 
so to speak, of human reason (ʿaql).581 
To critics of this position, this line of argument consequently marked an untenable 
fetter on divine omnipotence. Kevin Reinhart has characterized this second and historically 
later position, whose centre was the school of the Muʿtazila in Baghdad, by its pessimistic 
suspicion of a “world that deceives and ensnares”.582 Its moral epistemology rested on a 
profound scrupulousness (warʿ), and an ascetic austerity that was “deliberately cultivated 
as a religious virtue”.583 The core of their argument rested on the “fear that an act of 
unknown value might be an occasion of sin”.584 In their view, even possibly useful acts were 
subject to suspicion and aversion, since God had proscribed useful things as a test, 
including the consumption of wine and pork. Only revelation provided certainty.585 
Unaided reason (ʿaql), by implication, did not know enough to recognize a possible 
                                                        
580 Hourani 1985: 62; Reinhart 1995: 39. 
581 Reinhart 1995: 39; Emon 2010: 27, 185, 193. 
582 Reinhart 1995: 31. It was only in the late third/ninth century that this tendency’s tenets were adopted by 
other schools, including Shafiʿism and Hanbalism. “The fact that a number of prominent Ḥanbalīs shared 
doctrine with the Baghdādī Muʿtazilī […]”, Reinhart remarks in regard to Hourani’s (1985) earlier work, 
“ought to cause us to rethink the notion of a dichotomous Islamic intellectual history” (Reinhart 1995: 34). Of 
these different schools, only one – rather ambiguous – text has survived. This is the ʿUddah fī uṣūl al-fiqh by 
Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066), which represents Hanbalism’s first proper work on uṣūl al-fiqh (Reinhart 
1995: 31). This scarcity of sources allows us to reconstruct a mere “skeleton” of its proponents’ sophisticated 
polemics, which in addition often depends on their opponents’ account (Reinhart 1995: 33). For two seminal 
studies that engage with Hanbalism in modernity, see Halverson 2010; Lav 2012. 
583 Reinhart 1995: 23, 32. 
584 Reinhart 1995: 32. 
585 To denote this and similar tendencies, George Hourani uses the terms “subjectivism” and “ethical 
voluntarism”, which he defines as “any theory to the effect that the value of things or acts is always 
determined solely by the opinions or emotional attitudes of some judge or observer. […] ‘[G]ood’, ‘right’ and 
similar terms have no other meaning that ‘that which God wills’ ” (Hourani 1985: 269, 270). 
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transgression,586 it could merely establish the likelihood that a specific act is lawful (ḥalāl) 
or prohibited (ḥarām).587 In this view, anything that was left unmentioned in the Qurʾan was 
consequently forbidden.588 Thus, all acts were proscribed unless revelation proved their 
sanction – this included, according to some scholars, even the acts of eating, breathing and 
moving from one place to another.589 
Although this pietistic position established itself as the “orthodox view of Sunni 
Islam”, its dominance proved – in its unadulterated form – historically unviable.590 Its 
rapprochement and compromise with the objectivist–rationalist position in the guise of 
Ashʿarism provided a third way that merged reason and revelation on theological and 
legal–philosophical grounds.591 
Al-Qaraḍāwī, and other scholars along with him, have revived and adopted these 
debates of the early Islamic centuries to their modern context.592 His reflections on the 
relation between human reason and divine revelation have occurred in different, although 
mutually interdependent, disciplinary fields of Muslim scholarly tradition, comprising 
Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsīr),593 the science of hadith,594 the science of fiqh,595 and in more 
general treatises on the place of reason and knowledge in Islam.596 One of his later books 
Mawqif al-islām min al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿilm, literally “Islam’s Position on Reason and Knowledge”, 
                                                        
586 Reinhart 1995: 33. 
587 Reinhart 1995: 33. 
588 Reinhart 1995: 34. 
589 Reinhart 1995: 31. 
590 Opwis 2010: 32. 
591 Hallaq 1999: 32–33; Opwis 2010: 33; Emon 2010: 123–188. 
592 See e.g. Halverson 2010; Lav 2012. One of the most prominent of these modern re-enactments of this debate 
took place between al-Qaraḍāwī’s mentor and later colleague, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), and Salafi 
scholars from Saudi Arabia (Brown 1996: 108–132). 
593 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996d; 1999d. 
594 al-Qaraḍāwī 1995. 
595 al-Qaraḍāwī 1992. 
596 His earliest treatise on the topic is a small booklet entitled al-Dīn fī ʿaṣr al-ʿilm, “Religion in the Age of 
Knowledge“ (1978). Later, he reproduced the text as a chapter of his more voluminous and polemic Bayyināt 
al-ḥall al-islāmī (1988d), literally “Proofs of the Islamic Solution”, which is directed against secularists and 
Westernizers (al-mutagharribūn, sg. al-mutagharrib). See additionally al-Qaraḍāwī 1980. 
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provides us an insight into his more mature thoughts on reason and revelation and their 
legitimate role in the production of valid normative knowledge.597 
In a chapter on the balance between reason and revelation (al-muwāzana bayna al-
ʿaql wa-l-naql), he starts his reflections by invoking the definition of ʿaql in a number of 
premodern and modern lexicographic sources.598 The first source he draws on is al-Muʿjam 
al-wasīṭ, “The Intermediate Dictionary”, which was issued by the Arabic Language Academy 
in Cairo in the early 1970s.599 Its definition depicts ʿaql as a viable means to control humans’ 
instincts (gharāʾiz, sg. gharīza) and to curb their animal desires (shahawāt, sg. shahwa) – an 
aspect that al-Qaraḍāwī reinforces by invoking the word’s etymology: 
ﻊﻨﻤﻟ% :ﺎ'(ﻓ ﻞﺻﻷ%- .(/ 0 1) :23ﺎﻣ ﻦﻣ ﻞﻘﻌﻟ% 0ﺎﻘﺘﺷ%- !ﺎﻛ $%ﺈﻓ .ﻖ)ﻠ+ ﻻ ﺎﻤﻣ /ﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﻊﻨﻤ+ /ﻧﻷ ؛ﻚﻟﺬﺑ ﻰﱢﻤُﺳ ﺎﻤﻧ@A .
.ﻰﻐﺒﻨ% ﺎﻣ ﻞﻌﻔ% +ﺎﺴﻧﻹ/ +ﺈﻓ 2ﻰ3ﺘﺸ% ﺎﻣ ﻞﻌﻔ% +/ﻮ7ﺤﻟ/  
ʿAql is derived from the root “ʿ-q-l”, and the origin (aṣl) with regard to it is: to detain (manʿ). 
Indeed, it is named that: because it detains (yamnaʿ) its bearer from what is not appropriate 
                                                        
597 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013. 
598 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013. As Reinhart has pointed out, ʿaql is one of those Arabic words with a broader semantic 
field than the corresponding English word (1995: xi). Amir-Moezzi makes the following remarks on this issue 
of translation: “The ʿaql that is translated, depending on the context, by ‘reason,’ ‘intellect,’ ‘intelligence,’ or 
even ‘science’ or ‘discernment’ is a complex and delicate notion that covers a great semantic field, especially 
in the first centuries of Islam and previous to its conceptual quasi-stability after the systematization of 
Islamic dogmatic theology and philosophy. [...] Before the advent of Islam, it seems that the term had no 
special importance; it merely meant ‘good sense.’ Etymologically, ʿaql was ‘what was tied to an animal’s feet to 
restrain it’; its abstract meaning might thus be said to refer to that faculty that restrains human beings from 
foolishness. In pre-Islamic morality, ʿaql seems to have been eclipsed and even pushed into the background by 
the rich idea of [ḥ]ilm, an attitude of tremendous importance in Arab tribal mentality that included numerous 
character traits ‘from serene justice and measure of longanimity and indulgence to self- control and dignity 
of demeanor’ ” (1994: 7–8). 
599 According to Hassanein, the Muʿjam is the product of the “collaboration between scholars and researchers 
who possessed a great deal of expertise in the Arabic language and in lexicography. The compilers of this 
work were highly regarded in their fields of study […]. The dictionary excludes entries for archaic terms that 
are irrelevant for modern usage. […] Additionally supporting data adduced in al-Wasīṭ are quotations from the 
Qurʾān, prophetic traditions, common literary expressions and proverbs, and established rhetorical 
expressions” (2008: 41). 
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(mimmā lā yalīq). When the beast does what it desires (ishtahā), the human being does what is 
appropriate.600 
Second, as al-Qaraḍāwī continues, the Muʿjam ascribes ʿaql an epistemic and moral capacity: 
ﻜ" ﺎﻣ% ﻦﻣ ﺮ$ﺨﻟ'( )ﺢﺒﻘﻟ' ﻦﻣ ﻦﺴﺤﻟ' ﺰﱠ$ﻤﺘ3 4ﺑ ﺎﻣ( )7ﺎﻘ3ﺪﺼﺘﻟ'( 7': ﱡﻮﺼﺘﻟ' ﺐ$ﻛﺮﺗ( @ﻻﺪﺘﺳﻻ'( ﺮ$ﻜﻔﺘﻟ' 4ﺑ Eﻮ
ﻞ"ﺎﺒﻟ& ﻦﻣ ﱡﻖﺤﻟ&, - ﱢﺮﺸﻟ&. !
It is through [ʿaql] that thinking and reasoning (al-tafkīr wa-l-istidlāl), the making of 
imaginations and attestations (al-taṣawwurāt wa-l-taṣdīqāt) take place; and through which 
beauty from ugliness (al-ḥusn min al-qubḥ), good from evil (al-khayr min al-sharr), and true 
from false (al-ḥaqq min al-bāṭil) is distinguished.601 
The second source that he cites is al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ (The Encompassing Ocean) by the 
ninth/fifteenth-century lexicographer Majd al-Dīn al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1414).602 Al- 
Fīrūzābādī defines ʿaql as: 
 !" #ﻦ%ﺮﺸﻟ) ﱢﺮﺷ! #ﻦ%ﺮ,ﺨﻟ) ﺮ,ﺨﺑ ﻢﻠﻌﻟ) !" .ﺎ3ﻧﺎﺼﻘﻧ! ﺎ3ﻟﺎﻤﻛ! #ﺎ3ﺤﺒﻗ! ﺎ3ﻨﺴﺣ ﻦﻣ ءﺎ,ﺷﻷ) Bﺎﻔﺼﺑ ﻢﻠﻌﻟ) !" #ﻢﻠﻌﻟ)
.!ﻮﻣﻷ% ﻖﻠﻄﻣ  
                                                        
600 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 126. Amir-Moezzi highlights a similar origin for the word (1994: 6–7), as noted on the 
previous page. Chittick provides a related etymological reading prevalent in Sufi and philosophical literature: 
“[S]ince the ʿaql ‘ties’ and ‘binds’, and since on the human plane it reflects the First Intellect, it can serve to tie 
and bind man to God” (1981: 91, n. 1). For a comprehensive overview of the assumed inferiority of (non-
human) animals in Islamic and non-Islamic traditions in Late Antiquity, see Tlili 2012. 
601 Majmaʿ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya 2005; al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 126. Ḥusn and qubḥ are technical terms in fiqh that are 
normally translated as “good” and “bad”. By adding here the binary pair of khayr and sharr, however, the 
Muʿjam obviously transcends fiqh terminology. That’s why I have decided to translate al-ḥusn and al-qubḥ here 
literally as “the beauty” and “the ugly”. 
602 As Haywood puts it, the Qāmūs became “in modern terms, a ‘best-seller’ ” (1989: 237), introducing the term 
qāmūs (originally from Greek Ὠκεανός) into Arabic lexicography (Baalbaki 2014: 50). It has quite an 
interesting history of development. Initially, al-Fīrūzabādī had the ambitious plan to combine Ibn Sīda’s 
(d. 458/1066) voluminous and well-organized Muḥkam and Ṣaghānī’s (d. 650/1252) ʿUbāb. However, he soon 
realized that this would result in a dictionary of sixty or even a hundred volumes, and thus would be 
inaccessible to users. Consequently, he decided to make a summary of it – his Qāmūs (Fleisch 1997; Baalbaki 
2014: 392). For a detailed account of its development, its form and content and its later reception, see Baalbaki 
2014: 391–397. 
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knowledge (ʿilm), or the knowledge of the attributes of things in regard to their goodness 
and their badness (ṣifāt al-ashyāʾ min ḥusnihā wa-qubḥihā), their perfection and their 
imperfection (min kamālihā wa-nuqṣānihā). Or the knowledge of the better of two good things, 
and the worse of two evil things, or of unrestricted affairs (muṭlaq al-umūr).603 
This definition apparently depicts ʿaql as being acquired knowledge of the moral quality of 
things. However, it describes ʿaql, as al-Qaraḍāwī critically remarks, as an act (fiʿl) rather 
than as a substance (jawhar).604 Subsequently, al-Qaraḍāwī argues, al-Fīrūzābādī adds a 
further definition as a levelling response to the former: 
ﻦﺴﺤﻟ%& ﺢﺒﻘﻟ% ﻦ*ﺑ ﺰ**ﻤﺘﻟ% /ﻮﻜ2 ﺎ4ﺑ 5 ﱠﻮﻗ 8ﻧ:.  
That it is a capacity (quwwa) by which the distinction between evil (al-qubḥ) and good (al-
ḥusn) takes place.605 
In the end, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, al-Fīrūzābādī subscribes to the following definition of 
ʿaql: 
 !") ﺪﻟﻮﻟ& 'ﺎﻨﺘﺟ& ﺪﻨﻋ -.&ﺪﺘﺑ&0 1ﺔ3ﺮﻈﻨﻟ&0 ﺔ360ﺮﻀﻟ& 8ﻮﻠﻌﻟ& ﺲﻔﻨﻟ& =6ُﺪﺗ @ﺑ 1ﻲﻧﺎﺣ06 6ﻮﻧ @ﻧ" ﻖﺤﻟ&0 ﺔﻠﺣﺮﻤﻟ' ﻦﻣ
.!ﻮﻠﺒﻟ& ﺪﻨﻋ ﻞﻤﺘﻜ. /0 ﻰﻟ2 ﻮﻤﻨ. 3&ﺰ. ﻻ ﻢﺛ (ﺔ9ﻨ9ﻨﺠﻟ&  
The truth is that it is a spiritual light (nūr ruḥānī) through which the soul (nafs) attains 
necessary and speculative knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-ḍarūriyya wa-l-naẓariyya). It starts with the 
embryo (that is, from the embryonic stage) and then does not cease to grow until it reaches 
completion with maturity.606 
                                                        
603 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996d: 162. 
604 According to Reinhart, “[t]he conception of the ʿaql as things known was a characteristic feature of 
Muʿtazilī epistemology, over against the philosophers. It is quite clear that, for the Basrans, the conception 
that ʿaql is neither a body (jawhar) nor an instrument (ālah), neither a sensing organ (ḥassah) nor a faculty 
(quwwah). It does not perceive; it does not act […]. The ʿaql is not a mental faculty or capacity, as reason is 
understood to be. […] In this sense, what the Muʿtazilah understood by ʿaql was something akin to ‘common 
sense’ in both our workaday understanding of the term, and in the Stoic sense of the ‘common notions’ ” 
(1995: 152). 
605 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996d: 163. 
606 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996d: 163. As Rosenthal remarks with reference to such different figures as al-Muḥāsibī 
(d. 243/857) and Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201), “in Islam, the intellect (ʿaql) is also frequently brought into 
connection with light” (2006: 156, n. 4). For further reflections on the nexus of reason, illumination and light 
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To this definition, al-Qaraḍāwī adds another that the sixth/twelfth-century scholar and 
exegete al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502/1108) provided in his al-Mufradāt [fī gharīb] al-Qurʾān,  
“Terms in the Extraneous Parts of the Qurʾan”: 
.ﻞﻘﻋ :$ ﱠﻮﻘﻟ( ﻚﻠﺘﺑ -ﺎﺴﻧﻹ( 2ﻄﺒﻨﺘﺴ6 7ﺬﻠﻟ 9ﺎﻘ6: .ﻢﻠﻌﻟ( 9ﻮﺒﻘﻟ ﺔﺌﱢ@Aﺘﻤﻟ( $ ﱠﻮﻘﻠﻟ 9ﺎﻘ6 :ﻞﻘﻌﻟ(  
ʿAql: is said for the capacity (quwwa) which is prepared for the reception of knowledge (ʿilm). 
And that which the human being acquires607 from that capacity is called: ʿaql.608 
Finally, he invokes the renowned Tāj al-ʿarūs, “The Bride’s Crown”, by the 
twelfth/eighteenth-century scholar and lexicographer al-Zabīdī (d. 1205/1790):609 
! ﻢﺛ ؟$ﺮﻋ '( ﺮ)ﻮﺟ ﻮ) ﻞ) :-.ُﺪﺗ ﺔﻘ4ﻘﺣ 6ﻟ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ <=>' ؟ﻻ '( -.ُﺪﺗ ﺔﻘ4ﻘﺣ 6ﻟ ﻞ) :ﻞﻘﻌﻟ< ﻰﻓ <ﻮﻔﻠﺘﺧ< Gﺎﻨﻟ< I
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People are at variance about ʿaql:610 Does it have a real substance (ḥaqīqa) that might be 
comprehended (tudrak), or not? And if it has a real substance that might be comprehended: 
is it a substance (jawhar) or an accident (ʿaraḍ)? Further, they disagree about its locus: is it in 
the head (al-raʾs) or in the heart (al-qalb)? And are the ʿuqūl equal or different?611 
                                                                                                                                                                            
in Sufism and Muslim philosophy with particular reference to al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Ibn ʿArabī 
(d. 638/1240), see Chittick 2011: 126–128. On ʿilm ḍarūrī, which has been variously translated as “natural” or 
“primary knowledge” (Wensinck 2007: 252) , “immediate knowledge” (Hourani 1985: 156) or “necessary 
knowledge” (Abrahamov 1993), see Abrahamov 1993. 
607 Both al-Qaraḍāwī and al-Zabīdī (d. 1205/1790) here read yastanbiṭuhū (2013: 163; 1998: 18). The various 
editions of al-Iṣfahānī’s al-Mufradāt that I consulted read yastafīduhū, which can likewise be translated: “that 
he acquires”. See e.g. al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 444. Yastafīduhū appears to be correct, since al-Iṣfahānī differentiates 
between the innate (gharīzī) and the acquired (mustafīd) intellect. For a discussion of al-Iṣfahānī’s concept of 
ʿaql, see Mohamed 1995. 
608 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 163. 
609 The most comprehensive study of al-Zabīdī’s life and work has been produced by Reichmuth (2009). For an 
exploration of ʿaql in al-Zabīdī’s large commentary on al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, see Reichmuth 2009: 314–
318. 
610 The edition of the Tāj al-ʿarūs that I consulted reads min jihāt, “from a number of directions”, at this point 
(al-Zabīdī 1998: 20); these words are missing in al-Qaraḍāwī’s reproduction of the text (2013: 163). 
611 al-Zabīdī 1998: 20; al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 163. 
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From among these various definitions, al-Qaraḍāwī eventually gives preference (tarjīḥ) to 
the following one: 
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ʿAql is a truth which might be comprehended (ḥaqīqa yumkin ʾan tudrak), and it is a substance 
(jawhar) and not an accident (ʿaraḍ), and its locus is the head or the brain, and the ʿuqūl vary 
in their capacities. […] And we can say here that ʿaql is that force (quwwa) or that immaterial 
substance (al-jawhar al-mujarrad ʿan al-mādda) through which God has distinguished the 
human being from the beast. And through which [the human being] reflects and mediates 
on himself, and on the visible world (āfāq al-kawn) around him, through which he 
understands the message (al-khitāb), through which he acquires knowledge (ʿilm), through 
which he develops [his knowledge] and adds to it, through which he creates the new and 
criticizes the old, […] and through which he distinguishes good (al-khayr) from evil (al-sharr), 
and the beautiful (al-ḥasan) from the repulsive (al-qabīḥ) in actions (al-afʿāl), just like he 
distinguishes the sound (al-ṣawāb) from error (al-khaṭāʾ) in opinions (al-arāʾ), and true (al-
ḥaqq) from false (al-bāṭil) in the tenets of faith (al-muʿtaqadāt, sg. al-muʿtaqad). And through 
which he confers distinction upon the better in two good things (al-khayr min al-khayrayn) 
and the worse in two evil things (al-sharr min al-sharrayn), and through which he compares 
(yuqārin) and weights (yuwāzin) between things, persons and thoughts. And through which 
he plans the affairs of his life (amr maʿāshihī), and through which he reflects on the affairs of 
his life to come (amr maʿādihī). Or say: through which he mediates (yatafakkar) on the 
beginning of the world (mabdaʾ al-kawn), its destiny (maṣīr) and our destiny with it, and on 
our message in it, or in other words: he seeks for clear answers (ajwaba shāfiya) on the 
eternal questions that trouble the human being from times of old: From where? To where? 
And why?612 
                                                        
612 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 164–165. 
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In this dense definition, al-Qaraḍāwī blends a variety of discursive traditions, including the 
philosophical notions of substance (jawhar) and accident (ʿaraḍ);613 the physiological quest 
seeking whether ʿaql resides in the heart (qalb) or in the brain (dimāgh);614 its vital role in 
reflecting on fundamental theological and anthropological questions;615 and its innate 
capacity to arrive at valid moral judgements on thoughts, actions and things by 
distinguishing good from evil.616 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s definition of naql, literally “transmission”, is, by comparison, 
conspicuously brief.617 It lacks any explicit reference to Arabic lexicons or any other kind of 
literary sources. Naql, as he puts it, is that knowledge (ʿilm) which has neither been received 
through perception (mulāḥaẓa) or experience (tajriba), nor by empirical or logical reflection 
(tafkīr manṭiqī aw riyādī).618 Its source is divine revelation (waḥy ilāhī). It has been variously 
designated as audition (samʿ), revelation (sharʿ), religion (dīn) or text (naṣṣ), and has been 
transmitted from one generation to the next.619 Although its transmitters believed in its 
divine origin (al-maṣdar al-rabbānī) and obediently accepted its principles and its 
elementary truths, he continues, they “had the right to use reason (ʿaql) in its 
understanding, its comment, its interpretation and in deducing [legal rules] from it (al-
istinbāṭ minhu)”.620 As such, naql marks the origin of disciplines (ʿulūm) such as fiqh, Qurʾanic 
exegesis (tafsīr), ethics and mysticism (al-akhlāq wa-l-taṣawwuf), dogmatics and theology (ʿilm 
al-ʿaqāʾid aw ʿilm al-kalām) “and other sciences that established and lay their foundation on 
firm principles, like uṣūl al-fiqh, uṣūl al-tafsīr and uṣūl al-ḥadīth”.621 
                                                        
613 Van der Bergh 1965. 
614 In medieval Islam, the qalb was not perceived as “the locus of bodily lust” (Powers 2006: 35) but as “the 
central organ of intellect and attention” (Wensinck 1986). See on this point my remarks in n. 405, p. 89 above. 
615 Muslim theologians held the view that all human beings are able to acquire knowledge of God’s existence 
by rational means, and thus were obliged to do so. For the genealogy of this thought among pre-Muʿtazilite, 
Muʿtazilite, Ashʿarite and Shiʿite theologians, see Madelung 1985; Wensinck 2007; van Ess 1991; 1992a; 1992b; 
1997. 
616 For an overview over the debate in Muslim theological and legal thought, see Hourani 1985; Abrahamov 
1998; Reinhart 1995; Emon 2010. 
617 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 165–166. 
618 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 165. 
619 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 165. 
620 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 165. 
621 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 165. 
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According to al-Qaraḍāwī, people (nās) have taken three different stands on the 
relation between reason and revelation,622 and he ascribes each stand to a particular group: 
“rationalists (al-ʿaqliyyūn, sg. al-ʿaqlī), who exaggerate in their esteem of rationality 
(ʿaqlaniyya)”; “traditionalists (al-naqliyyūn, sg. al-naqlī), who exaggerate in valuing 
traditionalism (naqlāniyya)”; “and moderates (al-mutawassiṭūn, sg. al-mutawassiṭ), who 
combine reason and revelation (al-ʿaql wa-l-naql) in a harmonious balance (al-quṣtās al-
mustaqīm)”.623 
The rationalists are described as those who “sanctify reason” (taqdīs al-ʿaql), taking it 
as an “infallible proof” (dalīl lā yakhṭaʾ) and as “the sole source of knowing truth” (maṣdar 
maʿrifat al-ḥaqīqa) both in the realm of “the material and the spiritual” (al-māddiyya wa-l-
rūḥiyya) or “in the world of the visible or in the world of the hidden” (fī ʿālam al-shahāda aw 
fī ʿālam al-ghayb).624 This rationalist position is further subdivided by al-Qaraḍāwī into 
subgroups.625 
The first subgroup of rationalists allegedly maintain that they have – thanks to 
reason – no need of revelation (yastaghnī bi-l-ʿaql ʿan al-waḥy) or prophecy, since it is reason 
alone that guides them through its light to happiness (al-saʿāda).626 This group has been 
rebuffed, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, by Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) in his Risālat al-tawḥīd 
where he highlights the need (ḥāja) of humans for the message, arguing that 
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sensations (ḥawāss, sg. ḥāssa) need guidance from reason (ʿaql) to correct sensations’ error. 
So does the guidance of reason need guidance from something bigger than itself to correct 
reasons error – and this is guidance by revelation (waḥy).627 
The second subgroup of rationalism comprises those who believe in revelation, but either 
consider reason its antagonist (nidd), or give precedence (muqaddam ʿalā) to reason over 
                                                        
622 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 166. 
623 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 166. 
624 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 167. 
625 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 167–182. 
626 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 167. 
627 ʿAbduh 1993: 421–423; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 167. 
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revelation.628 Al-Qaraḍāwī divides this second subgroup into two further sets. The first he 
identifies as “the Islamic peripatetic philosophical school” (al-madrasa al-falsafiyya al-
mashshāʾiyya al-islāmiyya),629 including al-Kindī (d. 252/868), al-Fārābī (d. 339/950?) and Ibn 
Sīnā (d. 427/1037).630 Their teachings and thoughts have been epitomized and refuted, 
according to al-Qaraḍāwī, by al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) in his two works Maqāṣid al-falāsifa 
and Tahāfut al-falāsifa; he in his turn was later refuted by Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) in his 
Tahāfut al-tahāfut.631 Citing the Egyptian philosopher and his former teacher Muḥammad al-
Bahī (d. 1982), al-Qaraḍāwī highlights that these philosophers did not adhere to bare and 
free reason (al-ʿaql al-ḥurr al-mujarrad), but rather blended Aristotelianism with Islam.632 In 
doing this, they uncritically adopted Greek philosophy “without detaching its naturalistic 
and mathematical aspects (which have now entered the sphere of natural science (ʿilm)) 
from those aspects aside from nature: ‘metaphysics’ ”.633 
The second heterodox set which he discerns among the rationalists who believe in 
revelation, a set which historically preceded Islamic philosophy, is the Muʿtazila, who have 
also “been designated as ‘the Qadariyya’ ”.634 Although firmly rooted in Islamic theology and 
acknowledging the divine provenance of the Qurʾan and the sunna, their particular failing 
was, al-Qaraḍāwī argues, to favour reason over revelation.635 Their excessive and uncritical 
reliance on reason at the expense of revelation made some of them deny the existence of 
“jinn despite their obvious presence in the clear part of Qurʾan (bi-ṣarīḥ al-qurʾān) and 
unbroken tradition (mutawātir al-ḥadīth)”; “the question of the grave and what it contains of 
grace and punishment (suʾāl al-qabr wa-mā fīhi min naʿīm wa-ʿadhāb)”; “the straight path and 
the balance (al-ṣirāṭ wa-l-mīzān)”; or “the sight of God in the hereafter (ruʾyat Allāh taʿālā fī al-
                                                        
628 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 168. 
629 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 168. 
630 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 168. 
631 al-Ghazālī 1963a; al-Ghazālī 1963b; Ibn Rushd 1954; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 168. 
632 al-Bahī 1962; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 169. 
633 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 169. 
634 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 177. The research literature on the Muʿtazila is extensive. For an overview, see e.g. 
Anawati/Gardet 1948; Gardet 1971; van Ess 1987; Schmidtke 1998; Hildebrandt 2007. On the Qadariyya, see van 
Ess 1978; Judd 2016. 
635 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 177. 
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ākhira)”.636 At this point, al-Qaraḍāwī links his critique of the Muʿtazila to their underlying 
idea of nature, or rather of “divine custom (ʿāda)”: 
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And the reason for that is that they rendered themselves prisoners to present-day habits (al-
ʿawāʾid al-jāriya), as if the normal and the known (al-muʿtād al-maʿrūf) are rational necessities 
(lāzim luzūman ʿaqliyyan), although the disruption of [these] habits (kharq al-ʿawāʾid) is 
possible, as is evident from the occurrence of miracles performed by the prophets.637 
The following subchapter invokes a second heterodox position that is diametrically 
opposed to the position of the rationalists.638 Al-Qaraḍāwī subsequently identifies this 
second position with the “neo-Ẓāhiriyya” (al-ẓāhiriyya al-jadīda) school of thought, which 
gives inordinate weight to revelation.639 This position’s epistemic and hermeneutical failure 
consists, as he outlines, in their 
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lack of concern for reason and for giving it its due right in understanding (al-fahm), 
deduction (al-istinbāṭ) and criticism (al-naqd), and in adhering to particular traditions (nuqūl 
al-juzʾiyya) without scrutinizing their certainty (thubūt) and without linking them to the 
universal aims [of the shariʿa] (al-maqāṣid al-kulliyya).640 
                                                        
636 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 180. 
637 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 180. 
638 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 182–9. For an introduction and a critical discussion of the “neo-Ẓāhiriyya”, see Halverson 
2010; Duderija 2011; Lav 2012. The debate between al-Qaraḍāwī and Salafi writers who attacked al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
legal leniency had already started in the 1960s following the publication of al-Ḥalāl (Caeiro/al-Saify 2009; 
Shaham 2015: 115, n. 3). Meanwhile, the arena has been expanded to a number of websites that fiercely 
condemn al-Qaraḍāwī’s views and teachings, such as www.thenoblequran.com, www.allahuakbar.net and 
www.salafipublications.com (Caeiro/al-Saify 2009: 142, n. 47). 
639 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 182. 
640 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 182. 
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While lacking the ingenious mind of Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), the major representative of 
the original Ẓāhiriyya,641 the neo-Ẓāhiriyya adopted its precursor’s 
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inflexibility in regard to the text (jumūd ʿalā al-naṣṣ), its “literalism” (ḥarfiyya) in the 
interpretation [of the Qurʾan], its rejection of reasoning by analogy (rafḍ li-l-qiyās) in its 
entirety, and of justifying rules (taʿlīl al-aḥkām) and to consider that they have legal aims (al-
maqāṣid al-sharʿiyya), and realistic wisdoms (ḥikam wāqiʿiyya) that are aspired through 
them.642 
Despite their name – ahl al-ḥadīth – they lack the meticulous scrupulousness and scrutiny in 
establishing the soundness and certainty of Prophetic traditions (aḥādīth, sg. ḥadīth), let 
alone the traditions’ text and content (al-matn wa-l-maḍmūn), al-Qaraḍāwī continues in his 
trenchant critique.643 Neither do they pay due attention to the traditions’ concordance with 
reason.644 Their one-sided preference for the hadith and their neglect of the Qurʾan in legal 
reasoning (fiqh) means that they fall far behind such towering figures of scholarly erudition 
as Mālik (d. 179/795), Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) or al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), who 
combined knowledge of hadith with a thorough understanding of fiqh.645 This epistemic 
failure is paired with their bold immodesty “that the truth resides solely with them and 
falsehood with all others”, their “fierce attacks against those who contradict them” and 
their inability to take criticism: 
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641 On Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), see Adang et al. 2013. On the Zahiri school, see Goldziher 2010; Turki 2002; 
Adang 2006; Gleave 2012. 
642 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 182. 
643 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 183. Al-Qaraḍāwī has extensively written on hadith and the methodology of hadith 
criticism, in three voluminous publications: 1990b; 1992; 1995. For a critical assessment of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
contribution to the contemporary debate among Muslim scholars and his hadith methodology based on an 
analysis of his Sunna (1995), see Brown 1996: 119–120, 121, 125–126, 131. 
644 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 182. 
645 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 183–184. 
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They proclaim: with us is the hadith, a revelation (waḥy) from God, while with the others is 
[merely] human deliberation (raʾy). This contention, however, is not indisputable (ghayr 
musallama). Rather, there are traditions (min al-ḥadīth) that have been revealed, and there 
are those that do not enter into the field of legislation (al-tashrīʿ) at all […]. But even if the 
hadith has been revealed, their understanding of this hadith is not revelation, but rather the 
outcome of human reason.646 
In the end, al-Qaraḍāwī identifies eight inseparable attributes (lawāzim) that characterize 
this group:647 (1) their concern with form over substance (al-shakl qabla al-jawhar), and with 
literal sense over inner meaning (al-ẓāhir qabla al-bāṭin); (2) their focus on partial texts 
without linking them to the universal aims (al-maqāṣid al-kulliyya) of the shariʿa; (3) their 
attention for disagreement prior to agreement (al-mukhtalaf fīhi qabla al-muttafaq alayhi); (4) 
their disregard for ranking actions in jurisprudence (fiqh marātib al-aʿmāl), or the 
jurisprudence of priorities (fiqh al-awlawiyyāt), and thus their undue attention to 
supererogatory actions (nawāfil, sg. nāfila) rather than to obligations (farāʾiḍ, sg. farīḍa), to 
reprehensible affairs (makrūhāt, sg. makrūh) more than to outright prohibited ones 
(muḥarramāt, sg. muḥarram) and to the branches (al-furūʿ, sg. al-farʿ) more than to the roots 
(al-uṣūl, sg. al-aṣl); (5) their greater concern with the sunna than with the Qurʾan; (6) their 
refusal to read the scriptural texts alongside one another and to interpret the Qurʾan 
through the Qurʾan; (7) their stern rigidity that makes them declare everything unlawful, 
even based on weak tradition – like photography, television, singing, women having their 
faces uncovered or men cutting their beards; and (8) their excess in imposing obligations, 
such as requiring men to shorten their garb to the mid-calf or women to wear the niqāb.648 
Al-Qaraḍāwī finally discusses a third position, which he circumscribes with the 
programmatic notion of wasaṭiyya and which he says strikes a just balance (tawāzun) 
between the positions of the rationalists and of the “neo-Ẓāhiriyya”.649 Tellingly, he refers 
to a number of his own works to exemplify this intermediate position between reason and 
revelation.650 This third position, he says, is characterized by a number of well-established 
                                                        
646 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 184–185. 
647 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 186–189. 
648 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 186–189. 
649 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 189–206. On al-Qaraḍāwī’s notion of wasaṭiyya, see Gräf 2009a. 
650 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 190. Al-Qaraḍāwi has outlined his definition of the wasaṭiyya in numerous publictions, 
including al-Qaraḍāwī 1990b; 1994b; 1999d; 2008c. 
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theological and hermeneutical principles of Muslim orthodoxy, like the decisive certainty 
of the Qurʾanic text (qaṭʿiyyat thubūt al-naṣṣ al-qurʾānī), that is, its preservation and 
unadulterated transmission from revelation to the present day;651 the validation of sound 
traditions (al-tathabbut min ṣiḥḥat al-ḥadīth) according to established scientific standards 
(maʿāyīr ʿilmiyya) of Muslim scholarship; further, the method’s diligent application both to 
the hadith’s chain of transmission (isnād) and its content (matn), and its rejection when the 
hadith contradicts an established rational truth, historical evidence or a decisive element 
of the Qurʾan or the sunna; 652 the connection of particular texts to the universal aims [of 
the shariʿa] (waṣl al-nuṣūṣ al-juzʾiyya bi-l-maqāṣid al-kulliyya);653 the claim of absence of any 
contradiction between sound tradition and unadulterated reason (lā taʿāruḍ bayna ʿaql ṣarīḥ 
wa-naql ṣaḥīḥ);654 the absolute belief (al-īmān al-muṭlaq) in the continuity of God’s creation (lā 
tatabaddal wa-lā tataḥawwal) and its underlying system of causality (shabakat al-asbāb wa-l-
musabbibāt);655 the rejection of an exaggerated belief in preternatural phenomena (al-
khawāriq, sg. al-khāriq) and in fancy delusions (al-awhām, sg. wahm);656 the understanding of 
the sunna in the light of the Qurʾan (fahm al-sunna fī ḍawʾ al-qurʾān);657 the linking of texts 
together (rabṭ al-nuṣūṣ baʿḍihā bi-baʿḍ);658 and finally, the infallibility of the whole umma from 
error (ʿiṣmat majmūʿ al-umma min al-ḍalāl).659 
                                                        
651 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 190–191. 
652 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 191–198. This includes, al-Qaraḍāwī highlights, even hadith that are qualified as sound in 
the canonical collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. In this context, he quotes the sixth/twelfth-century 
polymath and Hanbali scholar Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201): “If you perceive a hadith that reason (al-ʿuqūl) 
opposes, that revelation (al-nuqūl) differs from or that the foundational principles (al-uṣūl) contradict, know 
then that it is fabricated” (Ibn al-Jawzī 1966; cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 192–193). 
653 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 198–200. 
654 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 200–201. 
655 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 201–202. 
656 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 201–202. 
657 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 202–204. 
658 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 204. 
659 al-Qaraḍāwī 2013: 204–206. In the subsequent subchapters, al-Qaraḍāwī pursues a number of further 
reflections, including the legitimacy of disagreement (ikhtilāf) on textual interpretations; the elevated place of 
reason and rationality in Islam, where he extensively quotes the French Orientalists Maxime Rodinson and 
Jacques Berque; the intellect as the foundation of revelation; the Qurʾanic conception of reason both as an act 
(fiʿl) and a capacity (quwwa); the need of humans for revelation (ḥājat al-bashar ilā al-waḥy); and the invocation 
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Al-Qaraḍāwī has followed up on many of these points in separate publications that 
cover various fields of Muslim scholarship, including the science of hadith, Qurʾanic 
exegesis (tafsīr), dogmatics and mysticism. Since each of these publications would have to 
be considered in its own right within its dialogical and historical context, we will focus in 
the following chapter on the question of how the ontological and epistemological 
reflections on reason and revelation (ʿaql wa-naql) translate into al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement 
with fiqh in general, and – in the chapter following that – how they affect his normative 
reflections on human’s gendered nature (fiṭra) in particular. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of reason by revelation and its legitimacy in the realm of creed (ʿaqīda), legislation (tashrīʿ), ethics (akhlāq), the 
universe (al-kawn) and life (ḥayāt) (2013: 221–240). 
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4. “Filling the Void” – Reinscribing Fiqh into the Public Sphere 
} ُﺪ#ُﺮ#  ُ ﱠﷲ  ُﻢُﻜِﺑ  َﺮُﺴ%ﻟ' ﻻ#َ  ُﺪ#ُﺮ#  ُﻢُﻜِﺑ  َﺮﺴُﻌﻟ'{  
{God desires ease for you, and does not desire 
hardship for you} 
THE COW, Q 2: 185 
According to al-Qaraḍāwī, the shariʿa contains two types of rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm).660 The 
first kind draws on Qurʾanic texts and traditions (aḥādīth, sg. ḥadīth) that are decisive (qaṭʿī) 
both in their certainty (thubūt) and in their meaning (dalāla). He notes that this first 
category includes only a small portion of the Qurʾan and the sunna, covering the five pillars 
of Islam, the prohibition of fornication (zinā), wine and usury, and – most significant here – 
the rules of marriage and inheritance.661 These rules on gender, dogma (ʿaqīda) and ritual 
(ʿibādāt) represent fixed points for the umma and embody its spiritual and ethical unity. 
Their transgression is tantamount to apostasy (kufr).662 
The second kind of rules draws on texts that are either probable in certainty (ẓannī 
al-thubūt) or probable in meaning (ẓannī al-dalāla), or both at once. These texts represent 
the vast majority of the Qurʾanic verses and traditions.663 It is here that the legitimate 
domain of reason (ʿaql) and the independent engagement of qualified scholars with the 
foundational texts (ijtihād) begins. 
In this domain, al-Qaraḍāwī outlines five elements of shariʿa’s “flexibility” 
(murūna).664 The first element is the universal and general nature of its rules.665 Although 
these rules are lasting in character (thābit), their particular details (juzʾiyyāt, sg. juzʾiyya) 
have been left unspecified by the authoritative texts, as these particularities are subject to 
continual change (mutaghayyir). Exempt from this general idea of change – al-Qaraḍāwī 
stresses repeatedly – are those matters of permanence and continuity, which include most 
                                                        
660 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 45-46; 1997e: 111; 2009c: 71-73. For academic discussions of this point, see Wenzel-Teuber 
2005: 87; Gräf 2010: 160; Johnston 2011: 184. 
661 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 45; 1997e: 105–106; 2006b: 197–198; 2009c: 72. 
662 al-Qaraḍāwī 1997e: 136. 
663 al-Qaraḍāwī 1997e: 106-107; 1986: 84; 2009: 72. 
664 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009. In an earlier text, he had differentiated six “reasons” (asbāb, sg. sabab) for shariʿa’s 
flexibility (al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 84–90). He later reproduced these reasons in al-Qaraḍāwī 1993: 135–204. 
665 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 35–44. 
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prominently the acts of worship (ʿibādāt) and matters of the family (shuʾūn al-usra) such as 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. These two domains of continuity – ritual and the family 
– are “the two most important affairs in life” and have been treated by the shariʿa in perfect 
detail, thus closing the door to all illegitimate innovation (ibtidāʿ), perversion (taḥrīf) and 
controversy.666 For all other domains, the elaboration of rules is left to the independent 
reasoning (ijtihād) of the qualified Muslim scholar according to the conjunctures of his time 
and place.667 
The second element of shariʿa’s flexibility rests on the openness of the authoritative 
texts to different understandings and interpretations.668 This openness, al-Qaraḍāwī argues, 
is grounded in the ambiguous nature of language (alfāẓ al-lugha) itself. The various legal 
schools (madhāhib, sg. madhhab) and orientations that have arisen throughout Muslim 
history bear an eloquent testimony to language’s innate ambiguity.669 
The third element consists in the shariʿa’s consideration of the necessities (al-
ḍarūrāt), needs (ḥājāt) and exceptional circumstances (ẓurūf istithnāʾiyya) that might afflict 
the individual believer or Muslim society at large.670 Accordingly, the shariʿa assesses these 
exceptional circumstances “in their true extent, and enacts exceptional rules (aḥkām 
istithnāʾiyya) corresponding to them”.671 These circumstances include conditions of 
compulsion and coercion (ikrāh), states of weakness and impotence (ḍaʿf wa-ʿajz) and the 
                                                        
666 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 85; 2009c: 35. 
667 A prominent example that al-Qaraḍāwī invokes for the general character of these rules is the notion of 
“consultation” (shūrā), referred to in the eponymous Qurʾanic sura “Consultation” (Q 42) and in the sura “The 
Family of Imran” (Q 3: 159). Despite its normative character, the precise form and implementation of shūrā 
have not been further outlined by the primary texts, because “each time has its procedure, each reality has its 
conditions and each environment its rule (ḥukm)”. The normative obligation to adhere solely to one rigid and 
motionless form of shūrā would represent an adversity and unnecessary hardship for believers and run 
contrary to the Qurʾanic principle of ease (yusr) and facilitation (taysīr). Its application and precise 
implementation has merely to stick to the general principles outlined in the Qurʾan and is subject to 
independent legal reasoning (ijtihād) by the qualified Muslim scholar, in harmony with the particularities of 
his time and environment (al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 36). 
668 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 85; 2009c: 45–60. 
669 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 85. 
670 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 86; 2009c: 61. 
671 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 61. 
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necessity of protecting the umma from harm.672 Muslim normative thinking (fiqh) reflects 
the relevance of these types of circumstances in a number of legal maxims (qawāʾid 
sharʿiyya) that have been deduced from the authoritative texts, such as the idea that 
“hardship brings along facilitation” (al-mashaqqa tajlib al-taysīr) or that “necessities permit 
forbidden things” (al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt).673 
Beyond these three elements, there exists a fourth element of shariʿa’s innate 
flexibility: “the space of forgiveness or of void” (minṭaqat al-ʿafw aw al-farāgh).674 This realm 
includes all matters about which revelation is silent. This silence, al-Qaraḍāwī hastens to 
add, is not due to God having overlooked these matters. Neither does this realm lie beyond 
the reach of shariʿa as such. Rather, this silence is intentional, and represents an intrinsic 
part of Islamic legislation, opening – as a mercy from God – a space that has to be “filled” by 
the independent legal reasoning of the qualified scholar (ijtihād).675 It is in this domain of 
silence where al-Qaraḍāwī revisits the classical methods and instruments (masālik, sg. 
maslak) of Muslim normative reasoning – qiyās, istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ and ʿurf – in an eclectic and, 
as we shall see, at times original manner. 
Al-Qaraḍāwī opens his methodological reflections with “the archetype of all legal 
argument”,676 that is, reasoning by analogy (qiyās), which he discusses, however, rather 
                                                        
672 In connection to this last point, al-Qaraḍāwī invokes the hypothetical situation of a Muslim army that faces 
an enemy who uses other Muslims as human shields. Although these human shields are innocent, the Muslim 
army is allowed to fire on their enemy – even if it kills the human shields. This sacrifice is justified by the 
need to protect the existence of the umma, giving priority to the welfare of the many over that of the few (al-
Qaraḍāwī 2009: 67–68). This example is claimed to have been developed by al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) (al-Ghazālī 
1971: 488). It is discussed in detail by Opwis (2005: 72–73). 
673 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 86; 2009c: 61–69. The latter maxim – “necessities (ḍarūrāt) permit forbidden things” – is 
one of the major principles (mabādīʾ, sg. mabdaʾ) that inform al-Qaraḍāwī’s view of “affairs of the lawful and 
the prohibited”. See al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 39–40. 
674 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 86; 2009c: 9–34. For a broader description of ʿafw in Muslim legal theory, see Hallaq 1999: 
176–177. Wenzel-Teuber has pointed to the parallels and divergences that this concept has to al-Ghazālī’s al-
barāʾa al-aṣliyya (basic exemption from judgment). On the notion of minṭaqaṭ al-farāgh in the works of the Shiʿi 
scholar Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d. 1400/1980 or 1401/1981) and its highly controversial nature in the Shiʿi 
context, see Clarke 2001: 192; Haidar 2006: 120–123. 
675 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 85; 2009c: 16. 
676 Hallaq 2009a: 22. 
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briefly.677 Referring to a number of Qurʾanic verses and Prophetic traditions, the prime 
example of the companions (ṣaḥāba) and the embracement of this method by the founders 
of all four legal schools and by the majority of the umma, he highlights the deep 
entrenchment and legitimacy of qiyās in the tradition of Muslim ethico-legal discourse.678 
The second method of reasoning that al-Qaraḍāwī refers to is istiḥsān – literally, “to 
deem preferable”.679 This preference relates to an interpretation that departs from the 
usual inference by analogy (qiyās) because the latter would contradict the aims (maqāṣid, sg. 
maqṣad) of the shariʿa.680 Or, as al-Qaraḍāwī puts it: 
 !ًﺎﻘﻠﻄﻣ (ﺎ)ﻘﻟ+ ﺪ-ﺘﺠﻤﻟ+ 1ﺪ)ﻓ !ﺎ-ﻟ+ﺪﺘﻋ+4 ﺎ5ﺮُﺴ94 ﺔﻌ9ﺮﺸﻟ+ ﺪﺻﺎﻘﻣ ﺎ5ﺎﺑﺄﺗ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻧ ﻰﻟE ً ﺎﻧﺎ)ﺣG (ﺎ)ﻘﻟ+ H+ﺮI+ JHﺆ9 ﺪﻗ4
 !ﺔﻟﺪﻌﻣ ﻖ(ﻘﺤﺗ ,- !.ﺪﺴﻔﻣ ﻊﻓﺪﻟ !ًﺎ(ﺋﺰﺟ ً8ﺮﻣ- :ﻨﻣ ﻰﻨﺜﺘﺴ(ﻓ ﻰﻠﻜﻟ8 ﻢﻜﺤﻟ8 BﺪC ,- !ﻰﻔﺧ Eﺎ(ﻗ ﻰﻟG ﻰﻠﺠﻟ8 Eﺎ(ﻘﻟ8 BﺪC ,-
!ﺬ#ﻓ  ﻰﻤﺴ$ ﺎﻣ“!ﺎﺴﺤﺘﺳﻻ(”.  
At times, the uniformity of reasoning by analogy (qiyās) leads to results which are rejected 
by the aims of the shariʿa (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa), its ease (yusr) and its moderateness (iʿtidāl). The 
legal scholar who formulates his independent legal decision (mujtahid) thus drops the 
analogy entirely. Or he skips the obvious analogy in order to turn to a hidden analogy. Or he 
                                                        
677 Al-Qaraḍāwī provides the following definition of qiyās: Reasoning by analogy (qiyās) “is the connection of 
one affair (amr) whose rule (ḥukm) has not been specified (nuṣṣa ʿalayhi) to another that has been specified, 
because there is a common underlying cause (ʿilla) between them, in cases where there exist no weighty 
differences between the two affairs” (al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 11–13). For a more extensive discussion of qiyās, see 
al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 40–43. 
678 According to Wenzel-Teuber, in al-Qaraḍāwī’s view almost all rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm) are justified (muʿallal) 
by the Qurʾan and sunna. They are thus rationally comprehensible: their cause (ʿilla) – and out of their ʿilla, 
their underlying wisdom (ḥikma) – is deducible, allowing one to draw analogies to new cases. Wenzel-Teuber 
argues, however, that al-Qaraḍāwī goes clearly beyond classical reasoning by analogy (qiyās) by identifying 
the wisdom (ḥikma) of rules with human welfare (maṣlaḥa). The force of this deeper wisdom (ḥikma) can, in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s view, even override the literal sense of the text. Thus, Wenzel-Teuber concludes, al-Qaraḍāwī 
clearly transgresses the boundaries of analogical reasoning (qiyās) proper. Wenzel-Teuber refers to several 
examples from al-Qaraḍāwī 1982 and al-Qaraḍāwī 1997 (Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 94). 
679 Kamali 2004; Rohe 2011: 64–65. 
680 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 13. On the notion of maqāṣid, see above p. 77–80. According to Rohe, the recourse to 
istiḥsān instead of using qiyās is only one case of the application of maqāṣid among others, although this case is 
very frequent (Rohe 2011: 64). 
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gives up the entire rule and exempts from it a partial command (amr juzʾī), in order to repel a 
cause of harm (mafsada), or to realize equality (maʿdala). And this is called “istiḥsān”.681 
As Wenzel-Teuber has pointed out, istiḥsān has been a particularly debated method in 
Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh).682 Its controversial and even contested character might 
well be seen in the cautious, at times even defensive, way in which al-Qaraḍāwī introduces 
the method. He repeatedly denies its allegedly volatile and arbitrary character, the idea 
that it is merely guided by the scholar’s “passion (hawā) and desire without resting on a 
firm foundation (aṣl)”.683 At the same time, al-Qaraḍāwī appears to be well aware of the 
many different definitions of the method and the plurality of approaches to it.684 
Nevertheless, he contends that all these different approaches share one common element: 
their reference to particular legal evidence (dalīl). Based on this, al-Qaraḍāwī clusters 
istiḥsān in four groups with regard to how it is supported: its support (sanad) from custom 
(ʿurf), from necessity (ḍarūra), from maṣlaḥa685 or from the alleviation of hardship (ḥarj).686 By 
striving to provide a clear-cut definitional framework for istiḥsān, and by subsequently 
grounding the method in the exemplary practice of the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-
ṣāliḥ),687 al-Qaraḍāwī clearly seeks to expand the legitimate boundaries of independent legal 
reasoning (ijtihād) beyond the limits of reasoning by analogy (qiyās). 
                                                        
681 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 13. 
682 Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 94. 
683 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 20. 
684 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 20. 
685 On the translation of maṣlaḥa, see above, p. 32 n. 153.  
686 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 21. 
687 The term salaf, literally “predecessors” or “forefathers”, designates the first three generations of the 
Muslim community, whose pious deeds and acts have become normative models and authoritative references 
to later generations (Chaumont 1995: 900). Al-Qaraḍāwī’s use of the term in his discussion of ijtihād establishes 
a clear reference to the reform programme of the classical salafiyya that was inaugurated (among others) by 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
On al-Qaraḍāwī’s indebtedness to Riḍā in his legal thinking, see Johnston 2014: 53–57. Brown (1996: 120–121) 
discusses Riḍā’s pioneering role in modern hadith criticism and his influence on al-Qaraḍāwī and his teacher, 
Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 1996). 
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This expansionary tendency is most perceptible – and probably most far-reaching in 
consequence – in the third method of reasoning that al-Qaraḍāwī discusses: istiṣlāḥ.688 Al-
Qaraḍāwī describes istiṣlāḥ as a peculiarly productive space for adapting Islamic legislation 
to the particularities of people’s times and circumstances and to take account of their 
maṣlaḥa and needs (ḥājāt, sg. ḥāja).689 The method rests on the premise that the overall aims 
(maqāṣid) of the shariʿa are to pursue the well-being of creation (khalq) and the prevention 
of material and spiritual harm.690 Everything that leads to the realization of this aim is 
maṣlaḥa, and everything that works in the opposite direction is mafsada. Based on this 
general premise, the method allows the legal scholar (mujtahid) to draw on maṣlaḥa in his 
argument even where there is no particular evidence (dalīl) of its explicit consideration in 
the authoritative texts (maṣlaḥa mursala).691 
Al-Qaraḍāwī attributes the method of istiṣlāḥ to the legal practice of the salaf, that is, 
to the ṣaḥāba and the rightly guided caliphs, and – following al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) – goes 
beyond a common attribution of it to the Maliki school, to state that it is used in all legal 
schools, although he admits it is less frequent in the Shafiʿi school.692 
In an electronic fatwa on “The Maṣlaḥa Mursala and the Conditions of Its 
Enactment” published on his website qaradawi.net, al-Qaraḍāwī highlights the importance 
of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and his contributions to the subject; while al-Ghazālī rejected 
istiṣlāḥ as one of the “illusory sources” (uṣūl mawhūma), he did provide the first clear-cut 
                                                        
688 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 23. Among the many academic contributions to the topic, Felicitas Opwis probably 
provides the most exhaustive discussion of maṣlaḥa’s genealogy and development in medieval and modern 
Muslim scholarship. See e.g. Hallaq 1999: 112–113, 168–174, 214–231, 261; Opwis 2005; 2007; 2010. 
689 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 23. 
690 al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 43–47; 1993: 53-54. The classical point of reference for this argument is al-Ghazālī 
(d. 505/1111) (1971). On the genealogy of this argument in medieval Muslim legal thought, see, among others, 
Opwis 2010. 
691 Citing Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) on this point: “The principles and fundamentals of the shariʿa 
concerning the injunctions and the maṣlaḥa of humankind in this life and the next are all based on justice, 
mercy, the good of man and wisdom. Every situation in which justice succumbs to tyranny, mercy to cruelty, 
goodness to corruption [or] wisdom to foolishness has nothing in common with the shariʿa, even if it is the 
result of an allegorical interpretation (taʾwīl)” (al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 43; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1991: 12). My 
translation of this passage is based on Khan (2006: 9). 
692 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 23; al-Qarāfī 1973: 394, 466. For an extensive discussion of al-Qarāfī’s contribution to 
maṣlaḥa, see Opwis 2010: 133–155. On al-Qarāfī, see Jackson 1996. 
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definition of istiṣlāḥ and its underlying notion of maṣlaḥa.693 According to al-Qaraḍāwī, al-
Ghazālī defined the term maṣlaḥa in his famous work al-Mustaṣfā as the preservation of the 
aims of the shariʿa (maqāṣid al-sharʿ).694 These aims encompass the five universalities (al-
kulliyyāt al-khams) of religion (dīn), life (nafs), rationality (ʿaql), progeny (nasl) and property 
(māl), to which al-Qaraḍāwī, following al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285), adds honour (ʿirḍ).695 
“Everything that is to do with the preservation of these five principles”, al-Qaraḍāwī cites 
al-Ghazālī, “is maṣlaḥa, and everything that abandons these principles is mafsada.” 696 The 
preservation of these five universalities, al-Qaraḍāwī further states, corresponds to the 
legal category of the “necessities” (ḍarūrāt or ḍarūriyyāt), representing – above the “needs” 
(ḥājiyyāt) and the “amenities” (taḥsīnāt) – the highest rank within the maṣāliḥ.697 
Al-Qaraḍāwī notes that, based on this definition, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) specified a 
distinct set of conditions for the application of maṣlaḥa in ethico-legal matters where no 
explicit rule in the authoritative texts exists (maṣlaḥa mursala). These conditions are 
threefold. First, the maṣlaḥa has to relate to the five necessities (ḍarūriyyāt, sg. ḍarūriyya) – 
that is, religion, life, intellect, offspring or property – thus excluding the categories of mere 
needs (ḥājiyyāt) and amenities (taḥsīnāt or taḥsīniyāt). Second, it has to be universal (kullī), 
including the whole of the Muslim community. And third, the benefit has to be of clear-cut 
certainty (qaṭʿī).698 
However, al-Qaraḍāwī contends that al-Ghazālī advocates an all-too-narrow concept 
of maṣlaḥa mursala with this definition, imposing on it conditions that not even the 
                                                        
693 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014d. The other three illusory sources that al-Ghazālī mentions are the teachings of earlier 
prophets that have not been abrogated by Muḥammad, the sayings of the companions of the Prophet, and 
istiḥsān (al-Qaraḍāwī 2014d; al-Ghazālī 1971: 434, 478–506). Al-Ghazālī’s contribution to maṣlaḥa represents, as 
Felicitas Opwis puts it, “[t]he breakthrough in defining maṣlaḥa as a legitimate concept of lawfinding” (Opwis 
2010: 65–66). Al-Ghazali’s concept of maṣlaḥa has been studied by numerous authors – see, among others, 
Bagby 1986: 103–129; Nyazee 1995: 197–230; Hallaq 1999: 88–90, 112–113; al-Raysuni 2005: 16–21; Opwis 2010: 
65–87. Opwis highlights the development of al-Ghazālī’s thinking on maṣlaḥa by drawing a comparison 
between his two major legal treatises, Shifāʾ al-ghalīl and al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. 
694 al-Ghazālī 1971: 481–482. 
695 al-Ghazālī 1971: 481–482; al-Qaraḍāwī 1993: 55; 2006b: 28. 
696 al-Ghazālī 1971: 481–482; al-Qaraḍāwī 1993: 55; 2006b: 28. 
697 al-Ghazālī 1971: 481. 
698 al-Ghazālī 1971: 489. 
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exemplary practices of the salaf meet.699 Referring to ʿUmar’s (d. 23/644) decision to divorce 
a woman from her husband, who had disappeared four months earlier, by appealing to the 
woman’s maṣlaḥa and the alleviation of hardship (rafʿ al-ḥaraj) from her, al-Qaraḍāwī claims 
that ʿUmar took maṣlaḥa into account in a case that was both particular (juzʾī) and only 
probable (ẓannī) – because the husband’s death had not yet been certified – and that 
responded merely to the woman’s needs (ḥājiyyāt), not to her existential necessities 
(ḍarūriyyāt).700 
In order to broaden the legal–philosophical grounds for istiṣlāh, al-Qaraḍāwī 
suggests drawing rather on another prominent theoretician of maṣlaḥa – the 
eighth/fourteenth-century Andalusian scholar al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388).701 In al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
view, al-Shāṭibī specified three different conditions for the application of maṣlaḥa where no 
authoritative text exists (mursala).702 First, the maṣlaḥa has to be logical in itself and must 
not affect any rules on devotional matters or acts of worship (ʿibādāt), the latter being 
subject to unquestioned recognition. Second, it has to be consonant with the general aim 
(maqṣad) of the shariʿa in its entirety and must not contradict any of its principles or any of 
its definite proofs (adilla qaṭʿiyya). And third, it has to relate to the protection of the 
necessities (amr ḍarūrī), as defined by al-Ghazālī, or to the alleviation of hardship (rafʿ al-
ḥaraj).703 Based on these three conditions, al-Qaraḍāwī derives a set of distinct arguments 
that allow him to broaden the use of maṣlaḥa mursala decisively: 
 ﺎﻣﺄﻓﺮﻣ.ﺪﺻﺎﻘﻤﻟ' ﻻ ﻞﺋﺎﺳﻮﻟ' ﻦﻣ /01 ﻲ3ﻓ .5ﺑ ﱠﻻ1 ﺐﺟ'ﻮﻟ' ﻢﺘ< ﻻ ﺎﻣ =ﺎﺑ ﻦﻣ ﻮ3ﻓ ,>?@ﺮﺿ ﺮﻣC ﻆﻔﺣ ﻰﻟ1 ﺎ3ﻌﺟ  
As far as [maṣlaḥa mursala’s] recourse to the protection of the necessities is concerned, it 
pertains to the category [of tools] that “the obligation (wājib) can only be accomplished by 
                                                        
699 For a critique of this reading of al-Ghazālī’s concept of istiṣlaḥ, see Krawietz 2002: 256–257. 
700 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 30. Here, al-Qaraḍāwī overtly contradicts al-Ghazālī, who draws on the very same 
example but rejects the application of istiṣlāḥ. See al-Ghazālī 1971: 498; Opwis 2010: 74. 
701 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 31. Al-Shāṭibī expounds his theory of maṣlaḥa in his four-volume work al-Muwāfaqāt fī 
uṣūl al-sharīʿa. His contribution to maṣlaḥa and aims of the shariʿa’s (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) has received ample 
attention in both Western and Muslim scholarship. See, among others, Masud 1977; Hallaq 1999: 162–206; al-
Raysuni 2005; Opwis 2010: 247–333. On al-Shāṭibī’s biography, see Masud 1977: 95–105; al-Raysuni 2005: 74–77. 
702 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 31. He refers to al-Shāṭibī 1992: 627–635; Khallāf 1956: 84–88. For further discussion of 
al-Shāṭibī’s argument, see Masud 1998: 272. On ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf’s (d. 1375/1956) remarks on maṣlaḥa, 
see Hallaq 2009b: 508–511; Opwis 2007: 76–77. 
703 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 31–32. 
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it”. Hence, [the maṣlaḥa mursala] belongs to the tools (wasāʾil, sg. wasīla), not to the aims 
(maqāṣid, sg. maqṣad).704 
This highly condensed argument has several implications. First, by drawing on the legal 
maxim “the obligation (wājib) can only be accomplished by it”, the consideration of maṣlaḥa 
mursala is itself rendered an obligation (wājib) whose refusal or omission would be a legal 
offence. Under this definition, however, maṣlaḥa mursala is depicted as a means – and is thus 
subject to change. 
In his second argument for broadening the legal–philosophical grounds for istiṣlāh, 
al-Qaraḍāwī refers to the apodosis to the third condition under which al-Ghazālī and al-
Shāṭibī consider that one can apply maṣlaḥa – the alleviation of hardship: 
ﺮ"ﺴ"ﺘﻟ&' ﻒ"ﻔﺨﺘﻟ& ﻰﻟ, -.ﺮﻣ 0ﺬﻟ& ,ﻲﺟﺎﺤﻟ& ﻦﻣ ﺎﻣ,' ,07'ﺮﻀﻟﺎﺑ ﻖﺣﻻ ﺎﻣ, ﻮ>ﻓ :@Aﻻ Bَﺮَﺣ ﻊﻓ7 ﻰﻟ, ﺎ>ﻋﻮﺟ7 ﺎﻣF.  
As far as the recourse to the necessary alleviation of hardship (rafʿ ḥaraj lāzim) is concerned, 
it may either be connected to a necessity (ḍarūrī) or pertain to a need (ḥājī), which is 
attributable to alleviation and facilitation (al-takhfīf wa-l-taysīr). 705 
Again, the point is decisive. The recourse to “the alleviation of hardship” allows him, by 
implication, to extend the scope of maṣlaḥa mursala beyond the level of necessities 
(ḍarūriyyāt) to the so-called needs (ḥājiyyāt), which, if neglected, do not lead to the total 
disruption of life’s normal order, but nevertheless inflict difficulty and hardship (ḥaraj). In 
other words, they are “needed” to alleviate hardship (rafʿ al-ḥaraj). This definition enables 
al-Qaraḍāwī by inference to argue that human needs (ḥājāt) represent a legitimate grounds 
for the maṣlaḥa mursala. Al-Qaraḍāwī thus departs from what he views as al-Ghazālī’s all-
too-narrow definition, by extending maṣlaḥa mursala to the layer of the so-called “needs” 
(ḥājāt).706 
In recent years, al-Qaraḍāwī has taken this expansive reading of traditional 
instruments and principles of normative reasoning – thereby following a general trend in 
Muslim scholarship – to a new level.707 This shift has directed his attention beyond the 
                                                        
704 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 32. 
705 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 32. 
706 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009c: 33. 
707 Johnston 2004; 2011; 2014; Duderija 2014a. 
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discussion of “welfare” (maṣlaḥa) to the more fundamental level of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, 
that is “the aims” or “purposes of the shariʿa”.708 
A major point of reference in his reflections is – again – Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.709 In 
the second chapter of his monograph on the topic, Dirāsa fī fiqh maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, “A Study 
on the Jurisprudence of the Aims of Shariʿa”, al-Qaraḍāwī returns to the fifth/eleventh-
century scholar by raising the following question: 
 ﻰﻟ#ﺰﻐﻟ# ﺪﻣﺎﺣ ﻮﺑ, -ﻼﺳﻹ# ﺔﺠﺣ ﺎ3ﺮﻜﺘﺑ# ﻲﺘﻟ# ﺔﻘ9ﺮﻄﻟ# ﺮ;ﻏ ,ﺔﻌ9ﺮﺸﻟ# ﺪﺻﺎﻘﻣ ﻰﻟ@ Aﻮﺻﻮﻠﻟ Cﺮﺧ, ﺔﻘ9ﺮE -#ﺪﺨﺘﺳ# ﻦﻜﻤ9 ﻞ3
؟[...] 
Is it possible to take another way to arrive at the aims (maqāṣid) [of the shariʿa] than the one 
first taken by the Proof of Islam (ḥujjat al-islām) Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī […]?710 
A question that he immediately answers in the affirmative. 
To begin with, al-Qaraḍāwī summarizes two ways in which one can arrive at the 
maqāṣid.711 The first way is the recourse that the scholar has to the explicit explanations 
(taʿlīl) that some Qurʾanic verses literally provide – like the aim (maqṣad) of justice (ʿadl) in 
the verse {Indeed, We sent Our Messengers with the clear signs, and We sent down with 
them the Book and the Balance so that men might uphold justice} (Q 57: 25); or the fair 
distribution of income in {Whatsoever spoils of war God has given to His Messenger from 
the people of the cities belongs to God, and His Messenger, and the near kinsman, orphans, 
the needy and the traveller, so that it be not a thing taken in turns among the rich of you} 
(Q 59: 7). Beyond this, this first way of arriving at the aims also includes recourse to the 
implicit or “non-literal explanation” (al-taʿlīl min ghayr ḥurūf) of some Qurʾanic verses – such 
as the spread of mercy to all creation in {We have not sent thee, save as a mercy unto all 
beings} (Q 107: 21); the protection of life (ḥimāyat al-ḥayāt) in {In retaliation there is life for 
you, men possessed of minds; haply you will be God-fearing} (Q 2: 179); or the justification 
that the Qurʾan provides for acts of devotion (ʿibādāt). 
                                                        
708 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s major work on the topic is Dirāsa fī fiqh maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (2006b). Earlier works tackling the 
topic include al-Qaraḍāwī 1985: 43–47; 1993: 51–79; 1999d: 71–125; 2011d: 227–286. Al-Qaraḍāwī himself might 
add to this list al-Qaraḍāwī 1996c: 191–288, where he writes about the ahdāf al-islām, “the aims of Islam”. 
709 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 23. 
710 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 23. 
711 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 24–25. 
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The second way al-Qaraḍāwī proposes for arriving at the maqāṣid is through a 
systematic exploration of “the particular rules (aḥkām juzʾiyya) of the shariʿa, following 
them up and mediating on them, relating them to one another, to arrive through this 
exploration to the universal end”. This method, he argues, has been pursued by earlier 
scholars like al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388), al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) and 
others after them. 
“But”, al-Qaraḍāwī pushes, “is there no other way to delineate the maqāṣid?” A way 
that does “not confine the maqāṣid to the five universalities, nor their derivations”. This 
other way, he suggests, has been taken by modernists and contemporary scholars, such as 
Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935).712 
In al-Qaraḍāwī’s view, Riḍā proposed a different order of the maqāṣid that does not 
follow their tripartite division into necessities, needs and amenities, but rather arranges 
them “according to the topics that Islam is preoccupied with and the larger objectives that 
the Qurʾan realizes in the life of the umma”. This led him, according to al-Qaraḍāwī, to 
delineate ten aims.713 
However, al-Qaraḍāwī does not elucidate Riḍā’s new finalities any further, but 
rather continues with the maqāṣid that he has himself outlined; first, the seven aims in 
Kayfa nataʿāmal maʿ al-qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm? and later – “in greater perfection” – the five aims in 
his Madkhal li-marʿrifat al-islām:714 the construction of the virtuous human being (bināʾ al-
insān al-ṣāliḥ) and of the virtuous family (usra ṣāliḥa), the construction of a virtuous society 
(mujtamaʿ ṣāliḥ) and of the virtuous umma (umma ṣāliḥa), and the call for the welfare of 
humankind (daʿwa ilā khayr al-insāniyya). These are, al-Qaraḍāwī concludes, five other 
universalities (kulliyyāt khams) whose realization Islam aspires and strives for.715 
Finally, he continues, there are other aims that are clearly not contained within the 
five universalities defined by al-Ghazālī and traditional Muslim scholarship. For him, these 
scholars appear to have been focussed on the welfare (maṣlaḥa) of the individual, and they 
were not immediately concerned with society, the umma, the state or human relations. 
Morality (akhlāq) and social values like freedom (ḥurriyya), equality (musāwāh), fraternity 
                                                        
712 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 25-26. Al-Qaraḍāwī refers here to the fifth chapter of Riḍā 1995: 191–248. 
713 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 25-26; Riḍā 1995: 191–248. For a summary and critical discussion of Riḍā’s ten maqāṣid, 
see Ibrahim 2006: 170–181. 
714 al-Qaraḍāwī 1996c: 191–288; 1999d: 71–125. 
715 al-Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 27. 
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(ikhāʾ), solidarity (takāful) and human rights (ḥuqūq al-insān) are thus largely absent in the 
traditionalists’ conceptions of human necessities (ḍarūriyyāt) and needs (ḥājiyyāt), and al-
Qaraḍāwī contends they remain relegated to the amenities (taḥsīniyyāt) of human life.716 
Although al-Qaraḍāwī does not provide any conclusive definition on how to arrive 
at the aims of the shariʿa in his text, the overall direction of his argument is apparent.717 In 
his expansive engagement with the classical instruments of legal theory, he not only seeks 
to widen the legitimate grounds for a Muslim scholar’s independent legal reasoning 
(ijtihād), but at the same time strives to reinscribe Islam and its normative claims into a 
public sphere that is marked by the ever-changing life-world of modernity, without 
abandoning its fixed principles: ritual and gender. In his view, Islamic jurisprudence can 
preserve its authority due to its inherent capacity and flexibility (saʿa wa-murūna) to adapt 
to this perpetually changing reality within certain boundaries. 
This latter aspiration is particularly manifest in the fifth element of shariʿa’s innate 
flexibility, that represents, as al-Qaraḍāwī puts it, the perfection of the previous four, and 
their application in practice (taṭbīq) – the fatwa.718 This fifth element, he goes on to specify, 
rests on the legitimacy of changing (taghyīr) a scholar’s formal legal opinion (fatwā) 
“according to changes in time, place, condition and custom”.719 In the following chapter, 
this fifth element will be illustrated by way of reference to a matter that has stirred much 
controversy in the last few decades, and which renders some of the repercussions of these 
shifts in Muslim legal philosophy most apparent: female genital mutilation (FGM) – or, as 
al-Qaraḍāwī terms it, females’ circumcision (khitān al-ināth). 
                                                        
716 He does, however, admit that traditionalists might have incorporated morality into the first element of the 
necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), as religion (dīn) includes “fundamental morals like sincerity and honesty (ṣidq wa-
amāna), justice and charity (ʿadl wa-iḥsān), modesty and bashfulness (ʿiffa wa-ḥayāʾ), humility and honour 
(tawāḍuʿ wa-ʿizza), compassion and kindness (raḥma wa-rifq), courage and generosity (shujāʾa wa-sukhāʾ)” (al-
Qaraḍāwī 2006b: 28). 
717 With the openness of his argument on the maqāṣid, al-Qaraḍāwī in fact continues the premodern tradition 
(Duderija 2014b: 3). 
718 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 70–109. 
719 al-Qaraḍāwī 1986: 86; al-Qaraḍāwī 2009: 70-109. Al-Qaraḍāwī has developed this element in a number of 
later texts – see al-Qaraḍāwī 2001a: 50-52; 2008b: 86-87; 2008c; 2009a: 5-36; 2011c: 45-50; 2011e. Al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
work on fatwas has attracted much attention in recent Western scholarship due to the fatwa’s particular 
location between theory and practice. See Caeiro 2006; Gräf 2010. 
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5. Revisiting the Subject of Desire: Female Circumcision & the Right to 
Pleasure – Between Islamic Ethics, Natural Law and Modern Medicine 
Already in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the Dutch Orientalist Arent Jan 
Wensinck noted the stark contrast between the marginal treatment of circumcision (khitān) 
in the books of Muslim scholarship and – referring to the observations of his compatriot 
and former doctoral adviser Snouck Hurgronje – the prominent value attached to it in 
popular discourse: 
To the uneducated mass as well as to the great mass of non-Muslims, both of whom pay the 
greatest attention to formalities, abstention from pork, together with circumcision, have 
even become to a certain extent the criteria of Islam. The exaggerated estimation of the two 
precepts finds no support in the law, for here they are on the same level with numerous 
other precepts, to which the mass attaches less importance.720 
This “reticence” of Muslim literary sources, as Berkey has observed in a more recent 
contribution, is complicated by a certain ambiguity in terminology: 
It is possible to distinguish between male circumcision and female excision by employing 
the term khitān to refer to the former, and, for the latter, khafḍ or khifāḍ, the root verb […] 
which means to lower, depress, or abase and, by extension, to make gentle, easy to deal with, 
compliant. In fact, however, khafḍ and khifāḍ appear relatively rarely in the source literature. 
More often, the verb khatana and its derivatives are used for circumcision in a generic sense, 
much as treatments of the subject in English often use the word “circumcision” 
indiscriminately, which sometimes makes it difficult to know whether sources discussing 
khitān are referring to male circumcision or what is more properly referred to as 
clitoridectomy, or female excision, or both.721 
According to Kecia Ali, the debate over whether or not circumcision (khitān) – and female 
circumcision in particular – is “Islamic” is specifically modern.722 Its emergence and later 
                                                        
720 Hurgronje 1913: 30; Hurgronje/Wensinck 1923: i, 402. The marginality of the topic in treatises of Muslim 
legal scholarship in the past and the present is highlighted by Bouhdiba (2003: 175) and also Badry (1999: 215). 
721 Berkey 1996: 20. It appears that this ambiguity was deliberately exploited by some medieval commentators 
in their discussions of the practice (Berkey 1996: 25). 
722 Ali 2015: 99. 
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development, she argues, have been decisively shaped by the larger context of Western 
colonial scrutiny and criticism, of which Wensinck, and even more so Snouck Hurgronje, 
Adviser on Native Affairs to the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies, formed 
constitutive parts. 723 
Western opposition to female genital mutilation or female genital cutting724 has a 
long genealogy. Religiously motivated campaigns to eradicate the practice took place as 
early as the seventeenth century725 In the 1920s and 1930s, colonial crusades to abolish the 
“barbaric” custom stirred fierce resistance “that idealized both local culture and female 
genital cutting” 726 and made the circumcised female body a symbol of emergent 
nationhood.727 
In the postcolonial period, the “global campaign” 728 against female genital 
mutilation has been re-launched with the first conference on female circumcision 
organized by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1979.729 International governmental 
organizations have rooted their position against the practice in health justifications.730 
Despite these health-based approaches being given credit for legitimizing international 
intervention into national politics without overtly undermining the sovereignty of the 
postcolonial nation–state, health-based campaigns against female genital mutilation have 
                                                        
723 Ali 2015: 99. 
724 As Hernlund and Shell-Duncan remark, the terms “female genital mutilation” (FGM), “female genital 
cutting” (FGC) and “female circumcision” (FC) casually encapsulate a variety of practices which are 
performed in different parts of the world in distinct and complex ritual contexts (2007: 2) According to the 
World Health Organization, female genital mutilation refers to any “injury to the female genital organs for 
non-medical reasons” (WHO 2010: 10): “The word ‘mutilation’ emphasizes the gravity of the act. Some United 
Nations agencies use the term ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’ wherein the additional term ‘cutting’ is 
intended to reflect the importance of using non-judgemental terminology with practising communities. Both 
terms emphasize the fact that the practice is a violation of girls’ and women’s human rights” (WHO 2010: v). 
725 Mackie 1996. 
726 Boyle, Elizabeth Heger et al. 2001: 528. 
727 Boddy 2007: 242. 
728 The American anthropologist Richard Shweder defines this campaign as an international movement “with 
the aim of creating and enforcing universal norms according to which any socially endorsed surgical 
alteration of the genitals of a female child or adolescent is defined as either a) an intolerably harmful cultural 
practice, or b) an obvious and impermissible violation of human rights, or both” (2005: 182). 
729 Hernlund/Shell-Duncan 2007: 13. 
730 Boyle, Elizabeth Heger et. al. 2001: 528. 
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experienced severe critiques from anti-circumcision activists. The latter argue that by 
merely targetting health-related and medical issues, health-related approaches do 
unintendedly promote less severe forms of the practice and, as a consequence, undermine 
other interventions that are designed to eradicate the practice entirely.731 
Since the early 1990s, a reassessment and gradual shift away from medical concerns 
has taken place, reframing discourses against female genital mutilation in the language of 
human rights, the rights of children and of women, the right to be free from torture or the 
right to bodily and sexual integrity.732 
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings on the topic of female genital mutilation – or the 
circumcision of females (khitān al-ināth), as he labels the practice – indirectly reflect these 
shifts and changes in the larger global context. This becomes most apparent when his texts 
are put into a comparative perspective. 
Already in the first volume of his fatwa collection Min hady al-islām, al-Qaraḍāwī 
issued a legal opinion on “the genital cutting of girls” (khitān al-banāt) which opens with a 
remarkably brief question: 
؟"ﺎﻨﺒﻟ' (ﺎﺘﺧ ﻲﻓ -ﻼﺳﻹ' ﻢﻜﺣ ﺎﻣ : 5  
Q[UESTION]: What is the rule of Islam (ḥukm al-islām) on the circumcision of girls (khitān al-
banāt)?733 
In his reply, al-Qaraḍāwī highlights the strong controversy and disagreement (ikhtilāf) that 
surrounds the practice, including the contrary voices and opinions of those scholars and 
doctors (ʿulamāʾ wa-aṭibbāʾ) who support it and those who oppose it.734 Within this 
controversial battlefield (maʿraka jadaliyya), he subsequently frames his own position as one 
                                                        
731 For a thorough discussion of these arguments against medicalization, see Hernlund/Shell-Duncan 2007: 14–
26. 
732 Hernlund/Shell-Duncan 2007: 26 According to Boyle, Songora and Foss, it was mostly under pressure from 
non-governmental organizations and feminists “that international governmental organizations eventually 
came to characterize female genital cutting as a violation of women’s rights” (2001: 528). 
733 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
734 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
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of moderation and intermediateness – advocating in the end a slight form of circumcision 
(khitān khafīf): 
ﺪﻌﻟ$ ﻰﻟ&' (ﻊﻗ$ﻮﻟ$ ﻰﻟ& ﺎ-ﺑﺮﻗ0' (ﺎ-ﺤﺟ30' ﺎ-ﻟﺪﻋ0' 5$ﻮﻗﻷ$ ﻂﺳ'0 ﻞﻌﻟ'ﻒ"ﻔﺨﻟ& 'ﺎﺘﺨﻟ& ﻮ+ ,ﺔ"ﺣﺎﻨﻟ& 0ﺬ+ ﻲﻓ 4  
Maybe the most moderate (awṣat) statement, and the one most equitable (aʿdal), most 
preferable (arjaḥ), closest to reality (al-wāqiʿ) and to justice (ʿadl) in this regard, is the slight 
circumcision (khitān khafīf).735 
His support of this opinion rests upon a tradition (ḥadīth) that has been repeatedly invoked 
by Muslim jurists despite its contested character due to the obscurity and questionable 
character of its genealogy.736 In this hadith, the Prophet advices the midwife Umm ʿAṭiyya 
on the way in which a woman should be circumcised.737 The tradition runs as follows: 
!"ﺰﻟ% ﺪﻨﻋ ﻰﻈﺣ," -.ﺟﻮﻠﻟ ﺮﻀﻧ, .ﻧﺈﻓ ..ﻲﻜ9ﻨﺗ ﻻ" ﻰﻤﺷ,.  
Ashimmī wa-lā tanhakī.. fa-innahū anḍar li-l-wajh wa-aḥẓā ʿind al-zawj.738 
As Kecia Ali has remarked in her critical review of contemporary English-language 
translations of the text, many of these translations “often do much of the work of 
interpretation”.739 A pamphlet by the Minaret of Freedom Institute, a liberal Muslim think 
tank in Bethesda, for example, explains the command lā tanhakī – which might be more 
literally rendered “do not ruin” or “do not uproot” – as the “removal of a miniscule 
segment of skin from the female prepuce”.740 The Canadian–Egyptian scholar Jamal Badawi, 
                                                        
735 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
736 Its sole redactor among the six Sunni canonical collections, Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī (d. 275/888–889), 
qualifies its chain of transmission as weak (ḍaʿīf) (2009: 541, n. 5271). Nevertheless, it has been included in 
later collections and transmitted in various versions (Berkey 1996: 28). 
737 In another version of the hadith recorded by al-Bayhaqī, ʿUmm ʿAṭiyya merely reports the Prophet’s words, 
but is not identified as the circumciser (2003: 562; Berkey 1996: 36). 
738 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. The phrase lā tanhakī is sometimes vocalized lā tunhikī (Berkey 1996: 37). Al-
Qaraḍāwī does not provide a vocalization in his fatwa collection; in his later publication on the topic, he uses 
the former vocalization (2007a: 8, 11). 
739 Ali 2015: 106. 
740 Ahmad 2016; Ali 2015: 106. 
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in the appendix to his frequently quoted book Gender Equity in Islam, makes several 
interpolations that are absent in the Arabic text, effecting a similar semantic shift: 
Cut off only the foreskin (outer fold of skin over the clitoris; the prepuce) but do not cut off 
deeply (i.e. the clitoris itself) for this is brighter for the face (of the girl) and more favourable 
with the husband.741 
Interestingly, al-Qaraḍāwī’s linguistic explanation of the hadith in Arabic points in a similar 
direction. “Ishmām”, he explains, “is decrease (al-taqlīl), and lā tanhakī is to say do not excise 
(lā tastaʾṣilī)”.742 His argument for a restricted and limited form of female circumcision, 
however, is given a subtle refinement. Highlighting the deplorable conditions of “our 
present times” (aṣrunā al-ḥāḍir), he expresses his overall support for the practice in order to 
protect the morality of girls, thus making an implied connection between female 
circumcision and women’s chastity explicit.743 This ambivalence between restricting the 
practice, on the one hand, and supporting it by virtue of its moral necessity, on the other, is 
likewise reflected in his final legal assessment. Qualifying the circumcision of girls as a 
noble deed (makruma), he restrains both from representing it as an obligation whose 
neglect is punishable, and from proscribing it as a prohibited act: 
 !ﻧﻷ !$ﻠﻋ 'ﺎﻨﺟ ﻼﻓ !ﻛﺮﺗ ﻦﻣ2 3ﺮﺿﺎﺤﻟ7 ﺎﻧﺮﺼﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺻﺎﺧ2 37ﺬ> ﺪ@AB ﺎﻧB2 3ﻞﻌﻔ$ﻠﻓ !ﺗﺎﻨﺒﻟ ﻆﻔﺣB ﻚﻟJ KB LBM ﻦﻣ
.!ﺎﺛﻵ% ﺾﻌﺑ ﻲﻓ ءﺎﺟ ﺎﻤﻛ/ 0ءﺎﻤﻠﻌﻟ% 3ﺎﻗ ﺎﻤﻛ 0ءﺎﺴﻨﻠﻟ ﺔﻣﺮﻜﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛ= ﺲ?ﻟ  
The one who deems that [i.e., circumcision] more preserving for his daughters: let him 
perform it. And I endorse (ayyada) this, particularly in our present times. And the one who 
abstains from it: it won’t be held against him (lā junāḥ ʿalayhī), because it is not more than a 
noble deed (makruma) for women, just as the scholars say, and just as is mentioned in some 
reports (āthār, sg. athar).744 
                                                        
741 Badawi 1995: 49. 
742 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
743 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
744 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. In the final paragraph of the fatwa, al-Qaraḍāwī refers to male circumcision (al-
khiṭān li-l-dhukūr). The latter belongs, he argues, to “the cultic practices of Islam (min shaʿāʾir Allāh)” and is “a 
customary characteristic of the Islamic umma (sunna mumayyiza li-ummat al-islām)” that has to be defended 
and preserved, even by means of force and violence if necessary (2009a: 443). 
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Al-Qaraḍāwī’s “moderate” hermeneutics and his ambivalence towards the practice, in the 
end relegating the final decision to parental authority, is admittedly neither unique nor 
entirely new. Medieval Muslim jurists were already drawing on the very same tradition to 
conceive of female circumcision as a limited tradition, while permitting it in general.745 As 
Berkey convincingly argues, their ambivalence was rooted in a more fundamental 
ambiguity towards sexual desire, and women’s sexual passion in particular.746 
On the one hand, the naturalness and legitimacy of women’s sexual desire and the 
right to its satisfaction has been an accepted component in the thinking of Muslim jurists, 
theologians and littérateurs since the medieval period.747 This desire, however, had to be 
channelled into particular, licit categories that confined it to certain specified, 
circumscribed and limited situations.748 Unchecked instincts, in contrast, were thought to 
lead to fitna: seduction, rebellion and chaos.749 
Marriage was perceived as the place par excellence for rightful sexual satisfaction 
and mutual fulfilment through emotional and physical intimacy.750 Within its framework, 
issues such as sexual communication, sexual roles and women’s sexual pleasure could be 
addressed without stigmatization.751 Conjugal sex was positioned as an important and 
positive aspect of and a core principle that organized married life, transcending the mere 
purpose of procreation.752 In the genre of “Prophetic medicine” (al-ṭibb al-nabawī), for 
example, writers expounded in great detail the particular steps a husband had to take to 
satisfy his wife’s sexual desires.753 Berkey further illustrates this positive attitude to 
                                                        
745 Berkey 1996. 
746 Berkey 1996. 
747 Berkey 1996: 33. This led the French legal scholar and Orientalist Georges-Henri Bousquet to ascribe to 
Islam, in contrast to Christianity, “eine bejahende Sexualethik” which said “‘oui’ à la sexualité et à sa 
satisfaction” (1953: 39). 
748 Berkey 1996: 33. 
749 Obermeyer 2000: 241. 
750 Bennett 2005: 107. 
751 Khoei et al. 2008: 244. 
752 Bennett 2005: 107; Khoei et al. 2008: 244. As Bennett observed during her fieldwork in Indonesia, “this 
understanding of a satisfying sexual union as crucial to a successful marriage is popular in liberal Islamic 
interpretations of the Qurʾan and ḥadīth. Muslim women in Mataram openly assert that sexual satisfaction in 
marriage is a right according to their religion, which is a position supported by many Islamic scholars who 
discuss conjugal sexuality” (2005: 47). 
753 Berkey 1996: 33. 
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married women’s desire by reference to Muslim jurists’ discussions of impotence and coitus 
interruptus (ʿazl): 
A woman’s right to sexual satisfaction was not illusory. Some jurists held that a man could 
perform coitus interruptus with his wife only with her consent, and others saw in a man’s 
impotence grounds on which a wife could legitimately seek divorce. To be sure, these 
provisions of the law were directed in large part at a free, married woman’s right to bear 
children, but the jurists also considered favourably her right to sexual satisfaction from her 
husband, and because some assumed that coitus interruptus, let alone impotence, was 
harmful to her in that regard, they insisted on her approval in advance.754 
This argument, as Kutscher remarks, still resonates in contemporary fatwas on such 
popular websites as IslamiCity.org, where “muftis state that ‘Islamic law protects a woman’s 
right to sexual enjoyment, as demonstrated by the fact that a woman has the right to 
divorce on the grounds that her husband does not provide sexual satisfaction’ ”.755 This 
positive attitude, however, has been attenuated by certain critical assumptions. 
As early as the first/sixth century, the Byzantine court physician Aetius of Amida 
described female excision as practised by the Egyptians as an attempt to reduce women’s 
“desire for copulation”.756 As the rationale behind the radical measure, he identified the 
increased growth of Egyptian women’s clitorises and the continual excitement and desire 
for copulation this caused, thus making it necessary to surgically “limit their sex drive by 
limiting the physical pleasure which they can receive from sexual intercourse”.757 
Admittedly, such fantasies about the physical oddity of Middle Eastern women were 
still shared by more enlightened Europeans. The eighteenth-century British traveller James 
Bruce (d. 1794) explained that “the heat of the climate, or some other natural cause, did, in 
that particular nation, invariably, alter the formation [of female genitalia], so as to make a 
difference from what was ordinary in the sex in other countries”.758 The renowned English 
lexicographer of medieval Arabic, Edward Lane (d. 1876), similarly supported the idea that 
the prepuce of the clitoris was removed because, “it seems, in the Arabian and Egyptian 
                                                        
754 Berkey 1996: 33. 
755 Kutscher 2014a: 218. 
756 Biblia Iatrika, vol. 16, chap. 106, cited in Anees 1989: 77; Berkey 1996: 22. 
757 Quoted in Meinardus 1967: 389–390; Berkey 1996: 39. 
758 Bruce 1790: 679; Berkey 1996: 37. 
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races, and others throughout Eastern Africa, and still more so in the Hottentot race, [it] 
grows to an extraordinary size”.759 
Bruce’s and Lane’s fantasies about Middle Eastern women’s genitalia, as Berkey 
pointedly remarks, did “not arise in a vacuum”.760 Until the nineteeth and even the mid-
twentieth centuries, many medical doctors in Europe and North America recommended 
excision as a way to relieve women from their “pathological” conditions, presumed to be 
caused by masturbation.761 “Investigative studies into the history of gynophobic Western 
biomedical practices reveal”, Anees warns his readers, “a horrid picture.” 762 
Despite the similarity between these Western convictions and the ones that shaped 
the cognitive framework of much medieval Islamic literature,763 Muslim jurists and writers 
expressed a fundamental ambiguity with regard to women’s sexual passions. This 
ambiguity inevitably tinted their perspectives on female circumcision. The third/ninth-
century scholar and littérateur al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869), for example, argued in a chapter on the 
“Effect of Circumcision on Lust” (Athr al-khitān fī al-ladhdha) in his famous Kitāb al-ḥayawān 
(Book of Animals), that 
 !ﺎﺘﺧ ﻞﺻ'( )ﻚﻟ, -ﺪﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ !ﺎﻛ ًﺔﺒَﻋﻮﺘﺴﻣ ًﺔﻠَﺻﺄﺘﺴُﻣ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ !ْﺈﻓ )ﺔﻧﻮﺘﺨﻤﻟD Eُﺪﺠﺗ ﻻ ﺎﻣ IﺬﻠﻟD ﻦﻣ ﺪﺠﺗ ءDﺮﻈﺒﻟD(
ﺎ"ﺗﻮ"ﺷ ﻦﻣ ﺺُﻘﻨ, -. ﻢﻠﺳ2 34ﻠﻋ ﷲ ﻰﻠﺻ 9:;. 3ﻧﺄﻛ [...] ?ﻮ"ﺸﻟ: -ﺎﺼُﻘﻧ Cﺎﻤﺘﻟ: -َ29 ُﻦﺴﺤﻟ: 3ﺑ Kْ2َﺎُﺤ, ﻢﻟ ءﺎﺴﻨﻟ: 
 !"# ٌﺪ'َْﻗ *" ﱠﺰﻟ. ﱡﺐﺣ" 2*."3ﻷ. ﱡﺐُﺣ َﺺَﻘﻧ" 2ﻊﱡﺘﻤﺘﻟ. َﺐ<= ْﺖﱠﻠﻗ .=@ ﺎBﺗﻮBﺷ !ِﺈﻓ ؛J.ﺪﺘﻋﻻ. ﻰﻟ@ ﺎ<#ّﺮP ﺎﻣ Rﺪﻘﺑ
.!ﻮﺠﻔﻟ&  
The uncircumcised woman (al-buẓarāʾ) finds sensual pleasure (ladhdha) that the circumcised 
woman (al-makhtūna) does not find. So if [her genitals] have been uprooted and extirpated 
(mustaʾṣala wa-mustawʿaba) her [pleasure is diminished] accordingly. And the principle of 
women’s circumcision is that beauty is not achieved without demanding a decrease of 
passion (shahwa). […] Therefore, he [i.e., the Prophet] – God bless him and grant him 
salvation – wanted their passion to be lowered to the extent that moderation is restored (bi-
qadr al-iʿtidāl); if it decreases, enjoyment (al-tamattuʿ) dies, and the love of the spouses 
lessens, and the love of a spouse is a shackle against profligacy.764 
                                                        
759 Lane 1984: 222. 
760 Berkey 1996: 31. 
761 For a brief overview, see Anees 1989; Lightfoot-Klein/Huber 1993: 214–217. 
762 Anees 1989: 83. 
763 Berkey 1996: 30. 
764 al-Jāḥiẓ 1945: 27–28. 
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Admittedly, al-Jāḥiẓ’s assumptions about women’s sexuality and the underlying tensions 
and ambiguities that shape those opinions on female circumcision remain largely implicit, 
in the brevity of al-Qaraḍāwī’s fatwa. This ambiguity, however, partly provides al-Qaraḍāwī 
with the very room to manoeuvre which he uses in returning to the matter some years 
later: first in Fiqh al-ṭahāra, “The Jurisprudence of Ritual Purity”, and later in a small booklet 
entitled al-Ḥukm al-sharʿī fī khitān al-ināth, “The Legal Rule on the Circumcision of 
Females”).765 In both texts, he takes his argument in a somewhat different direction from 
the earlier line of argumentation. 
Several differences between his fatwa and his later writings are noticeable. The first 
of these differences concerns a prominent change in their discursive settings. Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s earlier fatwa is, as we have seen, framed as a reply (jawāb) to an anonymous 
individual enquirer (mustaftī).766 His booklet al-Ḥukm, on the other hand, is set against a 
background that markedly departs from this dialogical setting. This new context becomes 
apparent in the introductory remarks that open his lecture (muḥāḍara): 
 !ﺎﺤﺗﻻ& ﻊﻣ )&ﺮﺘﺷﻻﺎﺑ ﺔ/ﺮﺼﻤﻟ& (ءﺎﺘﻓﻹ& 6&!) ﺪﻘﻌﺗ :ﻮ<ﻟ&= ﻲﻠﺳﺎﻨﺘﻟ( )ﺎ*ﺠﻟ( ,-ﻮﺸﺗ ﺔﺤﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟ ﺎ6ﻧﺎﻤﻟ8 ﻲﻓ ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟ(
 !ﻮﺘﻛﺪﻟ' (ﺎﺘﺳﻷ' ﺔﻠ.ﻀﻓ ﺔ1ﺎﻋ! ﺖﺤﺗ 67ﺮ9ﺎﻘﻟ' ﻲﻓ (7<ﺮﻤﻟ' ﺪﺴﺟ @ﺎAﺘﻧ' ﺮﻈﺣ ﻮﺤﻧ ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟ' ءﺎﻤﻠﻌﻟ' ﺮﻤﺗﺆﻣ) :7<ﺮﻤﻠﻟ
 !"#ﺪﻌﻟ" ﻢ(ﺮﺤﺗ# ,!ﺎﺴﻧﻹ" ﺔ(ﺎﻤﺣ ﻦﻣ ﺢ7ﺤﺼﻟ" ﻲﻣﻼﺳﻹ" ﻒﻗﻮﻤﻟ" ?ﺎ@AB ﺔ7ُﻐﺑ ,ﺔ(ﺮﺼﻤﻟ" ?ﺎ(ﺪﻟ" ﻲﺘﻔﻣ ﺔﻌﻤﺟ ﻲﻠﻋ
ﻓ "#$ﻠﻋ!ﺗﺎﻣﺮﺣ ﻦﻣ ﻚﻟ* ﺮ+ﻏ -. /!ﺿﺮِﻋ- !ﺘﻣ4ﺮﻛ -. /!ﻠﻘﻋ -. 8ﺪﺴﺟ -. !ﺴﻔﻧ ﻲ  
Today, the Egyptian Dār al-iftāʾ holds a session in cooperation with the World Union in 
Germany to fight the mutilation of woman’s reproductive systems (tashwīh al-jihāz al-tanāsulī 
li-l-marʾa): “the International Conference of Scholars to Proscribe the Abuse of the Female 
Body” in Cairo, under the auspices of His Eminence Professor ʿAlī Jumʿa, Mufti of the 
Egyptian lands, with the aim of revealing the sound Islamic position in regard to protecting 
the human being (ḥimāyat al-insān), to ban aggression upon him, his psyche (nafs) or his body 
(jism), his mind (ʿaql) or his honour (karāma), his dignity (ʿirḍ) and other things pertaining to 
his physical integrity (ḥuramāt, pl. ḥurma).767 
                                                        
765 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008d; 2009a. Since the text remains largely the same in both publications, I will refer in the 
following to al-Ḥukm. The text was later republished and framed as a fatwa in the fourth volume of his fatwa 
collection Min hady al-islām (2012: 517–540). 
766 al-Qaraḍāwī 2009a: 443. 
767 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 4–5. 
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Al-Qaraḍāwī’s introduction ostensibly re-situates his reflections on females’ circumcision 
(khitān al-ināth) on the stage of a global arena in which a number of national and 
transnational actors meet.768 In this new arena, female circumcision is reframed as lying at 
the intersection of modern concepts of reproductive health and human and women’s rights 
and of other concepts anchored in the discursive tradition of Islamic normativity. This 
framing provides al-Qaraḍāwī the very coordinates within which he reconfigures the 
practice in a creative and, as we shall see, at times eclectic manner. 
Much along the lines of his earlier fatwa, he opens his reflections with a reference to 
the disagreement (ikhtilāf) among Muslim scholars and medical experts alike that shape the 
debate on females’ circumcision (khitān al-ināth).769 Departing from his earlier reference to 
the controversy, however, he now sharply criticizes the scholarly disagreement, attributing 
it to a widespread 
ﺎﺨﻣ ﺐﱡ&'ﺗ) *ءﺎﻣﺪﻘﻟ/ ﺐﺘﻛ ﻲﻓ ءﺎﺟ ﺎﻣ ﺲ6ﺪﻘﺗ) *ﺐ7/ﺬﻤﻠﻟ ﺪ&ﻠﻘﺘﻟ/ ﺚ"#ﺎﺣ& 'ﻮﺿﻮﻤﻟ, ﻲﻓ /& :ﻢ1#ﺎﻘﺘﻋ,5 6ﻢ7ﺘﻔﻟ
.ﺎ"ﻟﺎﻔﻏ& 'ﻮﺠ* ﻻ, -ﺎ"ﺑ ﻞﻤﻌﻟ2 ﺐﺠ* ﺔﻨﺴﺣ ,8 ﺔﺤ:ﺤﺻ  
blind submission to the [established] schools (al-taqlīd li-l-madhāhib), the sanctification 
(taqdīs) of what has been said in the books of the elders [and] the fear of contradicting them 
and their doctrine (iʿtiqād): that there are sound or good traditions (aḥādīth ṣaḥīḥa aw ḥasana) 
on the topic according to which one has to act, and which may not be ignored. 770 
                                                        
768 The conference was initiated by the German human rights group TARGET and was praised by the German 
and international press as a major step in denouncing FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION as “un-Islamic” 
(Kutscher 2014: 219). For further information on the conference, see Fischer 2008. Despite his participation, 
al-Qaraḍāwī sharply criticized the conference from the beginning: first, because of the lack of neutrality 
(muḥāyada) of its title, and second, for the fact that it was funded by foreign parties (2007a: 4). 
769 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 3. Al-Qaraḍāwī refers – not without perceptible irony – to the position of the physician 
Dr Ḥāmid al-Ghawābī, allegedly one of the most fervent advocates and defenders of the practice in the 1950s, 
when al-Qaraḍāwī was still a student at al-Azhar (2007a: 3). For a comprehensive overview of the Egyptian 
debate on FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, see Badran 2009: 168–191. For al-Qaraḍāwī’s general stance on 
ikhtilāf, see al-Qaraḍāwī 1990a. 
770 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 4. 
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This epistemic failure of Muslim scholarship, he critically continues, is reinforced through 
its more fundamental “lack of knowledge in the sciences of tradition (ʿulūm al-ḥadīth), its 
reporters (rijāl, sg. rajul) and its deductions (takhrīj)”.771 
In contrast, al-Qaraḍāwī demands an immediate and independent recourse to the 
authoritative sources of normative reasoning in order to arrive “at sound rule (ḥukm ṣaḥīḥ)” 
and “conclusive resolution (qarār ḥāsim) in this affair that concerns half of all Islamic 
society” 772 – a move that he clothes in the scientific vocabulary of impartial evidence, 
objective proof and critical examination:773 
 ﻲﻋﺮﺸﻟ& ﻢﻜﺤﻟ& *ﺎ,ﺒﺑ /(0ﺎﻧﻹ& *ﺎﺘﺧ) 5,ﻓ ﻒَﻠﺘﺨﻤﻟ& ﺮﻣﻷ& &ﺬ? ﻲﻓ ﺔ,ﻀﻘﻟ& ﻢﺴﺣ ﻮ? Fﻮ,ﻟ& ﺎﻨﻣ Hﻮﻠﻄﻤﻟ& *ﺎﻛ &KL
!"#$ﺬﺟ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻣﻷ+ ﻊﺟ+ﺮﻧ ./ :ﺎﻨ2ﻠﻋ ﺐﺟ+ﻮﻟﺎﻓ !9ﺮﺒﺘﻌﻤﻟ+ ﺔ2ﻋﺮﺸﻟ+ ﺔﻟ@ﻷ+ ﻖﻓ$ !B2ﻓ ﺢﺟ+ﺮﻟ+ $/ ﻊDﺎﻘﻟ+  ﻲﻓ ﺮﻈﻨﻨﻟ
 !"#$ ؟ﺎ'ﺗﻮﺒﺛ ﻲﻓ .ﻮﻜﺸﻣ ﺔﻟ45 ﻲ6 75 .8ﻮﺒﺜﻟ! ﺔﺤ;ﺤﺻ ﺔﻟ45 ﻲ65 =ﺮﻌﻨﻟ Aﺔﻔﻠﺘﺨﻤﻟ! =!ﺮGﻷ! ﺎ'ﺗﺪﻤﺘﻋ! ﻲﺘﻟ! ﺔﻟ4ﻷ!
؟ﻻ #$ ﻢﻜﺤﻟ) ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻟﻻﺪﻟ) ﺔﺤ/ﺮﺻ ﻲ3 ﻞ5ﻓ 7ﺎ5ﺗﻮﺒﺛ ﺔ5ﺟ ﻦﻣ ﺔﻟ@ﻷ) Bﺬ3 ﺖﱠﺤﺻ  
If what is demanded from us today is the settlement of the issue in this controversial affair 
(al-amr al-mukhtalaf fīhi) – that is, “female circumcision (khitān al-īnāth)” – by clarifying the 
final or preferable rule on it based on the shariʿa (bayān al-ḥukm al-sharʿī al-qaṭʿī aw al-rājiḥ 
fīhi) according to acknowledged and lawful proofs (al-adilla al-sharʿiyya al-muʿtabara), then 
this is our obligation (wājib): that we critically examine (rājaḥa) the affair from its roots, in 
order to consider the proofs on which the different parties rely, so that we [can] find out: 
Are they proofs of sound certainty (adilla ṣaḥīḥat al-thubūt)? Or are they doubtful (mashkūk) 
in their certainty? And if these proofs are sound in regard to their certainty, are they clear 
in the meaning of the rule (ṣarīḥ al-dalāla ʿalā al-ḥukm) or not?774 
In his initial subchapter, he goes on to discuss the first source (aṣl) of Muslim normative 
reasoning, the Qurʾan.775 Here, he succinctly notes the absence of any direct exposition 
                                                        
771 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 4. Takhrīj signifies the practice of citing the various collections in which a report 
appears. For a historical overview of the emergence and development of this scholarly practice and its related 
literary genre, see Brown 2007: 211. On al-Qaraḍāwī’s involvement in contemporary Muslim debates on the 
sciences of hadith, see Brown 1996: 119–122. 
772 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 5. 
773 For a lucid discussion on the epistemic shift from a language-based conception of knowledge towards a 
conception modelled on the natural sciences in modern Muslim scholarship, and the effect of this on ijtihād, 
see Nakissa 2014. 
774 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 6. 
775 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 6–8. 
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(taʿarruḍ mubāshir) of the matter.776 The argument (istidlāl) of those scholars who declare 
both male and female circumcision as an obligation (wujūb) by referring to the command to 
follow {the creed of Abraham (millat Ibrāhīm)} (Q 16: 123) is just as quickly disqualified.777 He 
critizes their reading as being an artificially forced and false (mutakallaf) one. For him, that 
command’s larger and more profound meaning is not circumcision, but rather the act of 
believing and affirming that God is one and unique – namely, tawḥīd: 
ﻟ" #$ﺎﻜﺣﻷ) *ﺎ+ﺋﺰﺟ ﻦﻣ ءﻲﺷ 4ﻮﺣ ﻦﻜﺗ ﻢﻟ" #ﺪ+ﺣﻮﺘﻟ) 4ﻮﺣ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻢ=ﻌﻣ ?ﺘ ﱠﺟﺎﺤﻣ ﻞﻜﻓ !" #$ﺮﻘﻟ( ﻲﻓ ﺮﻛﺬ- ﻢﻟ (ﺬ/
!ﺎ#ﻋﺮﻔﻟ( )ﺬ+ ﻦﻣ ءﻲﺷ.  
All his dispute with them was about monotheism (tawḥīd), and not about a thing pertaining 
to the particularities of rules (juzʾiyyāt al-aḥkām), and therefore nothing of these specific 
matters (farʿiyyāt, sg. farʿī) in the Qurʾan.778 
The second authoritative source that he refers to are a number of traditions (aḥādīth, sg. 
ḥadīth) which form a major point of reference in the debate.779 In this text, al-Qaraḍāwī 
discusses three traditions.780 
                                                        
776 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 6. In research, there exists a general consensus that “the Qurʾan completely ignores 
female circumcision” (Kister 1994: 12); see also Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh 1994: 582; Atighetchi 2006: 306; Boyle, 
Elizabeth Heger et al. 2001: 527; Kutscher 2014: 222. 
777 Al-Qaraḍāwī does not explicitly mention which scholars hold this position. According to Kutscher, this 
interpretation is championed by Shafiʿites and most Hanbalites, who consider female circumcision to be an 
obligation (wājib) (Kutscher 2014: 226–227). 
778 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 7. Although he concedes that to follow “the creed of Abraham” implies the obligation to 
males’ circumcision (khitān al-dhukūr), he sees “no way to infer from this verse on the affair of females”; an 
argument that he presents in his later chapter on reasoning by analogy (qiyās) more thoroughly (al-Qaraḍāwī 
2007a: 7, 13–15). 
779 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 8–13. This does not imply, however, that there is much reference to the practice in the 
hadith in general. For an overview of the relevant traditions, see e.g. Kutscher 2014. 
780 Besides these three traditions, there exist two further traditions which he does not mention. The first is 
reported by al-Bukhārī in his al-Adab al-mufrad, and attributes to the Caliph ʿUthmān the order to perform 
circumcision on female prisoners who had converted to Islam (1955: 321, n. 1245). This tradition, as Berkey 
remarks, has elicited hardly any comment from Islamic jurists (Berkey 1996: 25). The second tradition runs: 
“Five are the acts quite akin to fiṭra: circumcision, shaving the pubic areas, cutting the nails, plucking the hair 
under the armpits, and clipping (or shaving) the moustache.” This tradition is reported in all six authoritative 
collections and recognized as sunna (Kutscher 2014: 224). 
  
 
 
168 
The first tradition he invokes was allegedly reported by the Prophet’s third wife, 
ʿĀʾisha (d. 57/678), and has been included in the hadith collections of al-Bukhārī 
(d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), al-Tirmidhī (d. 143/760), Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888-9), Ibn 
Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and Mālik (d. 179/795).781 It runs: 
ﻞﺴﻐﻟ% ﺐﺟ( )ﺎﻧﺎﺘﺨﻟ% ﻰﻘﺘﻟ% %01 
When two circumcisions meet, ritual ablution is obligatory (idhā iltiqāʾ al-khitānān wajaba al-
ghusl).782 
As Jens Kutscher has rightly pointed out, however, iltiqāʾ al-khitānān is only part of the title 
of the chapter, where the whole tradition is transmitted.783 The whole tradition reads: 
ﻞﺴﻐﻟ% ﺐﺟ( ﺪﻘﻓ ,,ﺎﺘﺨﻟ% ,ﺎﺘﺨﻟ% ﺲﻣ( ,ﻊﺑ4ﻷ% ﺎ6ﺒﻌﺷ ﻦ;ﺑ ﺲﻠﺟ %=> 
If he sits between her four parts and circumcision touches circumcision, then ritual ablution 
(ghusl) is mandatory.784 
The major frame of reference within which the hadith has been discussed is formed by the 
question of whether partial sexual intercourse785 makes ritual ablution (ghusl) obligatory.786 
However, it appears in addition that the tradition was quoted as early as the thirteenth 
century as historical evidence for the existence of female circumcision in pre-Islamic 
                                                        
781 Giladi 1997: 262. 
782 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 8. Al-Qaraḍāwī refers among others to Muslim ibn Ḥajjāj 2006: 130, n. 385; Ibn Ḥanbal 
1993: 151, n. 26025; Ibn Māja 1952: 200, n. 611; al-Shāfiʿī 1996: 114, n. 104 (al-Qaraḍāwī provides the number 
768 for this tradition); al-Albānī 1988: 130, n. 385. 
783 Kutscher 2014: 223. Al-Qaraḍāwī, on whom Kutscher draws extensively in his essay, provides the same 
information in his booklet al-Ḥukm in footnote 1, page 10. 
784 Other versions of the tradition read: “when the [male’s] circumcised part meets the [female’s] circumcised 
part (idhā massa al-khitān al-khitān)” or “when [male’s] circumcised part passes the [female’s] circumcised part 
(idhā jāwaza al-khitān al-khitān), ritual ablution is obligatory (wajaba al-ghusl)” (Giladi 1997: 262). 
785 That is, intercourse without complete penetration and ejaculation. 
786 For a most comprehensive discussion about the nexus of purity and passion in early Islamic jurisprudence, 
see Maghen 2004. 
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Arabia.787 Although al-Qaraḍāwī admits that the tradition might provide some evidence for 
the existence of the practice “at least among some Arabs”, he points out that it does not as 
such suggest whether the act of circumcision is an obligation (wujūb) or a recommendation 
(istiḥbāb).788 
The second tradition he quotes – and which he has already cited in his earlier fatwa 
– is that reported by Umm ʿAṭiyya in which the Prophet advises a female circumciser 
(khātina) on the way in which women should be circumcised.789 As mentioned earlier, the 
tradition has been transmitted in several varying but semantically similar versions, of 
which al-Qaraḍāwī, without further comment on their difference, quotes two: 
!"ﺰﻟ% ﺪﻨﻋ ﻰﻈﺣ," -.ﺟﻮﻠﻟ ﺮﻀﻧ, .ﻧﺈﻓ ..ﻲﻜ9ﻨﺗ ﻻ" ﻰﻤﺷ,.  
[Cut] slightly and do not overdo it … as that is more radiant to the face and more desirable 
for the husband.790 
ﻞﻌﺒﻟ% ﻰﻟ' ﺐﺣ*+ ,-*ﺮﻤﻠﻟ ﻆﻔﺣ* 3ﻧﺈﻓ ,ﻲﻜ9ﻨﺗ ﻻ.  
Do not overdo it, as that is more preserving for the woman and more pleasant for the 
husband.791 
                                                        
787 Ali 2015: 106; Berkey 1996: 22; Kutscher 2014: 223; Wensinck 1979: 20. This historical reading of the 
tradition has been criticized by a minority reading. The word al-khitānān in the tradition is merely the dual of 
the word for male circumcision – a grammatical construction which we find, for example, in al-wālidān: a 
(masculine) dual form of father (wālid), meaning parents. The less dominant part (the female) is thus 
subsumed under the characterization of the more dominant part (the male). From this, Roald concludes: “If 
khitān was a common synonym for the male sexual organ, which is not improbable, then the use of the word 
al-khitānayn might be a grammatical taghlīb form where the ‘stronger’, i.e., the male sexual organ, is 
linguistically preferred over the ‘weaker’, i.e., the female sexual organ. […] In this sense the Prophet’s 
expression of ‘the two circumcised’ implies only that the male sexual organ is circumcised; it does not 
necessarily imply a circumcision of the female sexual organ” (2001a: 247). 
788 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 10. 
789 In another version recorded by al-Bayhaqī, Umm ʿAṭiyya herself is identified as the khātina (Berkey 1996: 
36). 
790 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 8. 
791 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 11 He refers to the following collections: Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī 2009: 541, n. 5271; al-
Bayhaqī 2003: 562, n. 6/396; al-Albānī 1988: 148, n. 398. 
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At this point, some decisive differences from his earlier reading become apparent. 
First, al-Qaraḍāwī offers a markedly more explicit interpretation of the tradition 
than in his fatwa from 1988. Drawing on al-Nihāya fī gharīb al-ḥadīth by the Arab 
historiographer Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī (d. 630/1160), he offers the following interpretation: 
ءﻲﺷ ﻰﻧ&ﺄﺑ ءﺎﻔﺘﻛﻻ. /0 1ﺔﺤﺋ.ﺮﻟ. 7ﺎﻤﺷ9 ﻦﻣ <ﻮﺧﺄﻣ :((ﻲﱢﻤَِﺷ0)) ﻰﻨﻌﻣD .((ﻲَِﻜ%َﻨﺗ ﻻ)) ﻰﻨﻌﻣ, :  ﻮ"# $ﻚ&ﱠﻨﻟ* ﻦﻣ
: ((ﻲَِﻜ%َﻨﺗ ﻻ)) ﺮ*ﺴﻔﺗ ﻲﻓ (ﺔ/ﺎ%ﻨﻟ2) ﻲﻓ 3ﺎﻗ .ﻊﻄﻘﻟ2 ﻲﻓ 82ﺮﺳﻹ2; <;ﺎﺠﺘﻟ2 ﻦﻋ ﺎAﺎ%ﻨ/ .ءﻲﺷ ﱢﻞﻛ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻐﻟﺎﺒﻤﻟ2  ﻻ "#
.!"ﻓ ﺔﻐﻟﺎﺒﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻚ,ﱠﻨﻟ/0 1ﺔﺤﺋ/ﺮﻟ/ 5ﺎﻤﺷﺈﺑ ﺮ"ﺴ"ﻟ/ ﻊﻄﻘﻟ/ !ﱠﺒﺷ 1/ﺮ"ﺜﻛ ﺮﻈﺒﻟ/ ﻦﻣ Aﺬﺧﺄﺗ  
And the meaning of “ashimmī ” is: deduced from the diffusion of odour (ishmām al-rāʾiḥa), 
which [means] contentment with a minimal thing (al-iktifāʾ bi-adnā shayʾ). And the meaning 
of “lā tanhakī ”: it belongs to al-nahk, and it is an exaggeration in everything (al-mubālagha fī 
kull shayʾ). [The Prophet] forbids her [i.e., the woman circumcising] to exceed and exaggerate 
in cutting (qaṭʿ). He said in al-Nihāya in the interpretation (tafsīr) of “lā tanhakī ”: That is to 
say, do not take from the clitoris (baẓr) much. He compared the slight cutting (al-qaṭʿ al-yasīr) 
to the diffusion of odour (al-ishmām al-rāʾiḥa) [that is, contentment with a minimal thing], 
and the cutting to depletion (nahk) to exaggerating it.792 
Second, he rebuffs the tradition on the ground of its weak chain of transmission, thereby 
contradicting the renowned hadith scholar al-Albānī (d. 1999) who rectified (ṣaḥḥaḥa) it as 
sound (ḥasan) since it had been transmitted in several (admittedly “weak”) ways.793 
Third, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, the tradition represents the matter neither as an 
obligation (wājib) nor as a recommendation (istiḥbāb), but merely as advice (irshād). As 
advice, however, it is entirely related to the regulation of a worldly matter (tadbīr amr 
dunyawī) and thus to the realization of maṣlaḥa. This welfare is literally rendered as “the 
radiance to the face and favourable to the husband” (naḍārat al-wajh li-l-marʾa, wa-l-ḥuẓwat 
ʿind al-zawj)”, which he squarely reads as meaning 
!ﺎﻤﺠﻟ& ﺪﻨﻋ *+ﺮﻤﻠﻟ ﻰﻈﺣ+ 1ﻧ+! .ﺎﻀ#$ ﺎ%ﺟ'( ﻰﻟ+ ﺐﺣ$'  
that it is more favourable (aḥẓā) for the woman [when having] sexual intercourse (al-jimāʿ), 
and more desirable for her husband, too.794 
                                                        
792 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 9; al-Jazarī 2000: 950. 
793 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 11; al-Albānī 1988: 148, n. 398. 
794 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a. 
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Despite arriving at a similar conclusion to his fatwa of 1988, in the end declaring the 
practice as permissible (jāʾiz), we can see that al-Qaraḍāwī adds some decisive elements to 
his earlier interpretation of the tradition. Whereas earlier he drew on the tradition in order 
to argue for a slight circumcision without providing much further explanation, he now 
substantiates his argument by reference to the technical term maṣlaḥa which here he uses 
to refer to men’s and women’s sexual pleasure. However, it has to be remembered that he 
puts the whole tradition between tentative brackets, since its chain of transmission is 
weak. His earlier reference to circumcision as a legitimate means of parental control over a 
daughter’s sexuality is now entirely absent.795 
For the sake of completeness, let us have a look at the third tradition invoked by al-
Qaraḍāwī, since it provides him with a starting point for his further line of argument. It 
reads: 
.ءﺎﺴﻨﻠﻟ ﺔﻣُﺮﻜﻣ ,,ﺎﺟﺮﻠﻟ ّﺔﻨﺳ 0ﺎﺘﺨﻟ3  
Circumcision is a sunna for men, a noble deed (makruma) for women.796 
Like the preceding traditions, al-Qaraḍāwī (dis)qualifies this hadith as weak, both in this 
and in another version.797 “But even if the tradition held its ground (thabata)”, he adds in a 
rhetorical question, “what would it prove (dalla ʿalayhi)?” – just to provide the answer 
himself: “It would prove that circumcision is ‘a noble deed (makruma) for women’ ”, and 
thus neither an obligation (ījāb) nor a recommendation (istiḥbāb).798 This implies, he 
continues, that it is merely approved as a custom for them (mustaḥsan ʿurfan lahunna). As a 
custom, however, it is subject to change (taghayyur) and has no claim to universal validity, 
since “what is considered a noble deed (mukrama) in one age or region is not considered 
likewise in another age or region”.799 This argument on the historical and regional 
contingency of the practice and its corresponding status in Islamic deontology is 
subsequently extended on epistemological grounds, where al-Qaraḍāwī invokes the 
                                                        
795 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 20. 
796 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 9, 12. Here he follows e.g. Ibn Ḥanbal 1999: 319, n. 20719; al-Bayhaqī 2003: 563, n. 8/325; 
al-Albānī 1996: 407–410, n. 1935. 
797 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 12. 
798 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 13. 
799 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 13. 
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authority of modern science with its central tenets of “scientific progress (taqaddum ʿilmī)” 
and “the information revolution (thawrat al-maʿlumāt)”.800 
The third legal source – after the Qurʾan and some traditions – that al-Qaraḍāwī 
consults in his booklet al-Ḥukm is consensus (ijmāʿ).801 Despite the absence of any scholarly 
agreement (ittifāq) on females’ circumcision (khifāḍ al-ināth aw-khitānihā), al-Qaraḍāwī 
maintains that there exists within the controversy (khilāf) an implicit consensus (ijmāʿ 
ḍimnī), which declares the permissibility (jawāz) of the practice – a category, as he notes, 
which “is below a recommendation (istiḥbāb) and below an obligation (wujūb)”.802 The claim 
here of general permissibility, however, depends upon the fulfilment of three 
conditions,803 which are epitomized in part in the tradition in which the Prophet advises 
(naṣaḥa) Umm ʿAṭiyya – or another female circumciser – on how to conduct circumcision. 
The first condition consists in refraining from excessive cutting (tajāwuz al-
ishmām) to the degree of depletion (nahk), 
 !ﺎﻔﺨﻟ&) 'ﻧﻮﻤﺴ, ﺎﻤ-ﻓ ﻞﱠﺜﻤﺘ, ﺎﻣ ﻮ45 .6 ﱢﺮﺒﻣ ﺮ-ﻐﺑ ﺔﻋ5ﺮﺸﻣ ? ﱠﺬﻟ ﻦﻣ ?Bﺮﻤﻟ& Cِﺮﺤﺗ ﻲﺘﻟ& [...] Hﺎﺼﺌﺘﺳﻻ& MB
.(ﻲﻧﻮﻋﺮﻔﻟ(  
that is, excision (istiʾṣāl) […] which without justification deprives the woman of any 
legitimate lust. And this is represented in what is designated “the pharaonic circumcision” 
(al-khifāḍ al-firʿawnī).804 
The second condition concerns the way in which female circumcision is executed. It may 
only be carried out by qualified personnel – that is, by reliable and specialized female 
doctors (ṭabībāt mukhtaṣṣāt thiqāt), not by “uneducated midwives (al-jāhilāt min al-qābilāt) 
and the like”.805 
                                                        
800 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 13. In the following subchapter, al-Qaraḍāwī revisits the third source (aṣl) of Muslim 
normative reasoning, reasoning by analogy (qiyās), and forcefully rejects its application in this case, since it 
violates some of the method’s fundamental principles and core conditions. I will not delve further into his 
critique, since it has no direct implication for what interests us here: his engagement with medicine from 
within the discursive traditions of Islamic normativity. 
801 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 15–17. 
802 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 16. On the notion of an “implicit consensus”, see Rohe 2011: 61. 
803 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 16. 
804 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 16. 
805 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 16–17. 
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The third condition scrutinizes the quality of the instruments and where it occurs: 
the tools have to be “disinfected and safe (muʿaqqama wa-salīma) and appropriate (mulāʾima) 
for carrying out the desired operation”, and the place has to be “appropriate, such as a 
clinic, hospital or health centre”.806 If these three conditions are met, he closes his 
reflections, “female circumcision is neither prohibited (ḥarām) nor may it be decried as a 
barbaric crime (jarīma waḥshiyya)”.807 
Despite declaring the permissibility (jawāz) of the practice under these three 
conditions as being sanctified by implicit scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ ḍimnī), however, al-
Qaraḍāwī does not leave the affair there. Rather, he invokes two further instruments of 
Muslim normative reasoning: the juristic maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya) and the universal 
aims of the shariʿa (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa al-kulliyya).808 
The first legal maxim that he invokes is the legitimacy of prohibiting permissible 
actions for the sake of maṣlaḥa (sharʿiyyat manʿ al-mubāḥāt li-l-maṣlaḥa).809 By implication, it is 
legitimate (jawāz) and in fact even an obligation (wājib) to ban any permissible act partially 
or generally when it is proven to cause evil or harm (mafsada aw ḍarar).810 Applying this 
maxim to female circumcision, al-Qaraḍāwī argues: 
ﻧﺪﺑ ﻲﻓ &ﺎ(ﻟ ﻦﱠ,ﻌﻣ /ﺮﺿ 23 453 6,ﻠﻋ ﺐﱠﺗﺮﺘ< &=3ﺮﻤﻟ? ﻢﺴﺟ ﻦﻣ ءﺰﺠﻟ? ?ﺬG ﻊﻄﻗ Kﺎﻛ ?5M ﻦﻣ ﺎ$ﻣﺮﺤ' () *ﺎ$ﺴﻔﻧ () ﺎ$
 ء"ﻮﺣ %ﺎﻨﺒﻟ ﷲ +ﻠﻌﺟ /ﺬﻟ" 1(ﻲﺴﻨﺠﻟ" ء"ﻮﺗ6ﻻ") ﱢﻖﺣ: ,ﺎ;ﺟ:< ﻊﻣ ﺔ@ﺴﻨﺠﻟ" ﺔﻌﺘﻤﻟ" ﱢﻖﺣ ﻞﺜﻣ 1ﺎ;ﻟ /ﺮﻄﻓ ﱟﻖﺣ
ﺎﻋﺮﺷ %&ﻮﻈﺤﻣ ﻚﻟ- .ﺎﻛ :ﺎ01ﻠﻋ 3ﺎﻨﻟ% ﷲ ﺮﻄﻓ ﻲﺘﻟ% :ﺮﻄﻔﻟ% ﻰﻀﺘﻘﻤﺑ .[...]  
If (idhā) cutting off this part of a woman’s body is followed by pain or a determined harm 
(ḍarrar muʿayyan) to her, to her body or her mind (fī badnihā aw nafsihā), or if it deprives 
her of her natural right (ḥaqq fiṭrī), like the right to sexual pleasure with her husband and 
the right to “sexual satisfaction” (irtiwāʾ jinsī), which God has rendered to the daughters of 
                                                        
806 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 17. On the contrary, “[t]he use of primitive instruments (adawāt badāʾiyya) in a primitive 
way and in unprepared places is not allowed (lā yajūz), as [might] occur in rural areas and the like. [The is] 
because of the harmful consequences (aḍrār, sg. ḍarar), which are prohibited by Islamic law (sharʿ)” (al-
Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 17). 
807 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 17. 
808 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 18. This particular turn in his line of argument is, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter (pp. 154–157), not incidental, but rather reflects a larger trend in Muslim normative thinking of 
which al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings form a constitutive part. 
809 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 18. 
810 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 18–19. 
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Eve in accordance with the nature (fiṭra) that God endowed her with: [then] that is 
prohibited according to the shariʿa.811 
Of course, the crucial question that arises at this point is how – and by whom – it is 
determined “whether (idhā)” circumcision harms women, causes unjustified pain or 
deprives them of their natural right (ḥaqq fiṭrī) to sensual pleasure and sexual satisfaction. 
It is here where al-Qaraḍāwī invokes the authoritative “view of modern medicine and 
science (raʾy al-ṭibb wa-l-ʿilm)”, epitomized by the Egyptian physician and Islamist thinker Dr 
Aḥmad Shawqī al-Fanjarī, whom he quotes extensively:812 
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It is medically known that the woman’s sexual nerves are concentrated in the clitoris 
(Clitoris) just as man’s sexual nerves are concentrated in the upper end of the penis. Cutting, 
as the midwife practices it, means cutting off the clitoris … and sometimes cutting a part of 
the labium. This actually denies the woman of all nerves of sexual sensation. In its effect on 
woman’s femininity and on her sexual desire and her reaction to it (orgasm) […] this is a 
kind of annihilation of her humanness (ādamiyya) and the elimination of her feelings and 
her sensations … and [causes] sexual frigidity, and this is one of the reasons for divorce and 
the breakup of families in Islam.813 
                                                        
811 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 22. 
812 He draws on al-Fanjarī 1986. Al-Fanjarī has been discussed by Western academic scholarship first and 
foremost for his contributions to Islamist political thinking and his early discussion of democracy and Islam 
(al-Fanjarī 1983; Keane 2004; Enayat 2005; Malick 2005). 
813 al-Fanjarī 1986: 128–129, cited in al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 24–25. Another harmful consequence of women’s 
reduced sexual sensitivity that al-Qaraḍāwī invokes, again quoting al-Fanjarī, is social: men’s drug addiction. 
The argument links the absence of libido and circumcised women’s inability to orgasm to the use of drugs by 
their husbands in order to increase their sexual performance so that they can satisfy their mutilated wives. 
This consequence has repeatedly been invoked since the 1950s, when it was first articulated in the Cairo 
magazine al-Taḥrīr and later re-expressed by the Egyptian writer Yusuf al-Masry in his book Le drame sexuel de 
la femme dans l’Orient arabe (1962) in the catchy formula “if you want to fight drugs, ban excision” (Masry 1962: 
45–46; see also Atighetchi 2006: 307). 
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To these violations of women’s natural and human right to sexual pleasure and its related 
social consequences – the breakup of the family – al-Fanjarī further adds “health-related 
and medical complications” caused by circumcision, including post-surgical wound 
infection and scarring, contamination of the uterus and the ovaries, permanent infertility 
and other harmful effects on childbirth.814 
Following his extensive quotations from al-Fanjarī, however, al-Qaraḍāwī attenuates 
the former’s sharp criticism of the practice and its medical consequences by citing those 
who deny that these harms result from circumcision conducted according to the shariʿa 
(khitān sharʿī).815 In the end, al-Qaraḍāwī concludes his lecture with a remark on the 
ambiguity and “capacity” (saʿa) in this matter from an Islamic legal perspective.816 
Let us halt here for a moment and ask: What conclusions may we draw from al-
Qaraḍāwī’s position at this point? 
Unlike in his fatwa of the late 1990s, in this later booklet al-Ḥukm, al-Qaraḍāwī does 
not frame female genital circumcision – or “the circumcision of girls (khitān al-banāt)”, as 
he labelled the practice then – solely within the terminology of Islamic normativity (fiqh). 
Rather, he (re)constructs the allegedly customary and potentially harmful practice at the 
intersection of Islamic ethics, natural law and modern science. By citing the authoritative 
voice of Dr al-Fanjarī, al-Qaraḍāwī interweaves the notion of women’s God-endowed 
natural right (ḥaqq fiṭrī) to the sensation of lust and to sexual pleasure with the anatomical 
language of modern medicine that precisely maps these rights onto the anatomy of the 
female body. While Griffel’s reproaches contemporary Islamists’ thought for being 
inevitably caught in a “vicious circle”,817 it appears that these thinkers seek from within 
their traditional disciplines of Muslim knowledge to (re)discover dialogical pathways to 
other epistemic fields on whom they strategically rely in different social and political 
contexts. This strategic aspect comes to the fore in the final paragraphs of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
lecture, when in the end he invokes the question of the practical enforcement of these 
normative provisions on female circumcision: Shall they be enforced by the individual’s or 
                                                        
814 al-Fanjarī 1986: 128–129; al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 25–26. 
815 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 26. 
816 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 26. 
817 Griffel 2007. 
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the collective’s ethical self-regulation, or by the external and legal power of the state?818 
Tellingly, al-Qaraḍāwī distances himself from the latter perspective. Rather, he advocates:  
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To raise the consciousness (tawʿiyya) of people on this issue, raising [their] religious and 
[their] medical consciousness, with both moving along side by side. Legal and health-
related guidance and education (al-tawjīh wa-l-tathqīf al-sharʿī wa-l-ṣaḥḥī) make legislation and 
law enforcement (al-tashrīʿ wa-l-ilzām bi-l-qānūn) superfluous. So, I do not know: Is there a law 
that prohibits circumcision in those Islamic Arab countries in which women are not 
circumcised? Or is this left to the consciousness (waʿy) of society and its culture?819 
In June 2007, less than one year after al-Qaraḍāwī’s lecture at the conference organized by 
TARGET, the Egyptian minister of health made female circumcision a punishable offence.820 
The decree stirred a major debate and fierce resistance from the party of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament. 
                                                        
818 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 27. 
819 al-Qaraḍāwī 2007a: 27. 
820 Fischer 2008: 40. 
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Conclusion and Epilogue 
In part 1 of the present study, I started from a basic outline of al-Qaraḍāwī’s gender theory. 
In this theory, he inscribes the human being (insān) with an innate and profound truth 
(ḥaqīqa): its consuming desire for the other sex. This sexual desire, I further suggested, is 
represented in al-Qaraḍāwī’s media appearances as an eminent object of an epistemological 
desire. The pious Muslim seeks to know (ṭalab al-ʿilm) and to understand his God created 
nature (fiṭra) in the light of Islam and its normative rules (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm). It is this 
normative knowledge that enables the human being, through the proper use of his or her 
sexuality, to cultivate a pious subjectivity, and – via the family – to (re)build the welfare of 
Muslim society at large. 
In the second chapter of part 1, I located this epistemological desire in the 
disciplinary traditions of Muslim scholarship, most notably fiqh. I argued that knowledge 
(ʿilm) and understanding (fahm) are - in al-Qaraḍāwī’s engagement with this tradition - 
ineluctably material in character. Media are represented as powerful tools for transmitting 
a normative knowledge. In this representation, the partices of reading, of asking, and of 
consuming new media effect a particular, epistemological transformation of the Muslim 
subject towards an understanding (fahm) of his outward actions (al-afʿāl al-ẓāhira) in the 
light of their ethico-legal value. The success of this transformation through media, 
however, crucially depends on the disciplinary regulation of their production and 
consumption. The regulation of reading and writing, speaking, watching and listening 
according to a dinstinct set of normative rules restricts and enables the subject’s 
epistemological transformation through them. 
Besides their efficacy in cultivating a pious Muslim subject, media stand in a specific 
relation of reflexivity to reality (al-wāqiʿ). In other words, it is media that provide the legal 
scholar with privileged access and insight into the lived reality (al-wāqiʿ al-maʿīsh) of his 
subjects. In this conception, media’s logic of “currentness” and actuality appears to be 
intimately tied to the ever-changing character of reality. Engaging with reality and 
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cultivating a realistic sensibility through engaging with media represent indispensable 
conditions of success for the scholar’s ethico-legal project. Media’s reality thus inevitably 
acquires a powerful normative force. This force is most notably reflected in the notion of 
the fiqh of reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ). This fiqh of reality, as al-Qaraḍāwī puts it, utilizes an 
inherent capacity and flexibility (saʿa wa-murūna) to adapt to this perpetually changing 
reality. Fiqh’s flexibility, however, demands at the same time an ongoing reflection and a 
re-engagement with Islamic normativity, both in content and methodology; an 
engagement that is most clearly reflected in al-Qaraḍāwī’s recourse to independent legal 
reasoning (ijtihād) and his expansive rereading of the concept of maṣlaḥa and, more 
recently, of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, the aims of the shariʿa. This re-engagement allows al-
Qaraḍāwī not only to reinscribe fiqh into the life-world of a transnational Muslim public, 
thus departing from other Islamist trajectories – notably that of Sayyid Quṭb – but to 
perpetuate the regulative claim of fiqh, and thus also that of Muslim scholarship. Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s re-engagement with fiqh hence reflects both his endeavour to renew Islamic 
normativity (tajdīd al-fiqh) and to tame the normative force of reality, thereby carefully 
redrawing the boundaries of the discipline. 
This redrawing has most recently been reflected in certain shifts along the axis of 
interiority and exteriority, that is of the ethico-moral and the legal dimensions of fiqh. 
Although both of these dimensions have always been present in al-Qaraḍāwī’s texts, and 
beyond that in the discursive traditions of Islamic normativity at large, it appears that in 
recent years the ethico-moral dimension has come much more strongly to the fore in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s texts. 
In September 2014, I attended a conference with the (much debated) title “Pupils of 
al-Qaraḍāwī ” (Talāmīdh al-Qaraḍāwī), chaired by Yāsir ʿAwda in Doha. As a present, all 
attendees received a bag full of books by al-Qaraḍāwī, among them the latest edition of his 
“first” book, Al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī al-islām (The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam). 
Skimming the book, I realized that this new edition contains an additional chapter on “The 
Lawful and the Prohibited in the Acts of the Hearts” (al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī ʾaʿmāl al-qulūb), 
where al-Qaraḍāwī revisits – most revealingly – Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). In a 
brief moment of retrospection, al-Qaraḍāwī locates the subject of the chapter in the 
genealogy of his text: 
  
 
 
179 
 ُ"ﺮﺼﻗ ﺖﻨﻛ !ﺎﻌﺒﻄﻟ' ﻲﻓ ﻲﺜ+ﺪﺣ ﻋ [...] ﻲﺑﺎﺘﻛ ﻦﻣ ﺔﻘﺑﺎﺴﻟ- ﻦ"ﻌﻟ%& 'ﺎﺴﻠﻟ% +ﺎﻤﻋ. : 'ﺎﺴﻧﻺﻟ 1ﺮ3ﺎﻈﻟ% +ﺎﻤﻋﻷ% ﻰﻠ
 ّﺪﺷ$% ّﻢ'$ (ﻮﻜﺗ ﺎﻣ ً/ﺮ1ﺜﻛ , 4ﺮﺧ$ 6ﺎﻣﺮﺤﻣ 8ﺎﻨ' ($ ﻰﻟ< ً ﺎ=ﺒﻨﻣ, (ﺎﺴﻧﻺﻟ Bﺮ'ﺎﻈﻟ/ ءﺎﻀﻋﻷ/% HI/ﻮﺠﻟ/% K/ﻮﺤﻟ/%
 : !ﻮﻠﺴﻟ&' ( ﱡﻮﺼﺘﻟ& ُءﺎﻤﻠﻋ ﺎ1ﺎّﻤﺳ ﻲﺘﻟ& 5ﺎﻣﺮﺤﻤﻟ& ﻲ1' , 9ﺎﻨﻟ& ﺪﻨﻋ ﺔﻓ'ﺮﻌﻤﻟ& ﺔ?@ﺎﻌﻟ& 5ﺎﻣﺮﺤﻤﻟ& ﻦﻣ ًﺎﻤﺛD ﻢﻈﻋG'
).(!ﻮﻠﻘﻟ& 'ﺎﻤﻋ+  
In the previous editions of my book […], I had confined my account to the outward deeds of 
the human being: the deeds of the tongue, the eye, the sensations and the limbs and the 
outer organs of the human being, pointing out that there were other ordinances (maḥrumāt, 
sg. maḥruma), often of greater importance, stronger and more significant sins than the 
common ordinances known by the people – ordinances that the scholars of Sufism and 
ethics (ʿulamāʾ al-taṣawwuf wa-l-sulūk) called “the deeds of the hearts” (aʿmāl al-qulūb).821 
Indeed, al-Qaraḍāwī had already highlighted the primacy of “the deeds of the heart” in the 
afterword of previous editions through reference to a number of Qurʾanic verses, most 
notably to the very same tradition that serves as the title for his book, The Lawful and the 
Prohibited in Islam: 
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The lawful (al-ḥalāl) is clear, and the prohibited (al-ḥarām) is clear. And between the two, 
there are doubtful matters (mushtabahāt). Whoever avoids them has cleared himself [from 
suspicion] (istabraʾ) in regard to his religion and his honour (li-dīnihī wa-ʿirḍihī), while 
whoever falls in them is on the verge of engaging with the prohibited. Truly, every king has 
a protected sanctuary (ḥimā), and the sanctuary of God on His world is what He has 
prohibited. […] In the body, there is a piece of flesh. If it is sound the whole body is sound, 
while if it is corrupted the whole body is corrupted. And that is the heart.822 
However, the prominence of this interior dimension – “the heart (qalb), or the conscience 
(ḍamīr) as it is called today” 823 – should not suggest a mere reduction of al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
project of an Islamic awakening (ṣaḥwa islāmiyya) to its ethical dimensions, in which the 
legal dimension, exteriorly enforced through the legislative or judicative power of an 
                                                        
821 al-Qaraḍāwī 2014: 389–390. 
822 al-Qaraḍāwī 1994a: 313. 
823 al-Qaraḍāwī 2008c: 50. 
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Islamic state, is either completely absent or utopian. Both the ethical dimension and the 
legal dimension have always been present in al-Qaraḍāwī’s texts. Nevertheless, one has to 
admit that the notion of an Islamic state, besides its occasional – and rather polemical – 
invocations against secularism, has largely disappeared from al-Qaraḍāwī’s writings since 
the 1970s.824 This disappearance might indeed, as Wenzel-Teuber has suggested, be linked 
to the failure of Third World republicanism in the Arab world and beyond.825 Related to this 
observation, one might refer to al-Qaraḍāwī’s biographical experience of exile, barring him 
physically almost entirely from any immediate access to the institutions of the Egyptian 
nation–state. Indeed, this involuntary experience of exile should link him rather to 
another, transnational trajectory that appears to be much closer to the soft power of ethos 
than to the steel shell of modern nomos: the development of Qatar’s foreign policy through 
new media technologies since the mid-1990s. 
                                                        
824 Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 139. 
825 Wenzel-Teuber 2005: 142. 
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